The statement made by Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on July 21, 2025, has officially confirmed the growing fragility in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. While Peskov emphasized that bilateral relations rest on a solid foundation, he also underlined that the two countries are “going through a difficult period,” yet conveyed hopeful messages about the continuation of cooperation based on mutual respect.[i] However, behind this diplomatic politeness lie multilayered strategic and political developments fueling the tension. Especially at the end of June, the detention of Azerbaijani citizens in Yekaterinburg under serious accusations, the alleged police violence, Azerbaijan’s retaliatory cancellation of Moscow-led cultural events and detention of Russian journalists, and finally Baku’s decision not to attend the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Economic Council meeting in Moscow on July 18 have brought tensions to a peak.
In light of these developments, possible scenarios regarding the future of Russia-Azerbaijan relations highlight not only the fragility of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the two countries but also new fault lines emerging in the broader power balances of the South Caucasus, regional cooperation mechanisms, and the increasingly multipolar order in Eurasia.
The diverging strategic orientations of the two actors are narrowing common areas of interest and eroding the foundation of mutual trust. Azerbaijan’s tendency to pivot toward the West, Turkey, and Central Asia, contrasted with Russia’s increasing introversion and reflex to protect its sphere of influence, may lead to more frequent confrontations in the near future. New tensions in multidimensional areas such as energy corridors, trade routes, media influence, cultural soft power, and diaspora policies carry the potential to trigger geopolitical tremors beyond the bilateral level. In this context, the current crisis should not be viewed as a temporary diplomatic rift but as an indicator of lasting shifts in influence zones, alignments, and mediation mechanisms in Eurasia’s future.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting reshaping of global balances, Azerbaijan has been prompted to reassess its traditional alliances. The recent crisis could encourage Baku to build a multi-vector foreign policy, not only with the West but also with Turkey, China, and Central Asian countries. Accelerating Trans-Caspian energy projects, becoming a more active part of the Middle Corridor, and prioritizing strategic infrastructure such as the Zangezur Corridor are steps that fit within this framework. The crisis with Moscow could push Baku toward deeper defense and energy cooperation with Turkiye.
If tensions deepen, Moscow may choose to revive its ties with Yerevan to exert pressure on Baku. Russia, seeking to exploit the gaps within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), may offer renewed security guarantees to Armenia in the post-Karabakh period. This could alter the regional status quo established after 2020 and block the advancement of projects like the Zangezur Corridor. In an attempt to maintain its sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, the Kremlin may abandon its “balancing mediator” role and take a more overt side.
Azerbaijan’s detention of Sputnik Azerbaijan employees and cancellation of Russia-linked cultural events clearly indicates the declining effectiveness of Russia’s soft power strategy in the South Caucasus. These moves are not just simple diplomatic responses but can be interpreted as institutional reflections of a growing anti-Russian sentiment within Azerbaijani public opinion, especially among the youth. Traditional soft power tools such as media, language, cultural diplomacy, and diaspora policies have ceased to work in the Kremlin’s favor due to its passive stance during the 2020 Karabakh war and its increasingly aggressive image following the Ukraine war.
Even younger generations in Azerbaijan who speak Russian approach Moscow with skepticism; resistance to Russian influence is growing visibly on social media platforms and within civil society. This rupture is not limited to Azerbaijan but may also spark similar trends in Central Asian countries traditionally seen as cultural spheres of Russian influence. Rising nationalism, digital sovereignty, and multi-vector foreign policy tendencies among youth populations in countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are rendering Russia’s cultural penetration tools ineffective. In the age of social media, building soft power requires not just language and broadcasting, but also digital perception management and trust-building in cultural relations, areas in which the Kremlin’s reliance on outdated methods puts it at a disadvantage.
In the long term, this trend may weaken the perception of Russia as the “natural leader” of Eurasia and reshape ties in the post-Soviet space based not on cultural affinity but on pragmatic interests. If the Kremlin responds to this trend not with constructive and dialogue-oriented soft power reforms but with punitive, repressive, and isolationist reflexes, it may widen the gap not only with Azerbaijan but with other actors across its former sphere of influence. Russia’s increasing entrapment in “hard power reliance” could lead to the systemic erosion of its soft power tools, potentially reducing its geocultural presence to one based solely on military and energy might, thereby creating a path of isolation.
If tensions persist, Turkiye could reassume its role as a regional mediator, as one of the rare actors with strategic relations with both Russia and Azerbaijan. In particular, confidence-building mechanisms that Ankara can offer through energy diplomacy, defense industry cooperation, and coordination of transportation networks may play a key role in re-normalizing relations. During this process, Turkiye may be expected to pursue a multifaceted diplomacy involving topics such as the Montreux Convention, the post-Karabakh reconstruction, and the Caspian-Black Sea balance.
Azerbaijan’s decision not to attend the CIS Economic Council meeting in Moscow may deal a blow not only to bilateral ties but also to regional integration projects in Eurasia. At a time when countries like Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are also adopting a cautious approach toward Moscow-led institutions, Azerbaijan’s stance could trigger an institutional “wave of emancipation.” This process may also accelerate orientation toward alternative economic centers of gravity such as the EU and China.
In conclusion, Azerbaijan may turn the current diplomatic crisis with Russia into an opportunity to establish a more balanced, multipolar foreign policy architecture. The ineffectiveness of the Kremlin’s soft power tools in the region could lead Russia to re-evaluate its traditional influence mechanisms in Eurasia. Turkiye’s balancing role may become more central to the development of lasting diplomatic solutions in the South Caucasus.
[i] “Russia–Azerbaijan tensions deepen as diplomatic exchanges falter”, TASS, https://tass.com/politics/1992087 (Date of Access: 24.07.2025).
