Analysis

The United Nations Intervention in Haiti

Haiti's security crisis requires economic and institutional solutions, not military ones.
Since the 1990s, the country has repeatedly been the scene of international interventions.
The success of the mission depends more on local legitimacy and the principle of sovereignty than on international approval.

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On October 1, 2025, the United Nations (UN) Security Council approved a new international security mission for Haiti called the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), adding a new chapter to the country’s endless cycle of intervention. This decision was proposed by the United States (US) and Panama and was accepted with 12 votes in favor and abstentions from China, Russia, and Pakistan. The GSF will replace the Multinational Security Support Force (MSSF) mission, remembered for its failure. Although planned under the leadership of Kenya, the MSSF was only able to deploy 970 personnel out of a force of 2,500 and lacked the expected impact. The new mission envisions 5,500 soldiers and police officers along with 50 civilian personnel supporting the Haitian National Police for a period of 12 months. However, this step has sparked significant debate not only militarily but also politically, financially, and humanely.[i]

The UN’s security initiatives in Haiti are not new. Since the 1990s, the country has repeatedly been the scene of international interventions: the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established after Aristide’s overthrow; it later evolved into a justice support mission called the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). Yet these missions have failed to bring lasting stability to Haiti, and some have even created a crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the Haitian people. The cholera outbreak (2010-2011) caused by MINUSTAH soldiers and cases of abuse have undermined the credibility of the international community.

Today, approximately 90% of Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, is under the control of armed groups. Murder, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and all forms of violence have become a part of daily life. As of 2025, there are more than 3,000 murders, around 1,500 kidnappings, and approximately 200,000 displaced individuals in the country. Half of these victims are children. State authority, particularly the police force, has become virtually non-existent. With 5,000 active personnel, the Haitian National Police appear unable to counter thousands of armed group members. Therefore, the primary objective of the UN mission has been defined as “rebuilding the state’s security capacity”.[ii] However, this does not mean that armed groups entrenched in the field can only be eliminated by military force. Such groups are not merely criminal organizations in Haiti; they also function as parallel administrations and social solidarity networks.

Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry personally requested this intervention in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September. Henry stated, “I call on the international community to take action on behalf of women who are abused every day, displaced families, and children left without access to education”.[iii] This call reflects the Haitian government’s despair in its own security apparatus. Nevertheless, opposition circles have criticized Henry’s stance as a “policy of dependence on foreign powers.” Indeed, many civil society organizations in Haiti argue that international military interventions have further weakened the country’s sovereignty, creating “supervised stability” rather than generating lasting solutions. 

It would be more accurate to trace the roots of Haiti’s current security crisis not only to armed violence but also to the collapse of its economic structure. Until 2019, the country was able to obtain cheap oil through the Petrocaribe program spearheaded by Venezuela and finance its social programs with these revenues. But the end of this program left Haiti facing a sudden loss of income. The decline in state revenues, the halting of infrastructure projects, rising unemployment, and the cessation of social assistance have made large segments of society dependent on the gang economy. In this context, the success of the international mission will depend not only on security operations but also on economic rehabilitation policies. Because Haiti’s struggle against armed groups is, fundamentally, a “struggle for subsistence.”

The Security Council resolution has authorized the deployment of military forces within the mission. However, this decision has drawn criticism from many humanitarian organizations. This is because the crisis in Haiti is not just a matter of security, but also concerns the breakdown of the social fabric. Organizations such as Amnesty International and CARE have pointed out that direct contact between military forces and the local population could pose serious risks and that past violations could be repeated. Furthermore, the abstentions of China, Russia, and Pakistan indicate that these concerns are shared at the diplomatic level. Russia described the decision as a “dangerous and poorly planned adventure,” while China criticized the “lack of preliminary examination and local participation.” These qualms have stood out as factors that could undermine the legitimacy of the GSF.

The crisis in Haiti is not solely an internal security issue but a regional crisis affecting the overall stability of the Caribbean. Neighboring countries such as the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, and Jamaica are on high alert due to the increasing influx of migrants. From the US perspective, Haiti is the weakest link in the Caribbean geopolitical equation; therefore, Washington views this intervention as a matter of stability in its own backyard. However, the opposition of China and Russia points to a new manifestation of a multipolar order in the UN Security Council. This situation demonstrates that international security missions will be the scene of more diplomatic tension in the future.

The United Nations’ new mission in Haiti is intended to bring security to the country, but its chances of success appear limited due to the depth of structural problems. Lack of financing, debates over legitimacy, the risk that a military approach might overshadow the humanitarian dimension, and the Haitian community’s distrust of outside intervention are the main obstacles standing in the path of this initiative. Nevertheless, this operation could temporarily halt Haiti’s collapse, weaken the dominance of gangs, and pave the way for elections. However, lasting peace requires the rebuilding of Haiti’s own institutions, the achievement of economic independence, and a shift of the international community’s focus from short-term security to long-term development. Otherwise, GSF may also go down in history as an unsuccessful attempt.

Ultimately, this new initiative in Haiti has once again highlighted the limitations of the international community’s security-oriented aid. Haiti’s salvation lies not in external intervention, but in the will of its people to rebuild their own state.


[i] Ruiz, Luis Alejandro, “UN Security Council Launches New Anti-Gang Force in Haiti”, Guacamayave, guacamayave.com/en/un-security-council-launches-new-anti-gang-force-in-haiti/, (Access Date: 12.10.2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İNCESU
Ali Caner İncesu graduated from Anadolu University Faculty of Business Administration in 2012. He continued his education with Cappadocia University Tourist Guidance associate degree program and graduated in 2017. In 2022, he successfully completed his master's degrees in International Relations at Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and in Travel Management and Tourism Guidance at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. In 2024, he graduated from the United States University of Maryland Global Campus (UMGC) Political Science undergraduate program. As of 2023, he continues his doctoral studies at Cappadocia University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. In 2022, Mr. İncesu worked as a special advisor at the Embassy of the Republic of Paraguay in Ankara. He is fluent in Spanish and English and is a sworn translator in English and Spanish. His research interests include Latin America, International Law and Tourism.

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