The process pursued between Türkiye and the European Union (EU) with the aim of visa liberalisation acquired an institutional framework with the launch of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue on 16 December 2013, and the 72 criteria to be fulfilled by Türkiye were established within the framework of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap. Türkiye made significant progress during the initial phase of the process, having fulfilled 65 of the 72 criteria by 2016; following the fulfilment in 2018 of the criterion concerning passports compatible with EU and International Civil Aviation Organization standards, the number of outstanding criteria was reduced to six. From a quantitative perspective, the fulfilment of approximately 92 percent of the criteria demonstrates that Türkiye has made significant progress in terms of technical and administrative alignment. However, the key point to be noted here is that, although the remaining six criteria are few in quantitative terms, they concern highly sensitive areas from a political and legal perspective. In other words, the problem encountered in the process relates less to the number of criteria than to their substance. The final six criteria to be fulfilled by Türkiye are:
- Harmonisation of counter-terrorism legislation with EU standards,
- Completion of the operational cooperation agreement with Europol,
- Bringing legislation on the protection of personal data into conformity with EU standards,
- Implementation of the recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption in the field of combating corruption,
- Ensuring effective judicial cooperation with all EU Member States,
- Full implementation of all provisions of the Türkiye-EU Readmission Agreement.
Each of these criteria concerns not only technical legislative amendments but also directly relates to Türkiye’s security policies, the protection of personal data, its capacity for judicial cooperation, anti-corruption mechanisms, and migration management.
Six Fundamental Barriers to Türkiye-EU Relations
First, the criterion of harmonising counter-terrorism legislation with EU standards is one of the most controversial issues in the process. The fundamental difference between Türkiye and the EU does not concern whether terrorism should be combated, but rather the scope of counter-terrorism legislation, the manner in which it is implemented, and how it is balanced with fundamental rights. In this context, the EU argues that the scope of Türkiye’s counter-terrorism legislation is excessively broad and that this may create problems with regard to freedom of expression and other fundamental rights. In contrast, Türkiye maintains that a broader legal framework is necessary, taking into account the nature of the terrorist threat and its own security conditions. Accordingly, this criterion constitutes a political domain in which Türkiye’s understanding of security intersects with the EU’s understanding of the rule of law, rather than being merely a matter of a simple legislative amendment. The fact that this criterion has remained outstanding for years in the European Commission’s reports on Türkiye also demonstrates that the problem is not limited to technical regulatory adjustments but is of a more structural nature.
The second criterion, namely the establishment of operational cooperation with Europol within the framework of the Türkiye-EU Visa Liberalisation Roadmap, constitutes a structural integration issue situated at the intersection of sovereign rights, international data law, and the regional security architecture, going beyond mere technical law-enforcement coordination. The strategic-level cooperation between Türkiye and Europol, which has been in place since 2004, covers only general threat assessments and the exchange of information that does not constitute personal data. This situation restricts real-time intelligence flows, biometric data sharing, and the transfer of suspect profiles in the fight against cross-border crime, organised criminal networks, and terrorism. The conclusion of an operational agreement with Europol, the EU’s security agency, is directly conditional upon aligning national legislation with the EU acquis on data protection, particularly with the standards of Directive 2016/680 on data protection in law enforcement, which regulates criminal proceedings. Consequently, this requirement renders the Europol criterion directly interdependent with other obligations concerning the protection of personal data and the definitions contained in the Counter-Terrorism Law. While the EU seeks to integrate Türkiye into the outer perimeter of the European security area and to contain threats at their source, for Türkiye, the confidentiality of national security information, data security safeguards, and the overcoming of differences in the definitions of terrorist offences create a critical balance of sovereignty. This transforms the operational agreement from a mere bureaucratic protocol into a multidimensional negotiation process requiring the mutual alignment of the parties’ judicial and security paradigms.
The third criterion is the alignment of legislation on the protection of personal data with EU standards. This criterion, particularly in the contemporary context of accelerating digitalisation and cross-border data sharing, extends far beyond a conventional technical legal regulation. The sharing of personal data among law-enforcement authorities, judicial authorities, and Europol raises questions concerning the purposes for which data will be collected, the length of time for which they will be retained, with whom they may be shared, and how individuals’ rights concerning such data will be protected. From the EU’s perspective, the protection of personal data is of critical importance not only for safeguarding individual privacy but also for establishing a reliable legal basis for data sharing among EU security institutions. Therefore, Türkiye’s alignment of its personal data legislation with EU standards also serves a complementary function with regard to operational cooperation with Europol. The fundamental issue arising here is how to establish a balance between increasing data sharing for security purposes and ensuring the protection of individuals’ personal data.
