The Central African Republic (CAR) is at the center of one of the most complex geopolitical equations on the African continent today. Shaped by political instability, ethnic divisions, chronic poverty, and recurring armed conflicts, the country is an important front in the struggle for influence among major powers. Recent developments indicate that the CAR is not only shaped by its internal dynamics but also by the logic of global power competition. The Russian Federation’s plan to withdraw the Wagner Group from the field and replace it with the Africa Corps, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, is a critical turning point in this context.[i] This step should not be seen as a mere security reform, but rather as a concrete expression of a multi-layered strategic repositioning.
Wagner’s presence in the CAR began with security agreements signed in 2018. The official justification was to protect the capital Bangui, repel rebel attacks, and train the army. However, Wagner’s influence quickly extended far beyond these boundaries. The security of mining sites, the protection of government officials, operations against rebel groups, and intelligence activities have become the core areas of activity for this organization. Moreover, Wagner has become not only a security actor but also a power center functioning as a “parallel state.” It has established de facto authority in areas where the state is weak, rearranged local militia balances in its favor, and played a decisive role in the operation of strategic mines.
Moscow’s new plan envisages integrating this structure into the Defense Ministry hierarchy. The new structure, called Africa Corps, will be directly controlled by the state, partially financed from the Russian budget, but the OAC government will also assume certain financial obligations.[ii] This model serves two important strategic objectives. The first is to erase Wagner’s image as an “uncontrolled militia” in the international public eye and to give Russian presence an official status. The second is to build a lasting relationship of dependency by tying the host country financially to the process. In this way, Russia is both legitimizing its presence on the ground and establishing itself as an indispensable actor in the OAC’s security architecture.
From the OAC’s perspective, the consequences of this transition paint a complex picture. Wagner stood out for its high mobility on the ground, pragmatic relationships with local militias, and operational flexibility free from bureaucratic constraints. The Africa Corps, on the other hand, will have slower decision-making processes tied to state hierarchies, which could create a risk of losing initiative in the face of asymmetric threats. Moreover, the networks Wagner developed locally were not limited to mere military capabilities but represented a complex ecosystem that intertwined security with economic interests.
This development has the potential to affect not only the internal balance of the OAC, but also the security architecture in the Sahel region. Over the past decade, the Sahel has become one of the regions where jihadist organizations and organized crime networks are most active. The Sahel States Alliance, formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has shifted toward Russia as France’s influence in West Africa has waned. The Africa Corps, which will be stationed at the OAC, could form the southern wing of this regional security network, creating a Russian security corridor stretching from the Sahel to Central Africa. Such a corridor would give Moscow a strategic advantage not only militarily, but also logistically and economically.
Russia’s strategic line in Africa actually continues some of the principles inherited from the Cold War era in an updated form. The Soviet Union supported anti-colonial movements in Africa from the 1960s onwards and cooperated militarily and technically with countries that gained independence. The ideological and logistical support provided during this period strengthened Moscow’s influence in Africa. However, these relations weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union and were revived in the early 2000s. Today, Russia bases this strategy on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds, offering security support in exchange for access to natural resources and diplomatic support.
Wagner’s role in Africa served as the unofficial arm of this strategy. Wagner had quickly filled the void left by the decline of Western influence across a vast geographical area stretching from Libya to Sudan and from Mali to Mozambique. However, the leadership crisis and international pressure that followed in 2023 prompted Moscow to reshape this structure. The establishment of the Africa Corps represents the official and institutional dimension of this restructuring. In this sense, the OAC will serve as a testing ground. If this model proves successful, it is likely to be applied to other African countries as well.
France and the United States view these developments as a threat to their interests. For France, the OAC is part of what has historically been referred to as its “pré carré” sphere of influence. France’s loss of influence in the Sahel is now compounded by a similar process in Central Africa. Washington, meanwhile, views Russia’s establishment of an institutional military presence in Africa as a significant challenge not only to regional but also to global power balances. This is because such a presence creates political capital that could be effective in a wide range of areas, from United Nations votes to natural resource markets.
At the local level, reactions to the Africa Corps plan are divided. The government presents this step as a positive development in terms of sustainable security. The opposition and civil society, on the other hand, warn that it will lead to a loss of sovereignty in the long term and make the country dependent on a single pole in foreign policy. These criticisms show that the dilemma of “security in exchange for sovereignty,” observed in many African countries, is also on the agenda in the OAC.
From a historical perspective, the influence of external powers in the OAC has been continuous since the country gained independence in 1960. French military presence, political interventions, UN peacekeeping operations, and the influence of regional actors have shaped the country’s internal balance in every period. However, the current situation has taken on a different dimension with Russia’s attempt to establish a military presence that is directly integrated into the state structure. This is a model that aims for continuity and institutionalization, unlike the temporary or limited missions of the past.
Although negotiations between Bangui and Moscow appear to focus on troop numbers and base locations, behind the scenes much more critical issues are being discussed. The sharing of mining revenues, control of logistical supply lines, and diplomatic protection mechanisms against international pressure are the real determinants of these negotiations. Russia is keeping the “full integration or withdrawal of support” card on the table, leaving the OAC strategically without alternatives.
In the short term, the deployment of the Africa Corps may contribute to controlling the insurgent threat and strengthening government authority. However, in the long term, this model may narrow the OAC’s maneuvering space in foreign policy and condemn the country to a one-sided dependency relationship. Geopolitically, this will grant Russia significant prestige while further weakening the West’s influence on the continent. Additionally, if this model is applied in other countries, security relations in Africa will be reshaped by a new paradigm.
Ultimately, the Africa Corps plan is not merely a military choice for the OAC; it is a strategic decision that will determine the country’s future direction. With this step, Russia will not only remain an ally but will become a permanent actor influencing the state’s most critical decision-making mechanisms. Such a transformation will redraw not only the OAC’s but the entire continent’s power map. History shows that the effects of such decisions are felt for decades. The steps taken in Bangui today have the potential to write the opening lines of a new era in Africa’s future.
[i] Jean-Fernand Koena ve Mark Banchereau, “Russia asks Central African Republic to replace Wagner with state-run Africa Corps and pay for it”, AP News, 6 Ağustos 2025, https://apnews.com/article/central-african-republic-russia-wagner-africa-corps-b9e4078548ceda4bbe8b70eb821d5a87, (Date Accessed: 07.08.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
