Russia Expert Andrea Alberti: “Historically, Russia Has Seen the Arctic as a Desirable Target.”

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In 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued the Maritime Doctrine, a strategic document reflecting the country’s national maritime activities and policies. Moscow’s new maritime doctrine is seen as a reflection of Russia’s increasing competition not only with the United States, but also with its maritime neighbors, including China, in changing global geopolitics. It is believed that Russia’s main goal is to achieve and maintain the status of a global maritime power.

From this point of view, Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM) presents the views of Russia Expert Andrea Alberti to evaluate Russia’s Arctic policy.

1- In your opinion, what are the most significant changes in Russia’s policy towards the Arctic in recent years and what impact have these changes had on the regional and global environment?

The beginnings of relations between the Russian Federation and the Arctic region date back to the time of Kievan Rus, almost a thousand years ago. Throughout its centuries-long history, Russia has always regarded the Arctic as a desirable destination. The reason for this was that this region represented the access to the seas that Moscow had always sought. This perspective influenced decisive phases of Russian history, from the time of Peter the Great through the tsarist and imperial periods to the Soviet era.

The Arctic region has also been at the center of recent historical events. In particular, the Arctic policy of the Russian Federation in the last two decades is closely linked to the country’s rebirth after the turbulent 1990s, known as the second “Time of Troubles” between Boris Godunov’s famous seventeenth century. When President Vladimir Putin took office in 1999, he pursued a pragmatic approach that led to a significant change in the situation in Russia. As a result, Russia went from a potential ‘failed state’ threatened by economic bankruptcy and separatism to a ‘petro-state” and then to one of the most influential powers in the world. This transformation was made possible by the abundant natural resources of the Arctic region, which played a key role in revitalizing an economy in crisis, withstanding the challenges of the great recession following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the international sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea.

Furthermore, Arctic resources have enabled a second era of gas diplomacy for Moscow, providing significant leverage in international relations thirty years after the Brezhnev era. Russian Arctic policy has evolved over the last two decades through various decrees, concepts, and foundations, using the polar region not just as a tool to justify Moscow’s spread of chauvinism but also as a fortress against NATO expansion. This process has nourished Russia’s traditional siege mentality and significantly contributed to the unbroken popularity of Putin’s government. Internationally, after tensions with the Western bloc reignited, the ‘Easternization’ and ‘Asianization’ of the Arctic region and the entire country have given the Kremlin an opportunity to question the outcomes of the Cold War and to alter and succeed in a situation akin to that of Weimar Germany, both internally and externally.

It’s also important to highlight the significant role of climate change in this narrative, altering the international perception of the Arctic and transforming it into one of the most strategic scenarios on the planet. This has provided Russia with the opportunity to regain the international status it lost after the collapse of the USSR. In summary, the strategy outlined by President Putin in his 1997 doctoral thesis “Strategic Planning of Regional Resources Under the Formation of Market Relations: St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region” at the St. Petersburg Mining University has been effective.

Indeed, the sequence of events described above would not have been possible without a complete restructuring of the state’s political and economic structures, supported by the development of the Arctic. More importantly, the war we experience today would not have been possible. In fact, Russia 25 years ago could not have sustained this, neither politically and ideologically, nor, above all, economically

2-How do you foresee the strategic resources in the Arctic region shaping Russia’s future policies?

The immense natural resources in the Russian Federation and, by extension, in the Arctic region, have been fully integrated into the new global architecture advocated by the Kremlin, which, in collaboration with Zhongnanhai, aims to shake the hegemony of the G7. This context includes, particularly in light of the most recent expansion on January 1st, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union, and BRICS. Specifically, Russia has in recent years embarked on numerous joint ventures with emerging and other rising powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, India, and notably China in the polar region.

This vision foresees the use of the Arctic region not only politically but primarily economically, especially considering its rich natural resources, both known and yet to be discovered. To give an example of the immense scale of resources in the Arctic, it’s enough to consider that just the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug has more natural gas and LNG reserves than the total of Qatar, one of the world’s leading players in hydrocarbons. Additionally, since the beginning of Putin’s era, Russia has been increasingly assertive on the international stage in protecting its strategic-economic interests in the region. Notably, last year, the Russian Federation won a dispute at the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, recognizing its sovereignty rights in the area adjacent to the Lomonosov Ridge. This dispute, ongoing since 2001, has cemented Kremlin’s sovereignty over this area under international law. Scientists consider this area among the richest in hydrocarbons, rare earths, and precious metals in the Arctic Ocean and, consequently, in the world.