The fourth criterion is the full implementation of the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) within the Council of Europe in the field of combating corruption. Within the EU acquis, the fight against corruption is directly linked to the principle of the rule of law, public integrity, and standards of democratic governance. The inclusion of this criterion in the process demonstrates that the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue is not limited solely to technical border management or migration policies, but that, through the EU’s cross-cutting political conditionality mechanism, judicial and administrative reforms are subjected to an integrated oversight regime.
The fifth criterion requires Türkiye to establish mutual judicial assistance in criminal matters with all EU Member States, to operate effective mechanisms for combating organised crime and terrorism, and to fully implement extradition procedures. However, the emphasis on all Member States at the centre of this criterion goes beyond technical judicial cooperation for Türkiye, as it also encompasses the conduct of judicial relations with the unrecognised Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GKRY), thereby directly intersecting with disputes concerning sovereignty and foreign policy. While, from the EU’s perspective, judicial cooperation requires balancing security needs with universal legal safeguards, from Türkiye’s perspective it points to a two-sided legal negotiation domain involving, in particular, the expectation of overcoming political and judicial obstacles originating from EU Member States in the extradition of individuals accused of terrorist offences.
The sixth and perhaps most strategically significant criterion in terms of Türkiye-EU relations is the full and comprehensive implementation of all provisions of the Türkiye-EU Readmission Agreement, signed simultaneously with the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue on 16 December 2013. Indeed, this mechanism provides for the readmission by Türkiye not only of Turkish citizens but also of third-country nationals who reach the EU through irregular routes using Türkiye as a transit route. From the EU’s perspective, the functioning of the agreement constitutes a vital buffer mechanism for preventing irregular migration at its source, consolidating border security, and ensuring the sustainability of the 18 March 2016 Statement, whereas from Türkiye’s perspective, the implementation of the provisions concerning third-country nationals has been directly linked to the condition of granting visa exemption (the principle of reciprocity). Consequently, the Readmission Agreement, beyond being merely a technical instrument of border and migration management, lies at the centre of the strategic bargaining between the fair sharing of the migration burden and the right to free movement, as well as the institutional conditionality regime governing Türkiye-EU relations.
Fundamental Contradictions and Expectations in the Process
When these six criteria are considered together, it becomes clearer why Türkiye has been unable to make progress in the visa liberalisation process for such a long period. A significant proportion of the criteria are not independent of one another. For example, in order to establish operational cooperation with Europol, the legal infrastructure concerning the protection of personal data needs to be brought closer to EU standards. The development of judicial cooperation, in turn, is linked both to the capacity to combat crime and to safeguards concerning the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Readmission Agreement is directly related to migration and border management policies. Counter-terrorism legislation, meanwhile, raises the issue of the balance between security policies and fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus, the final six criteria actually constitute an integrated area of reform that connects different fields of Türkiye’s public administration and legal system.
At this point, there appears to be a contradiction between the fact that Türkiye has fulfilled 66 criteria and the EU’s continued failure to issue a positive assessment. However, this contradiction disappears when the nature of EU conditionality is taken into account. From the EU’s perspective, fulfilling the criteria does not merely mean amending legislation; the effective and sustainable implementation of the relevant regulations is also of importance. The European Commission’s 2025 Türkiye Report, which states that no progress has been made towards fulfilling the six criteria, demonstrates that the problem remains unresolved. Therefore, it would be insufficient to assess Türkiye’s visa liberalisation process solely in terms of completing the remaining six criteria. A clear tension emerges here between the EU’s normative conditionality and Türkiye’s national security and sovereignty priorities. In particular, counter-terrorism and the Readmission Agreement are the areas in which this tension is most visible
Nevertheless, it would not be correct to assume that visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens would automatically enter into force even if the criteria were fully met. Türkiye’s fulfilment of the remaining criteria constitutes the first and mandatory stage. Subsequently, the European Commission must assess whether Türkiye has sufficiently fulfilled all the criteria. Following the Commission’s positive assessment, the decision-making process involving the European Parliament and the Council of the EU will come into play. In order for Türkiye to be included in the EU’s list of countries whose citizens are exempt from visa requirements, the relevant EU legislation must be amended. Türkiye’s own Directorate for EU Affairs also states that, upon completion of the visa liberalisation process, Türkiye should be transferred from the negative list of countries whose citizens are subject to visa requirements to the positive list of countries whose citizens are exempt from visa requirements. Therefore, the process is not an automatic mechanism whereby “Türkiye fulfils the six criteria and visas are abolished the next day.” A more accurate model would be: “Türkiye implements the reforms → the European Commission assesses whether the criteria have been fulfilled → the European Parliament and the Council of the EU provide political and legal approval → the relevant EU legislation is amended → visa liberalisation enters into force.” Therefore, the challenge facing Türkiye is both technical and political in nature.
