The American intervention in Venezuela, which took place at the very beginning of 2026, carries a significance far beyond its military outcomes. The operation was shaped by the sudden removal of the Nicolas Maduro administration from power and by what Washington described as “limited bombing” maneuvers. The process is structured around “second wave” attacks, which were announced as being deployed if necessary but were canceled at the last minute.
This hybrid coercion strategy on the ground reflects an effort to present the military operation as part of a broader strategic vision. The “reconstruction” narrative, particularly prevalent after the operation, proves that the issue is not merely a regime change. Thus, the Venezuela file has become the stage for a new doctrinal moment, allegedly redefining Washington’s hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
In Latin American and Global South literature, this move is read as a laboratory for the order shaped by Trump. It is claimed that a 21st-century, updated, and hardened version of the Monroe Doctrine has emerged, particularly around the phrase “Monroe Doctrine.”[i] In this context, Venezuela is described as an experimental field that redefines the normative limits of American interventionism. Therefore, the conceptual debate overshadows military success or failure on the ground.
The second Trump administration provides a critical context for analysis. Although it’s only been a year since Trump took office, it’s clear that a much more “muscular” and punitive foreign policy profile has emerged compared to his first term. The threshold for the use of force has been significantly lowered across the spectrum, from Iran to Yemen, and from Syria to Venezuela.
This table shows that while Trump used language that appealed to “war fatigue” at the rhetorical level, he recklessly deployed military instruments in practice. In such an atmosphere, it’s not surprising that the Venezuela operation is being marketed as the showcase of the “Trump 2.0 doctrine.” Doctrine discourse is becoming a tool for both internal and external political legitimacy.
Assessments in European capitals place the picture within a broader discussion about the overall situation. In ECFR’s 2026 assessment, it is stated that the illiberal wave in the West can no longer be seen as a temporary anomaly.[ii] On the contrary, this situation points to a structural transformation linked to the internal erosion of the liberal international order.
Accordingly, Trump-style foreign policy is far from being a deviation of individual leadership. It signifies the institutionalization of the gap between the West’s normative claims and its interest-driven practices. The “doctrinalization” of the intervention in Venezuela is the clearest symptom of this structural transformation.
From this point on, the meaning and flexibility of the concept of “doctrine” must be examined. In the classical sense, a doctrine refers to the sum of certain principles, a long-term orientation, and institutional acceptance. It is not merely a slogan uttered in a speech, but a holistic framework that guides institutional patterns of behavior.
The Bush Doctrine, which took shape after 2001, presented a true example of a doctrine by coding preventive war, unilateralism, and regime change as legitimate means. The Obama administration, however, introduced a different approach with its discourse of “leadership from the back seat.” While emphasizing multilateralism, targeted operations based on unmanned aerial vehicles and a limited engagement strategy were adopted.
Trump’s “America First” approach, with its emphasis on maximum pressure, negotiated diplomacy, and overt self-interest, has relegated normative references to the background. Conversely, it has paved the way for the creation of new labels for each crisis. Venezuela, in this sense, constitutes a striking example of “doctrine inflation.”
Of course, there are aspects of the operation that can be considered new from a tactical perspective. The overt articulation of the “profitable reconstruction” narrative and the live broadcasting of negotiations conducted through energy companies on social media are among these. The announcement on television that the “second wave” of bombing had been cancelled was also contrary to diplomatic norms.
However, the pattern of legitimation is largely familiar. The rhetoric of democracy, human rights, regional stability, and energy security is nothing more than a repetition of arguments seen in numerous files from 2003 Iraq to 2011 Libya. In light of this, the invention of a “new doctrine” after each new intervention is eroding the weight of the concept. Doctrine is evolving from a guide to action into a marketing label.
The function of doctrinal discourse in producing legitimacy is the main element fueling this inflation. In US domestic politics, presidents tend to frame their actions within a broad doctrinal framework to convey the message to voters that “there is a consistent strategy.” In this way, operations carried out in different geographies are removed from being isolated crisis management steps.
Presented as part of a comprehensive vision, these moves create a perception of “calculated policy” among Congress and allies. Military maneuvers that could otherwise provoke a reaction are packaged under a normative heading. In the field of international law, doctrinal discourse is also a tool for presenting controversial practices as “new norms.”
Slogans are taking the place of real strategic debate. The constant declaration of new doctrines also has dire consequences for the international order and other actors. On the one hand, the US’s tendency to turn every intervention into a doctrinal cornerstone is opening up space for revisionist powers.
Actors like Russia and China are legitimizing their interventions through “regional doctrines.” For example, Moscow’s “near abroad” rhetoric is becoming a conceptual cover for the construction of its de facto spheres of influence. On the other hand, medium-sized powers are relying on the argument that “the US is taking similar steps.” These actors, emboldened in packaging their military operations with normative language, are fueling regional conflicts.
Ultimately, the hierarchy of common rules of the liberal international order is weakening rather than strengthening. The system is dividing into disconnected “doctrinal islands.” A more rigorous use of the concept of “doctrine” in international relations literature is essential. The distinction between “real doctrine” and “marketing discourse” must be clarified. The level of institutional internalization of this framework, and its reflection in legal texts and strategy documents, are decisive criteria.
Discourses that do not permanently transform budget and power distribution should not be accepted as doctrines. Instead of constantly inventing new doctrines, it is healthier to focus on the impact of crises on institutional structures. The long-term damage to alliance relations and international norms must be considered.
For policymakers, relying on the label of “doctrine” is an easy path. However, it is necessary to produce a clear objective definition, a transparent legal framework, and a concrete exit strategy. Slogans cannot be a solid source of legitimacy. The Venezuelan example is not the birth of a “new doctrine,” but rather a mature manifestation of doctrine inflation. Inventing a new doctrine in every case diminishes the value of international law over time. Norm production is reduced to a communication tool that glorifies the use of force.
What is needed for a lasting and predictable international order cannot be an increase in the number of labels. Strengthening common, enforceable, and verifiable rules regarding the use of force is essential. Otherwise, discussions similar to the “Donroe Doctrine” that emerged in Venezuela will not consolidate the order. They are doomed to become discursive headlines that accelerate normative fragmentation.
[i] Robin Wright, “The Aggressive Ambitions of Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine”, The New Yorker, 8 Ocak 2026, https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/the-aggressive-ambitions-of-trumps-donroe-doctrine, (Date Accession: 14.01.2026).
[ii] Mark Leonard, Jeremy Shapiro ve Anand Sundar, “2026: The year we stop pretending it’s just a phase”, ECFR, 7 Ocak 2026, https://ecfr.eu/article/2026-the-year-we-stop-pretending-its-just-a-phase/, (Date Accession: 14.01.2026).
