China, playing a critical role in the strategic balances in the Asia-Pacific region, finds itself confronted with a complex security dilemma in light of North Korea’s advancement in nuclear weapon activities. The ongoing nuclear weapon trade agreement between North Korea and Russia, coupled with the utilization of these weapons by Russia in the Ukraine conflict, alongside North Korea’s recent escalation in nuclear activities and provocations, directly impact China’s regional security interests in the Asia-Pacific. In a period marked by escalating regional polarizations and endeavors aimed at constraining China in the Asia-Pacific, the approach adopted by China in managing its relations with North Korea and Russia stands out among the foremost topics of curiosity.
China’s proximity to North Korea, which poses a “threat of nuclear weapon use,” presents significant challenges in its competition with the United States of America (USA). Prioritizing regional stability, China experiences security concerns due to its neighbor North Korea’s deliberate pursuit of instability. This situation has led experts in China to characterize North Korea as both a “strategic asset” and a “strategic liability.”[1]
Intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea emerge as one of the key factors disrupting security stability in the Asia-Pacific region.[2] Given the need to counter North Korea’s nuclear activities, the United States has significantly increased its military presence around the Korean Peninsula through consultations with South Korea, which is a neighbor of China. As a result, China is concerned about the possibility of the United States and its allies using North Korea’s nuclear weapon activities and provocations in the region as a pretext to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-like formation in East Asia.
These developments prompt China’s concerns about the potential establishment of a formal trilateral alliance relationship between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. This concern also underscores the significance of the annual trilateral summit meetings held among China, Japan, and South Korea. The upcoming trilateral summit on May 26-27, 2024, occurring at a time when China is accelerating its diplomatic contacts with North Korea, represents a positive development. This constitutes a significant signal of China’s intention to promote stability and cooperation in the region with Japan and South Korea.
The meetings between China and North Korea are significant for China to comprehend Pyongyang’s intentions in the region. Indeed, Beijing administration endeavors to assume a constructive role in the equation involving North Korea, South Korea, and Japan, considering mutual interests. At the same time, China also strives to prevent North Korea’s activities from leading to a destructive conflict in the region or further U.S. military buildup in the area.
For Russia, which continues its cooperation with North Korea in the nuclear field, the situation is markedly different. While China’s primary security interests are concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region, Russia’s interests lie in the Euro-Atlantic area.[3] In other words, Russia’s priority lies more in incidents occurring in Europe. North Korea’s nuclear weapon activities, by diverting the attention of the United States and its East Asian allies to the Asia-Pacific, enable Russia to manage its security realm in the Euro-Atlantic more comfortably, while deepening China’s security dilemma in the Asia-Pacific.
Considering Putin’s defense strategy of Russia against NATO on the Western front, the likelihood of him deploying Russian troops to the region in the event of any Korean crisis is also low. Indeed, the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation signed between Russia and North Korea in 2000 does not contain any binding provisions regarding mutual military assistance.[4] Hence, the most probable form of mutual support between the two countries stands out as arms trade.
In the current strategic environment, China’s diplomatic relations with North Korea progress at a slower pace compared to the Russia-North Korea relations. North Korea, while providing military equipment and weapons to Russia in the war against Ukraine, has very little to offer to China at present. In this context, China maintains its relationship with North Korea while also considering these dynamics of the relationship.
Relations with Western states are also crucial for China. During periods when the United States imposes high tariffs, Western countries emerge as an alternative market where China can export its products. From this perspective, China’s economic relations with Western states play a critical role. In the years ahead, China aims to establish a trust-based relationship with Western states in order to continue its economic and technological collaborations. In this context, China neither seeks to appear as Russia’s primary military ally, which endeavors to expand its influence in Eurasia, nor does it aspire to be part of the North Korea-Russia security alliance. For instance, China has attempted to remain aloof from the events by characterizing the transfer of weapons from North Korea to Russia as an issue between two sovereign states.
China opposes NATO’s activities in strategic areas of the Asia-Pacific region such as the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea. On the other hand, the arms trade between Russia and North Korea, along with the use of these weapons by Russia in the Ukraine conflict, leads the United States and its allies to converge the security of Europe and the Asia-Pacific. This situation has paved the way for the United States and its allies to establish cooperation with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand under the framework of “NATO-Asia Pacific (AP) 4.”[5] In this context, the increase in interaction between Europe and the Asia-Pacific as a result of cooperation between Russia and North Korea could jeopardize China’s long-term strategic interests.
In conclusion, as China endeavors to maintain strategic balances in the Asia-Pacific, it is confronted with a complex security dilemma in the face of North Korea’s nuclear weapon development. The proximity of North Korea to China escalates regional tensions by prompting increased military activities by the United States and its allies aimed at constraining China in the region.
In this context, China endeavors to uphold stable relations with its East Asian neighbors like Japan and South Korea, leveraging its diplomatic ties with North Korea to mitigate regional tensions and encourage Pyongyang towards a peaceful resolution. Meanwhile, China intensifies scrutiny on defense industry trade with Russia to ascertain that such commodities are not deployed in the conflict in Ukraine. Consequently, China abstains from vending any defense industry goods to Russia that could potentially be utilized in the Ukrainian conflict, thereby safeguarding its trade relations with European nations and striving to bolster these ties.
Despite Russia’s evolving diplomatic relations with North Korea, China exerts significant pressure on North Korea, thus exerting a considerable influence in restraining it. In short, China has successfully utilized its influence over North Korea in a positive manner, owing to the advantages derived from its constructive role in the region.
[1] “China and Russia Disagree on North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/china-and-russia-disagree-on-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons/, (Date of Access: 16.05.2024).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] “China Reaches out to Russia, North Korea as US Cements Trilateral Partnership With Japan, Philippines”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/china-reaches-out-to-russia-north-korea-as-us-cements-trilateral-partnership-with-japan-philippines/, (Date of Access: 17.05.2024).
[5] “China’s Ambivalence on the North Korea-Russia Security Alignment”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/chinas-ambivalence-on-the-north-korea-russia-security-alignment/, (Date of Access: 16.05.2024).