Getting to the heart of the matter; a strategic, political, and economic turning point occurred with the freezing and seizure of the Russian Federation’s foreign currency reserves by the G7 countries at the start of the Russia-Ukraine War. This undermined the reliability of the dollar as the international reserve currency. Capitalizing on this situation, the Kremlin, through Sergey Glazyev, the Minister of Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Union, began drafting an international agreement for the introduction of a new world currency. This initiative culminated in an agreement adopted by BRICS at the Johannesburg Summit in August 2023. Since 2012, especially since China started reducing its hard currency reserves in 2009 and established the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), an equivalent to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), this project has attracted China’s interest. The idea of Beijing and Moscow is to create a joint international currency linked to a basket of about 20 commodities, including metals, gas, oil, and rare earths. If realized, this would bring a “Copernican revolution” to the international economic system, offering participating countries greater monetary sovereignty, reducing problems against financial crises, and positioning Russia as a leading economic power.

At its core, this basket would be largely filled by Russia’s immense natural resources in the Arctic, turning the region into an even more valuable “golden goose” for the Kremlin than ever since the birth of the Russian state. Especially considering the aforementioned events regarding BRICS’ declaration on creating a joint currency and the participation of new geopolitical formations with significant shares of global commodities, it can be said that the dynamics of recent developments are steering towards this perspective. This trend, combined with the weakening of the Western economy due to inflation and the gradual de-dollarization of the international monetary system (a long process), could, as pointed out by Zoltan Pozsar of Credit Suisse, potentially lead to a process called Bretton Woods III, triggering a groundbreaking change in the global economic-financial paradigm.

3- In your opinion, what could be the long-term geopolitical consequences of Russia’s increasing influence on the international stage, particularly in Central Asia and its surrounding regions?

In the long term, it would be logical to assume that the Russian Federation’s increasing utilization of natural resources could contribute to the development of its national economy and the diversification of its manufacturing sector. The implementation of such a strategy could also outline a scenario where the strengthening of the internal economy would positively influence the dynamics of the Kremlin’s international relations. In particular, Russia could claim influence over territories that were once part of its sphere of influence, such as in Ukraine and the countries of the Caucasus, by leveraging its newly assertive position in the international order. This trend could also encompass Central Asian countries, characterized by government fragility due to recently gained state autonomy.

Currently, nations such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan are subject to historical Russian hegemony and, in particular, U.S. intervention in the context of counter-terrorism. However, the dominant player in the region now is China, which has launched a broad plan to utilize the rich natural resources in Central Asian countries in accordance with the Belt and Road Initiative.

As a result, when considering the bigger picture, Central Asian countries could be integrated into a broader Eurasian context under the leadership of Russia and China, under the control of the previously mentioned institutions, through large-scale infrastructure projects currently taking shape in the region.

In this context, the “Russian Federation’s 2035 Arctic Policy Strategy” suggests the realization of a type of “support junction” expected to connect the Arctic region to the Trans-Siberian Railway and then to Southeast Asia, China, and the entire Middle East region. The International North-South Transport Corridor project, which aims to transport raw materials from Russia to Mumbai, starting from St. Petersburg, crossing the Caspian Sea, Iran, and the Oman Sea, thus significantly reducing the travel time of goods compared to the standard maritime route through the Suez Canal, could also be mentioned. The contrast between the Northern Sea Route and the route extending from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean has resurfaced, connected directly to the center of Egypt and with a clear reference to recent events. In particular, geopolitical tensions around Yemen could prefer the Arctic option, which offers advantages such as a shorter route, economic and environmental savings, and the absence of chokepoints like the Straits of Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab-el-Mandeb.

Thus, the Northern Sea Route could offer an alternative route for international trade, free from geopolitical tensions; however, according to scientists from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the complete melting of the ice may only be possible in an uncertain future.

Andrea Alberti

Andrea Alberti is a Kremlinologist recognized for his expertise in the Arctic policy of Russian Federation and in the geopolitics of the post-Soviet space. He earned his master’s degree with honours in International Studies from the University of Pisa and subsequently completed an Executive Master’s program in “Leadership for International Relations.” Presently, he is engaged in advanced studies focused on cybersecurity, cyber intelligence, and global security through enrollment in the Master’s program titled “Strategic Protection of the Country’s System” at the Italian Society for International Organizations. In addition to his academic accomplishments, he possesses proficiency in eight languages, demonstrating fluency in four of them. Notably, in 2023, he received the prestigious “America Giovani” prize, an annual accolade presented by the Italy USA Foundation to recognize the top 1000 graduates from Italian universities who have demonstrated exceptional merit and promise.

Dilara Cansın KEÇİALAN
Dilara Cansın KEÇİALAN
Dilara Cansın KECİALAN is currently pursuing her master's degree in Political Science and Public Administration at Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy University. She completed her master's degree in International Relations at Khoja Akhmet Yassawi University. She graduated from Anadolu University, Department of International Relations. She is also studying in the Department of New Media and Journalism at Atatürk University. Working as a Eurasia Research Assistant at ANKASAM, Kecialan's main areas of interest are Eurasia and Turkestan regions. She speaks English, Russian and a little Ukrainian and learning Kazakh.

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