The United States of America’s (USA) withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s return to the country after a 20-year hiatus shortly before the withdrawal brought the Afghan Question to a new stage. The second Taliban period, which can also be formulated as “Taliban 2.0”, has begun in the country. However, despite the time that has passed, the Taliban government has not been officially recognized by any state.
The problem of recognition makes it difficult to attract investment and deliver humanitarian aid to the Afghan people. Accordingly, the employment problem in Afghanistan is deepening, leading first to an economic crisis and then to a humanitarian crisis. The increase in economic and social problems also creates space for terrorist organizations. In particular, it is known that the terrorist organization State of Iraq and al-Sham (DAESH), which is trying to create a lebensraum for itself after its defeat in Syria and Iraq, has a presence in Afghanistan. This situation threatens Afghanistan in particular and the regional security environment in general.
Uzbekistan is one of the actors that is aware of the risks posed by the regional security environment and stands out with its constructive attitude towards the solution of these problems. The Tashkent administration is concerned that the problems in the neighboring country may spill over into its own territory in the context of radicalization and terrorism, and due to these concerns, it aims to strengthen the regional security environment by developing policies aimed at regional cooperation and prosperity.
Uzbekistan’s approach is based on two concerns. The first is that some Uzbekistan-based terrorist organizations have crossed into Afghanistan and declared allegiance to the terrorist organization DAESH. The second is the possibility that the Fergana Valley, where a certain stability and reconciliation has been achieved through peaceful policies for many years, may be affected by radicalization and thus create an environment of regional chaos.
For these reasons, Tashkent does not officially recognize the Taliban but develops de facto relations with them. In this sense, on the one hand, Uzbekistan is trying to draw the Taliban to the ground of regional dialogue and cooperation; on the other hand, it is taking initiatives to contribute to the welfare of the Afghan people by involving Afghanistan in various projects. In addition, Uzbekistan continues to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.
Moreover, Tashkent pays attention to the formation of a regional consensus in the course of this strategy. At a time when global rivalries and conflicts are on the rise, Uzbekistan’s approach can be characterized as an antidote to instability that aims to build bridges of cooperation.
As part of this approach, the Tashkent administration periodically organizes meetings-conferences where regional states come together; from time to time, it participates in summits organized by other actors where the Afghan Question is discussed and makes concrete proposals for developing a constructive attitude.
In the course of this approach, Uzbekistan does not consider the issue only in the regional dimension and considers that the Afghan Question concerns the whole world due to various reasons such as terrorism, radicalization and migration. In this context, Tashkent is also taking various steps to keep the issue on the agenda of the international society. The most tangible example of this is the proposal of the President of Uzbekistan, Mr. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, to establish a commission on Afghanistan within the United Nations (UN).[1]
At this point, it should be underlined that Uzbekistan, within the framework of Mr. Mirziyoyev’s visionary leadership on the Afghan Question, operated conference diplomacy even before the Taliban’s second term began and, in a sense, carried out a preemptive diplomacy in the face of crises. As a matter of fact, the “Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity, Challenges and Opportunities Conference” held in Tashkent on July 15-16, 2021 is an example of such a conference.[2]
Similarly, Uzbekistan, which wanted to remind the international community of the continued problems in Afghanistan at a time when the international community was focusing on the Russia-Ukraine War and did not refrain from developing a responsible attitude in this sense, as the Chair-in-Office of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), hosted a conference titled “Afghanistan: Security and Economic Development” in July 2022, bringing together SCO member states and the Taliban: Security and Economic Development” in July 2022, bringing together SCO member states and the Taliban.[3] Finally, Uzbekistan hosted the “Tashkent Summit” on March 7, 2023, with representatives from China, Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.[4]
All these meetings clearly demonstrate Tashkent’s constructive attitude towards the solution of the Afghan problem. Moreover, Uzbekistan wants to include Afghanistan in regional cooperation projects such as the “Timriz-Mazar-i-Sharif-Peshawar Railway Project” and thus open the door to investments that will contribute to the welfare of the Afghan carpet.
In addition, it is very important that Uzbekistan maintains this constructive approach despite having some disagreements on Afghanistan. This is because such a stance of Tashkent despite its disagreements clearly demonstrates the importance that the Government of Uzbekistan under the leadership of Mr. Mirziyoyev attaches to regional and global security and peace.
Obviously, Uzbekistan also takes a dialogue-centered perspective on conflicts. That is the reason for the visit of an Uzbek delegation under the leadership of Mr. Mirziyoyev’s Special Representative for Foreign Policy Abdulaziz Kamilov to Afghanistan on March 22, 2023. In Kabul, the delegation held meetings with Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Birader, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaki and Defense Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid.[5]
It can be noted that various areas of cooperation, ranging from regional security to economics, were discussed in the talks between the parties. However, the most important issue discussed was the Taliban’s construction of a canal on the Amu Darya River. The Tashkent administration believes that the construction of the canal will change the flow of water in the river and this will negatively affect Uzbek farmers. Although it is known that such issues cause serious crises in today’s conditions where the importance of water is increasing day by day, Uzbekistan has put forward a stance that puts dialogue at the center of the Amu Darya issue. As a result of this constructive approach, the Taliban have already announced their readiness to cooperate to complete the canal “in accordance with international norms and taking full account of privileges”.[6]
On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, as a reflection of its sensitivity to not deepening the areas of conflict, did not mention the issue of the canal being built on the Amu Darya in its statements on the summit; it only published a text expressing the importance of cooperation on “water and energy” issues.[7] This is significant in that it indicates that the parties will resolve this issue with an approach centered on regional cooperation with the awareness that every crisis also contains opportunities.
In conclusion, Uzbekistan is one of the states that stands out with its constructionist position on the solution of the Afghan Question. Therefore, Tashkent takes care to develop a healthy dialogue with the Taliban, continues its humanitarian aid activities for the Afghan people, strives to build a consensus on Afghanistan at the regional and global level, and brings cooperation opportunities, not conflicts, to the agenda by involving the country in various projects. The most current example of this is Kamilov’s visit to Kabul, which demonstrated the will to find a middle ground on the canal being built on the Amu Darya River. This makes Uzbekistan the most critical actor in the resolution of the Afghan conflict.
[1] Doğacan Başaran, “Seeking Solutions to the Afghan Problem: Tashkent Summit”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/seeking-solutions-to-the-afghan-problem-tashkent-summit/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 25.03.2023).
[2] Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, “Uzbekistan’s Impact on Regional and Global Peace: “Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity. Challenges and Opportunities” Conference”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/uzbekistans-impact-on-regional-and-global-peace-central-and-south-asia-regional-connectivity-challenges-and-opportunities-conference/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 25.03.2023).
[3] “نشست تاشکند پایان یافت | آمریکا ذخایر مسدود شده افغانستان را به یک صندوق امانی سپرده است”, Shahrar News, https://l24.im/G5zSnw, (Date of Accession: 25.03.2023).
[4] Başaran, op.cit.
[5] “Узбекская делегация посетила с рабочим визитом столицу Афганистана”, Central Asia News, https://centralasia.news/20355-uzbekskaja-delegacija-posetila-s-rabochim-vizitom-stolicu-afganistana.html, (Date of Accession: 25.03.2023).
[6] “Uzbekistan Pursues Dialogue with Afghanistan on Fraught Canal Project”, Eurasia.net, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-pursues-dialogue-with-afghanistan-on-fraught-canal-project, (Date of Accession: 25.03.2023).
[7] Ibid.
