The Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, is one of the most critical chokepoints in global energy trade. For this reason, every tension in the region directly affects not only regional countries but also major economies dependent on energy imports. India, which is directly influenced by regional developments due to its geographical position, relies heavily on imports to meet most of its energy needs and is therefore significantly dependent on Gulf countries for oil supply. Indeed, any military or political crisis in the Strait of Hormuz could lead to sudden increases in oil prices and supply disruptions. This, in turn, may result in economic problems for India, such as inflationary pressure and an increase in the current account deficit.
Today, energy security and international trade relations are considered among the key factors shaping states’ foreign policies. Naturally, states pursue diversification strategies in their foreign policies to secure energy supply. Increasing energy cooperation in the field of liquefied natural gas (LNG) with the United States (US), Russia, and Algeria can be evaluated within this framework.
Tensions in the Hormuz region stem from the rivalry between the US and Iran. From India’s perspective, while its strategic partnership with the US (particularly in the Indo-Pacific context) is deepening, it also maintains economic and geopolitical relations with Iran. The Chabahar Port project is of critical importance for India’s access to Central Asia. This project could provide an opportunity to diversify trade routes by bypassing Pakistan. However, US sanctions have forced India to limit its relations with Iran. Moreover, the reduction of oil imports from Russia due to the possibility of US sanctions has revealed the limits of cooperation between New Delhi and countries such as Moscow and Tehran. On the other hand, India’s Free Trade Agreement with the European Union can be seen as part of its efforts to diversify its foreign policy.
One of the most important benefits of a balancing policy or multilateral diplomacy is the factor of strategic autonomy. The Hormuz Crisis represents one of the arenas in which this approach is being tested. India’s inability to establish strong bridges with its two key neighbors, China and Pakistan, leads to a significant degree of isolation in foreign policy and results in geopolitical gaps or regression.
The crisis in the Middle East, which has global repercussions, reflects New Delhi’s attempt—albeit belatedly—to make certain adjustments in its foreign policy. India increasingly requires dialogue with China within organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, of which it is a member. This situation has become more evident following the high tariffs imposed by the US on India and has emerged as a necessity.
Within the framework of recent geopolitical developments, talks lasting two days were led by India’s SCO National Coordinator Alok Amitabh Dimri and, on behalf of China, Yan Wenbin. This development is interpreted as the latest official step in a broader diplomatic thaw that began in 2024, when troops from both countries withdrew from sensitive areas such as Depsang and Demchok along their approximately 3,500-kilometer disputed Himalayan border.[i] According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the parties exchanged views on the implementation of decisions taken by SCO leaders and the future direction of the organization. They also agreed to continue consultations by reviewing cooperation in areas such as security, trade, connectivity, and people-to-people relations.[ii]
Keeping diplomatic channels open, even to a limited extent, is not an exception in times of war. However, given India’s past experiences of occasional direct conflicts and its close exposure to hybrid warfare, its more distant approach toward Pakistan and China is almost understandable. Another point worth mentioning is that Pakistan and China have also experienced similar dynamics. The India–Pakistan conflict in 2025 constituted a setback in bilateral relations. From China’s perspective, India represents a significant market. India’s absence as an active participant in China’s Belt and Road Initiative has also contributed to maintaining a certain distance in bilateral relations.
In comparison with Pakistan, the situation differs. Islamabad, following a multidimensional foreign policy approach, has undertaken significant initiatives and continues to develop its relations with Central Asian states through platforms such as the SCO, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and others. Mutual investments and increasing trade contribute to the emergence of new transportation routes. For instance, Pakistan has carried out its first transit shipment to Uzbekistan via the Iran corridor. This initial shipment consisted of frozen meat products transported by refrigerated trucks. The route begins in Pakistan, passes through Gwadar into Iranian territory, and reaches Central Asia. Authorities have stated that this corridor aims to facilitate overland trade and create an alternative to maritime transportation. In 2025, bilateral trade between the two countries reached approximately $500 million, and around 230 Pakistan-funded companies operate in Uzbekistan. Cooperation covers various sectors, including textiles, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and chemicals.[iii] The parties have agreed to increase trade volume to $2 billion in the short term. These steps include expanding the list of goods under the Preferential Trade Agreement, facilitating phytosanitary requirements, and strengthening trade infrastructure, including Uzbekistan’s trade offices in Lahore and Karachi.[iv]
The Gwadar Port is an important component of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Therefore, due to its rising regional trade dynamics and strategic position, the Gwadar Project emerges as a serious competitor to the Chabahar Port. However, another factor to consider is that Gwadar is located in Pakistan’s volatile Balochistan province. For this reason, maintaining relations with neighboring Iran on the basis of mutual benefit is considered an indispensable option.
Previously, Pakistan announced that it would allow exporters to send goods to Iran, Azerbaijan, and Central Asian countries for a limited period without requiring bank guarantees or letters of credit. This three-month measure, valid between 24 March and 21 June, aims to reduce costs and delays in overland exports. The regulation was introduced particularly due to limited formal banking relations with Iran. However, the requirement to repatriate export revenues within a specified period remains in effect.[v]
Pakistan’s mediation role in facilitating a ceasefire between Iran and the US is also noteworthy and can be evaluated as a calculated strategy aimed at ensuring its own long-term national stability. The prospect of a second round of negotiations presents a new opportunity not only for the parties but also for Pakistan.
The crisis surrounding Iran, along with ongoing sanctions, and instability in Afghanistan create obstacles to the implementation of planned energy projects in South Asia and Central Asia. The Iran–Pakistan–India Natural Gas Pipeline and the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Natural Gas Pipeline are among the most evident examples of this challenge.
From a geopolitical perspective, it is inevitable that India will take steps toward becoming a more visible and balanced actor in the Middle East. Its efforts to establish multidimensional relations with its neighboring countries, China and Pakistan, as well as with Gulf states and Iran, can be considered part of this strategy. Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are not merely a foreign policy issue for India; they are directly linked to economic stability, energy security, and its search for a global role. Every escalation in Hormuz directly affects India’s economic planning. Rising oil prices may reduce growth targets, while insurance costs and risks in maritime transportation also increase. India’s multidimensional and balanced diplomacy in this process will continue to be one of the key factors shaping its future global position.
[i] Junaid Kathju, “India and China wall off border rows to focus on trade and security”, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3350732/india-and-china-wall-border-rows-focus-trade-and-security?module=top_story&pgtype=section, (Access Date: 21.04.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Sadokat Jalolova, “Pakistan Sends First Transit Shipment to Uzbekistan via Iran Corridor”, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/pakistan-sends-first-transit-shipment-to-uzbekistan-via-iran-corridor/, (Access Date: 21.04.2026).
[iv] Ibid.
[v] “Pakistan grants temporary exemption for exports to Iran”, The News Pakistan, https://www.thenews.pk/print/1406890-pakistan-grants-temporary-exemption-for-exports-to-iran, (Access Date: 21.04.2026).
