A day when voters go to the polls in Bangui often goes beyond being an ordinary calendar event in the Central African Republic. The general elections held on 28 December 2025 once again remind us of this reality.[i] This time, the debate is unfolding on a broader ground than the possibility of a leader being re-elected. The real meaning of the election is defined by how the state survives, who is included in the system, who is excluded, and how all these choices affect the regional balance. The ballot box has almost become a measuring tool for the bargaining between security and legitimacy. For this reason, elections in Central Africa are not just a procedure limited to ballots; rather than who wins, they show at what cost winning becomes possible.
The scope of the election carries an unusually heavy weight. Approximately 2.3 million registered voters are choosing the president, the parliament, regional bodies, and municipalities on the same day.[ii] In much of the country, the logistics of the voting process have always been a risky issue due to road conditions and limited administrative capacity. For this reason, the election tests not only political competition but also the state’s ability to “function.” The fact that local elections were suspended for a long time strengthens the claim of rebuilding ties between the center and the periphery. The presidential race becomes the showcase. The real decisive field is the provinces: who will build governance networks there, and whether these networks will prioritize security or public service.
One reason why so much meaning is attached to the ballot box is the constitutional rupture that took place in 2023.[iii]The changes extended the term of office from five to seven years and, by removing term limits, opened the way for a third term. Official results pointed to a high “yes” vote. The opposition, however, chose a boycott during that process, and the debate turned into a fault line shaping the country’s political future. Therefore, this election, in a sense, represents an on-the-ground approval test of the step taken in 2023. The result emerging from the ballot box says less about starting a new period and more about whether an existing order can become permanent.
Faustin-Archange Touadéra is the central figure of this system. He began as an academic with a background in mathematics, served in administrative roles at the University of Bangui, held the post of prime minister between 2008 and 2013, and was elected president in 2016 after one of the country’s most severe periods of breakdown. In the atmosphere of destruction left by the civil war wave of the 2010s and the 2013 coup, he gained support with the discourse of the “return of the state.” In his second term, he emphasized the claim of “maintaining order.”[iv] Today, the political logic that keeps him in power brings together alliance-building and a security umbrella. The government creates a central structure based on loyalty and the distribution of resources, and while this center expands its own circle, it narrows the room for maneuver of the opposition.
Security is the strongest card in Touadéra’s campaign language. For years, the country has lived with armed groups practicing looting, roadblocks, and forced taxation. Even the discussion of the possibility of “peaceful voting” in PK5, a symbolic neighborhood of the capital Bangui, shows how deep the collective trauma is. For a country that was associated with rocket fire in 2015 and remembered election day in 2020 for armed pressure and disruptions, the fact that a relatively calmer atmosphere is mentioned in 2025 directly affects voter psychology.[v] The voter weighs not only “rights and representation” but also the possibility of “being able to open the shop tomorrow morning.” This calculation places the security narrative at the center of politics.
On the domestic political front, the picture appears more complex. Some parts of the opposition rely on a boycott strategy, arguing that the process is not fair. Despite this, there are also strong candidates who have entered the race. Figures such as former prime ministers Anicet-Georges Dologuélé and Henri-Marie Dondra claim that the government uses state resources in favor of the election and that the campaign space has been narrowed. These objections deepen the question of “there is an election, but is there real competition?” On the other hand, the government’s administrative capacity, its power to distribute resources through local networks, and its security umbrella clearly strengthen Touadéra’s position. For this reason, the election does not remain a simple contest between names; it measures the continuity of the ruling power network.
The foreign policy dimension is the less visible frame of the picture. The Touadéra administration has built a deepening partnership with Russia and Rwanda in the name of security and regime stability. On the ground, this takes the form of training, advisory roles, protection, and operational support. The United Nations peacekeeping presence has also become one of the main pillars of the election process in terms of logistics and security. Such an equation pushes the perception of sovereignty in two directions. On one side, armed groups are pushed back and the capital gains breathing space. On the other side, the long-term reliance on external partners for the security architecture increases the risk of putting the state’s own capacity “on hold.” This dilemma remains one of the central tensions shaping the fate of the Central African Republic.
