On January 10, 2023, Serbian Foreign Minister Iviva Dacic visited Hungary. In this context, in his statement in Budapest, Dacic announced that the membership of Kosovo to the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU) would be rejected by Hungary.[1] It can be considered as a remarkable situation that Hungary developed such an attitude despite recognizing the independence of Kosovo.
Undoubtedly, there are various reasons for the Budapest administration’s stance on Kosovo. The first of these is that Hungary borders Serbia. In this context, the two countries cooperate especially in the fight against illegal immigration. Although the said cooperation has been criticized for having strict measures, it is possible to state that the parties are united in anti-immigrant policies due to economic, sociological and demographic reasons. In fact, Austria was included in this cooperation and the parties signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding on the fight against irregular migration on 16 November 2022.[2]
In addition, Budapest and Belgrade felt the need to deepen their bilateral relations due to the energy crisis that emerged after the Russia-Ukraine War. As a matter of fact, it should be reminded that in September 2022, the parties announced the opening of the Hungary-Serbia Oil Pipeline.[3] The two countries, which do not want to participate in the sanctions imposed on Russia, especially because of their energy dependence, are in an effort to eliminate their energy dependence through the cooperation they have developed among themselves. This means that the rapprochement between the parties accelerates.
The reflection of this rapprochement on Kosovo-centered processes can be considered as a normal development. Serbia does not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Moreover, the tension on the Belgrade-Pristina line has been escalating recently. During the events that started with the plate and identity card crisis, the concerns that conflict may occur from time to time come to the fore. The EU stands out as an important actor in reducing the dose of the aforementioned tension. In such an environment, Budapest’s statement that it will veto Kosovo’s EU membership in order to show its solidarity with Belgrade is a development that could limit the influence of the EU in the process; On the other hand, it reveals Hungary’s capacity to direct the events in the Balkans and the power of its veto power within the EU.
At this point, it is possible to evaluate Hungary’s approach to Kosovo’s EU membership from two perspectives. The first of these is the dimension of conflicts on the Budapest-Brussels line. Because there are some problems in Hungary’s relations with the EU due to its criticism of the union’s authoritarianism and violation of the rule of law. In fact, the EU demands that Hungary make various reforms to make progress on these issues. As a matter of fact, it was decided that Budapest would be deprived of EU funds until these reforms were made.
As might be expected, Hungary’s main priority within the EU is to resolve the issue of funds. At this point, it can be stated that Hungary, which gives the message that it may even harm the mediation role of the EU regarding Kosovo, is trying to use its veto power as an element of pressure and bargaining. Therefore, it can be argued that Budapest will try to get some concessions from Brussels over its stance on Kosovo. As a matter of fact, Budapest’s stance on Sweden and Finland’s request for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has revealed that Hungary can benefit from these processes to achieve its own interests. Because Hungary has not yet ratified the NATO membership of these states. However, a difference should be mentioned at this point. Because Hungary does not state that it is against the NATO membership of Sweden and Finland. It only spreads the process over time and uses it as a bargaining element. A very clear statement was made about Kosovo.
Secondly, it should be reminded that Hungary has been a cracking actor in the EU and NATO since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War. In fact, while various segments criticize Hungary’s multi-faceted diplomacy, which, like every nation-state, prioritizes its own interests and observes the balances between power centers; Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orban, went to the extreme to describe Russian President Vladimir Putin as the “Trojan Horse” in the West. However, one of the countries that is reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia and prioritizes its own interests is Serbia. Therefore, there is a common approach between Budapest and Belgrade at the point of protecting the nation-state reflexes against the demands of the West.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the most fundamental ideological instrument in Russia’s Balkan policy is pan-Slavism. At this point, the Moscow administration cares about Serbia, Bosnian Serbs and Kosovo Serbs. Moreover, within the framework of the “Greater Serbia” imagination in Belgrade, it has a claim to the protection of Kosovo and Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, Hungary, on the one hand, Russia; On the other hand, considering Serbia’s regional policy, it may prefer to stand by Belgrade. Of course, in this case, the geopolitical position of Kosovo is also effective.
As can be understood, Hungary cares about its relations with Russia; but it is an actor in the West. Kosovo, on the other hand, declared its independence with the support of the United States of America (USA) and has come to the forefront with its close relations with the USA and its allies since its establishment. As a matter of fact, NATO’s Kosovo Task Force (KFOR) is located in this country. Therefore, the USA ensures the security of the country through NATO through KFOR and while doing this, it increases its influence in the Balkan geopolitics. This bothers Russia. At this point, Hungary may consider vetoing Kosovo’s EU membership, which it sees as a development that will increase the Western influence in the Balkans, in terms of its own world view.
As a result, the Budapest administration has established close relations with Belgrade for various reasons, especially immigration and energy. On the other hand, it has some problems in its relations with the EU due to the funding issue and various criticisms of the union. In this process, Budapest may see the issue of Kosovo’s EU membership as a bargain where it can gain some gains through its veto power. At the same time, it can be said that Hungary, as a result of its relations with both Serbia and Russia, is keeping a distance to the developments that will increase the Western influence in the Balkan geography. Because although Hungary is not a Balkan country, it is a state bordering the Balkans. Therefore, it may consider preserving the status quo in the region as a more appropriate option in terms of its own interests.
[1] “Serbia Says Hungary Will Vote against Kosovo EU-COE Membership”, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-says-hungary-will-vote-against-kosovo-eu-coe-membership, (Date of Accession: 13.01.2023).
[2] “Austria Teams Up With Hungary, Serbia to End Asylum a la Carte”, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/austria-teams-up-with-hungary-serbia-to-end-asylum-a-la-carte/, (Date of Accession:12.01.2023).
[3] “Hungary, Serbia Agree to Build Pipeline to Ship Russian Oil to Serbia”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/hungary-serbia-agree-build-pipeline-ship-russian-oil-serbia-hungarian-govt-2022-10-10/, (Date of Accession: 13.01.2023).
