The approach that “there is no friendship in interstate relations, there are interests” constitutes the foundation of the discipline of international relations. So much so that this form of relationship occasionally rises to more extreme levels, developing in a “power-centric” manner in the form of “what is yours belongs to you, what is mine belongs to me, but when I become stronger, I can take what you have at any moment.”
Following the Second World War, the West-centered United States (USA) and the European Union (EU) took part in the same alliance, establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, perceiving the Western alliance as a threat to itself, formed the Warsaw Pact in the face of this threat. The period from the aftermath of the Second World War until the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) was termed the Cold War and bipolarity in the world. During this process, both sides pursued expansionist policies against one another.
With the increase in security concerns in Western Europe following the Second World War, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg established the Brussels Pact in 1948 for collective defense purposes. This formation expanded in 1949 with the participation of the USA, Canada, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, and Denmark to form NATO. The Soviet Union closely monitored this military structuring in the Western Bloc. The alarming development for the Soviet Union was West Germany becoming a member of NATO in 1955. In the face of this situation, the Soviet Union formed the “Warsaw Pact” in the same year with the participation of East Germany, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The Warsaw Pact, which maintained its existence as a military and political counterweight to NATO throughout the Cold War, dissolved in 1991. Following the dissolution, all of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact became members of NATO in the ensuing years. On the other hand, as a reflection of NATO’s policy of eastward expansion, it was officially stated at the NATO Summit held in Bucharest, the capital of Romania, in 2008 that Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO members in the future.
Russia perceived NATO’s policy of expanding towards its own borders as a “direct security threat.” In line with this perception, Russia intervened militarily against Georgia in August 2008 and recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this process, Georgia became the scene of a proxy war where the great power competition between NATO and Russia took place, and it lost territory.
NATO was established in 1949 with the participation of a total of 12 countries specified by name above. Since its establishment, NATO has expanded ten times in the passing 76-year period. In this context, Turkey and Greece became members of the alliance simultaneously in 1952. Subsequently, Germany joined NATO in 1955, and Spain in 1982. Within the framework of the expansion waves that took place after the Cold War, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were admitted to membership in 1999. Later, in 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were included in NATO. In the Balkans-centered expansion process, Albania and Croatia became members of the alliance in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020. Finally, with Finland joining in 2023 and Sweden in 2024, the number of member states of the organization rose to 32.
The mutual expansionist and enlargement policies between Russia and the West have brought along great competition and crises in the EU’s enlargement policy, which has continued from its establishment to the present day. The fundamental reason for this is Russia’s evaluation of the geography of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, especially the Baltic countries, as its own sphere of influence and strategic backyard.
The foundations of the EU were laid by six countries that established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the European Economic Community (EEC) by signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The countries in question are Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg. In the following years, new members joined the Union. These were the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986; and with the participation of Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995, the number of members rose to 15. In 2004, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia from Central and Eastern Europe, along with Malta and Cyprus, became members of the Union. Following this expansion wave, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. Finally, with the participation of Croatia in 2013, the number of members of the Union reached 28, and no new member has been admitted since this date. However, with the United Kingdom’s Brexit decision, the number of members of the Union dropped to 27.
Until 2013, the EU’s enlargement policy proceeded without issues, but after this date, the Union began to face enlargement fatigue. The fact that the EU faced enlargement fatigue negatively affected the memberships of Balkan countries that had not yet become members of the EU. This situation naturally brought along multidimensional uncertainties in the EU’s enlargement policy.
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the EU was continuing potential candidacy processes with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU hastily initiated candidacy processes for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
Ukraine has become an important stage for the proxy war taking place between great powers, especially since the 2000s. As a reflection of the competition between the Western Bloc led by the USA and the EU, and Russia, the “Orange Revolution” took place in Ukraine in 2004. In this process, the Ukrainian administration frequently changed hands between political actors such as the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych and the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. Furthermore, the crises regarding natural gas supply cuts experienced between Russia and Europe in 2006, 2009, and 2014 clearly revealed the economic dimension of the proxy war between the parties. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 carried the proxy war in question to the highest level.
Europe is currently facing multidimensional structural problems. Chief among these problems are the decrease in access to cheap energy resources and the significant increase in energy costs. In addition to this, the aging of the population and the rise in the share of the retired population within the total population create serious pressures on labor markets and social security systems. The EU’s cumbersome bureaucratic structure slows down decision-making processes. The shifting of production facilities in the EU to Asian countries (factory migration) deepens the deindustrialization trend, increasing unemployment and the cost of living. In the political field, the rise of far-right movements draws attention as center parties lose power. In the security dimension, the absence of a common and integrated European defense army against Russia stands out as a significant weakness. In addition, the USA’s search to reshape its relations with Russia at a strategic level and its display of a reluctant attitude regarding directly protecting the EU against Russia increase uncertainties regarding Europe’s security architecture.
Establishing a lasting peace in Ukraine is in a very difficult situation. There is more than one structural and strategic factor behind this difficulty. Primarily, territorial disputes located at the center of the war make reconciliation between the parties difficult. The issue of which actor will have control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant after the war constitutes a significant area of uncertainty with both security and energy dimensions. The USA does not want to be physically present on the ground within the framework of security guarantees pledged to Ukraine. This attitude also overlaps with why Washington did not give Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.
European countries encourage the continuation of the war in order to gain time against Russia. Under these conditions, it is estimated that the proxy war in Ukraine will continue its existence as a “frozen conflict zone” for many years. On the other hand, leaving a significant portion of Ukrainian territory to Russia would mean “rewarded aggression” for Moscow. This reward would weaken regional deterrence and encourage Russia to expand towards Europe in the long term, primarily towards Moldova and the Baltic countries. Furthermore, in the war process approaching four years, the parties have not yet been able to defeat one another. The fact that the parties have not yet defeated each other means that even if the Ukraine proxy war ends in the short term, Ukraine will continue to remain a frozen conflict zone in the long term.
There are many political and strategic reasons behind the harsh rhetoric of EU leaders regarding the war. This rhetoric primarily aims to generate deterrence against Russia and to create awareness regarding the security threat in European societies. At the same time, an attempt is being made to persuade public opinion to increase defense budgets and legitimize defense policies. European countries have realized that the USA will not provide unconditional and continuous support against Russia. This and similar developments have led to the hardening of Europe’s security discourse. The prominence given by EU leaders to war rhetoric for domestic public opinion is parallelly related to attempts to cover up economic and social problems stemming from expensive energy policies and post-2015 migration crises.
For states and societies to maintain their multidimensional togetherness, there is often a need for a perception of a threat, a common enemy, or a unifying narrative. It is observed that while this narrative was the EU project in Europe in the past, it has shifted to the axis of war and security today. Finally, Donald Trump defining European countries as “rotting actors” and European leaders as “weak leaders” has led European leaders to develop a harsher rhetoric in the field of security and defense.
The possibility that a consensus cannot be reached between the USA and Russia in the coming period within the context of Ukraine’s rare earth elements, or to what extent Russia would support the USA in the event that the USA enters a direct hot conflict with China in the future, remains uncertain. Similarly, how Russia would position itself in the face of a probable military intervention by the USA against Venezuela stands out as an important question mark. This environment of strategic uncertainty will deepen the competition between great powers and pave the ground for the further fueling of the proxy war in Ukraine.