The question of why the country matters finds its answer exactly here. The Central African Republic stands at the heart of the continent and directly feels the pressure of neighboring crises. Instability along the Sudan line, cross-border mobility on the Chad frontier, and the fragility of trade through the Cameroon corridor constantly wear down state capacity. Moreover, gold, diamonds, uranium, and other minerals that are becoming prominent in new exploration create a space where security and the economy are deeply intertwined. Control over resources means control over the budget and public spending. The question of who manages these resources, and through which networks, is one of the harshest areas of politics. For this reason, every election in Bangui redraws a power map that stretches from mining sites to border crossings.
If Touadéra wins, what may change, or will there really be change? The first possibility is the continuation of the current security architecture. In the short term, this could produce a more predictable order in the capital and along main trade routes. The second possibility is the creation of a new distribution map based on the results of local and regional elections. Local elections that have not been held for a long time may change how the center reaches into the periphery. However, this change may spread patronage relations into finer layers rather than produce strong, institutionalized local governance capacity. The third possibility is that the space opened by the constitutional amendment further radicalizes the opposition.
If the branches of the opposition that reject the ballot gain strength, politics may shift again toward “post-election street” tension.
In the short term, expectations about the results point to Touadéra having an advantage in the first round. Preliminary results are expected to be announced in the first week of January. In this process, the most critical factor is whether the counting system can create trust. On election day, problems were reported at some polling stations, such as ballot supply, voter lists, and identity verification. A calmer atmosphere on election day does not mean that the period afterward will automatically be calm. In Central Africa, tension often begins after the polls close. Transparent announcement of results, management of objections, protection of the streets from provocation, and restrained behavior by security forces become the key thresholds that shape the fate of the election.
The direction Central Africa will take depends more on the post-election period than on the result itself. An election offers a snapshot of the state at a single moment. The real story of the state unfolds through justice, public services, and representation. In symbolic areas like PK5, peace remaining only at the level of “silence of the guns” keeps social peace fragile. Unless everyday issues such as electricity, water, roads, identity documents, education, and employment are addressed, security gains may turn into political capital, but social consent will remain narrow. For this reason, the possibility of Touadéra’s third term requires more than a promise of stability. When stability fails to keep pace with service delivery, governance relies more on security, and this reliance further hardens politics.
From Turkey’s point of view, the Central African file is seen as one of the quiet test areas of its Africa policy. Ankara’s emphasis on sovereignty, development, and humanitarian diplomacy on the continent directly touches the fragile stability equation in Bangui. In the post-election period, Turkey’s contribution may take concrete form in areas that strengthen state capacity, such as institution-building, humanitarian aid, education, and trade corridors. This approach gains meaning as long as it can develop a partnership language that does not pull Turkey into security rivalries. When the question in Central Africa shifts from “who brings more soldiers” to “who leaves behind more institutions,” foreign policy can stand on a healthier ground.
The elections of 28 December are not an “end.” In Central Africa, the ballot box often marks the beginning of a new phase. Touadéra’s victory appears to be a strong possibility. The real question is what kind of state this victory will produce. If stability remains only a line in security reports, the country may be drawn into a new cycle of crisis. If stability turns into a political contract supported by representation and public services, Bangui may slowly reverse the fragile state narrative at the heart of the continent.
[i] “Présidentielle en Centrafrique: pour Faustin-Archange Touadéra, «le travail continue»”, Jeune Afrique, 28 Aralık 2025, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1752491/politique/presidentielle-en-centrafrique-pour-faustin-archange-touadera-le-travail-continue/, (Date of Access: 28.12.2025).
[ii] Egbejule, Eromo, “Central African Republic goes to polls as president seeks third term”, The Guardian, 28 Aralık 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/28/central-african-republic-goes-to-polls-as-president-seeks-third-term, (Date of Access: 28.12.2025).
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
