Europe’s energy security has become one of the key issues on the international security agenda, amid the geopolitical crises and transformations in energy markets in recent years. In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine War, steps taken by European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy sources have accelerated the diversification of energy supplies and the shift toward alternative sources. At the same time, energy security has gained importance not only in terms of access to energy sources but also in terms of protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring market stability, and increasing resilience against potential disruptions.
Cyberattacks targeting energy infrastructure in particular, along with damage to pipelines and undersea cables and disruptions in international energy transportation, demonstrate the diversification of security risks facing Europe. Following the energy crisis of 2022, the impact of developments in the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 on global energy supply has once again brought to the forefront the sensitivity of energy markets to geopolitical developments. In this context, the European Union’s (EU) efforts to increase renewable energy capacity, invest in energy storage technologies, and strengthen cross-border energy connections are considered key elements of its long-term energy security strategy.
In light of this, the Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies (ANKASAM) conducted an interview with Dr. Aura Sabadus, an energy security expert who co-authored the study “Testing Europe’s Resolve: The Growing Threat Against European Energy” with James Coe, in which she addresses threats to Europe’s energy infrastructure. We present this interview—which assesses the geopolitical vulnerabilities of European energy markets, the impact of hybrid threats on critical infrastructure, and Europe’s long-term energy security strategy—for your consideration.
1. In your recent RUSI article, you examine the growing risks facing Europe’s energy infrastructure. How have hybrid threats, including cyber operations and potential physical disruptions, changed the way European countries need to approach energy security?
Hybrid threats have forced European countries to treat energy security as both a supply and national-security issue. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, cyber operations have increasingly been accompanied by risks to physical infrastructure, including pipelines, electricity networks and subsea assets.
The Danish cyberattack in 2023, which compromised 22 energy companies, and Poland’s 2025 attacks targeting 30 renewable installations and combined heat and power (CHP) plants show how attackers can move beyond corporate IT towards operational systems capable of affecting physical energy production.
Furthermore, the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022, the damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline in October 2023 and subsequent incidents involving subsea power and communications cables have prompted NATO to step up the protection of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.
The alliance launched Baltic Sentry on 14 January 2025 following a series of suspicious incidents, including damage to the Estlink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia. The initiative strengthens maritime surveillance and NATO’s ability to detect and respond to threats to critical subsea infrastructure.
One important lesson that European countries are learning is the need to increasingly approach energy security through an integrated framework combining cybersecurity, physical protection and system resilience.
This means securing industrial control systems and networks, strengthening surveillance of pipelines, subsea cables and interconnectors, improving cross-border intelligence-sharing and incident response, and building sufficient redundancy to keep energy flowing when individual assets are disrupted.
At national level, countries are also looking at how civilian capabilities can strengthen resilience. Sweden’s “Total Defence” approach, for example, integrates civilian and military preparedness, offering a broader model for protecting critical services and maintaining their operation during severe disruption.
Critically, Ukraine’s experience of repeated Russian missile and drone attacks on its energy infrastructure has underscored the need for a large pool of skilled personnel who can be deployed at short notice to repair damaged infrastructure and restore electricity supplies.
2. European energy markets have undergone significant transformations in recent years, particularly following efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies. How could disruptions to critical energy infrastructure affect European energy prices, market stability, and broader economic security?
Russia’s decision to cut as much as 80% of exports to Europe, aiming to undermine western support for Ukraine at the start of its full-scale invasion in 2022, triggered record energy price spikes and volatility. To curb costs, Europe managed to diversify away at very short notice, expanding its LNG regasification capacity, cutting demand and fast-tracking the deployment of renewable and battery capacity.
While some industries such as fertilizer or petrochemical production were forced to reduce output, other sectors started to boom.
Europe’s shift towards decentralised solar generation and battery storage was already under way before 2022 but accelerated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis.
EU solar capacity increased from around 165 GW in 2021 to more than 400 GW by 2025, while battery-storage capacity expanded almost tenfold, from 7.8 GWh to 77.3 GWh over the same period. The expansion is changing the energy-security equation by providing more domestic generation and flexibility, although the rapid growth of distributed and digitally connected assets also creates new infrastructure and cybersecurity challenges.
3. Although Europe has diversified its energy supplies, its energy system remains interconnected and exposed to geopolitical risks. What do you consider the most significant remaining vulnerabilities in Europe’s energy security architecture, particularly regarding infrastructure and cross-border energy flows?
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the Middle East crisis of 2026 have demonstrated that oil and gas supplies remain particularly vulnerable to geopolitical disruption.
Europe’s dependence on Russian pipeline gas exposed it to the weaponisation and loss of supply in 2022, while the disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 highlighted the risks associated with global energy chokepoints and Europe’s growing reliance on internationally traded LNG.
As long as geopolitical risks persist, Europe will remain highly exposed to disruptions in oil and gas supplies, strengthening the security case for accelerating the phase-out of fossil fuels, particularly natural gas, while fast-tracking EU market integration and scaling up domestic renewable generation and battery storage.
4. Looking ahead, how can European countries reconcile the objectives of energy diversification, market competitiveness, and infrastructure protection? What should be the main priorities for strengthening Europe’s long-term energy resilience?
Europe’s first and foremost priority must be energy security. The two major energy crises of 2022 and 2026 have reinforced the importance of bolstering security through deeper market integration, greater reliance on home-grown energy and stronger infrastructure resilience.
One of the clearest lessons from 2022 is that access to seemingly cheap energy can come at an excessive security cost. Europe’s dependence on relatively cheap Russian gas left it dangerously exposed when Russian supplies were progressively curtailed, contributing to record energy prices. Governments were subsequently forced to commit hundreds of billions of euros to shield households and businesses from the impact of the crisis. Bruegel estimates that European countries allocated €651 billion for such measures in the aftermath of the crisis.
In the long term, Europe’s objectives are clear: it needs to build a deeply integrated energy system that combines diversified and increasingly domestic supplies with robust physical and military protection of critical infrastructure.
This means accelerating renewable generation and battery storage, completing the internal energy market and expanding cross-border interconnections so that energy can flow efficiently to where it is most needed, while maintaining highly diversified external supplies during the transition.
Ultimately, Europe must be able not only to deter and withstand attacks and supply disruptions but also to recover rapidly thanks to supply and infrastructure redundancy.