The Türkiye-EU Visa Liberalisation Process
This process is one of the important indicators of the level of Türkiye’s integration with Europe. Although Türkiye’s fulfilment of 66 of the 72 criteria represents a significant achievement in terms of technical alignment, the political and legal nature of the remaining six criteria makes the completion of the process more difficult. The common feature of these six criteria is that they concern not only legislative amendments but also the functioning of institutions and their capacity for implementation. In particular, the completion of requirements in areas such as counter-terrorism legislation, the protection of personal data, cooperation with Europol, the fight against corruption, judicial cooperation, and the Readmission Agreement requires Türkiye to achieve greater alignment with the EU’s understanding of security, the rule of law, and fundamental rights.
From this perspective, the fundamental problem in the visa liberalisation process is not merely that Türkiye has been unable to complete six criteria. The main issue is that these six criteria are concentrated in the most sensitive areas of Türkiye-EU relations. Therefore, success in the forthcoming period will depend not so much on whether Türkiye formally fulfils the criteria, but rather on whether it can effectively implement them in a manner that meets the EU’s expectations. In addition, a positive assessment by the European Commission alone will not be sufficient. The political will of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU will also be decisive. Therefore, visa liberalisation should be regarded not merely as a technical bureaucratic process, but as a multidimensional policy area in which mutual trust, legal alignment, and political will between Türkiye and the EU are put to the test.
Conclusion
The full fulfilment by Türkiye of the remaining six criteria within the visa liberalisation process conducted with the EU does not mean that visa exemption for Turkish citizens travelling to European Union countries will be granted automatically. First and foremost, a distinction must be made between “visa liberalisation” and “visa exemption.” While visa liberalisation refers to the legal and political process aimed at enabling Turkish citizens to travel visa-free between Türkiye and the EU, visa exemption refers to the removal of the obligation for Turkish citizens to obtain visas for short-term travel under certain conditions as a result of the successful completion of this process. Accordingly, visa liberalisation constitutes a process and policy objective, whereas visa exemption is a legal consequence that may arise upon the completion of this process. Therefore, Türkiye’s fulfilment of the remaining six criteria constitutes a necessary stage for the realisation of visa exemption, but is not sufficient on its own. Following the fulfilment of the criteria, the European Commission must issue a positive assessment, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU must adopt the necessary political and legal decisions, and the relevant EU legislation must be amended. In other words, the process does not operate on the basis that “the six criteria have been completed and visas are automatically abolished.” While Türkiye’s fulfilment of the criteria means that it has completed the fundamental obligations within the visa liberalisation process, the decision-making process at the EU level must also be completed for visa exemption to be implemented in practice.
Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to assess the process solely on the basis of technical and legal criteria. Relations between Türkiye and Europe have historically been shaped by various political and historical disputes, ranging from Ottoman-European relations and the Cold War period to Türkiye’s European integration and EU accession process and the Cyprus issue. Today, the linking of issues such as migration, security, human rights, democracy, and foreign policy to visa policy has led to the increasing politicisation of the visa liberalisation process. In addition, the growing Islamophobia and Turkophobia discussed in Europe in recent years constitute one of the factors underlying the political and social debates concerning the mobility of Turkish citizens in Europe. Although the EU’s legal decision-making mechanisms are not directly shaped by social prejudices, public opinion in Member States, as well as debates surrounding migration and security, may influence political will and, consequently, the atmosphere surrounding visa negotiations between Türkiye and the EU. Therefore, Türkiye’s fulfilment of all technical criteria does not mean that political and social perceptions in Europe will completely disappear.
As can also be understood from the statements above, although the completion by Türkiye of the remaining six criteria in the Roadmap would bring the process of technical alignment to its conclusion, this would not mean that visa exemption for Turkish citizens would automatically and effectively enter into force. While the fulfilment of the criteria represents merely the crossing of a technical threshold, the decisive stage is the final political approval mechanism to be exercised by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU through a qualified majority. Therefore, rather than being merely a matter of technical legislative alignment, the process depends directly on the political will of EU institutions, domestic public opinion dynamics within Member States, and the foundation of mutual trust.
