The Government of Japan approved three new defence and security plans on December 16, 2022: “National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Development Programme.”[1] Thus, the Tokyo administration has taken an important step towards fulfilling its commitment to increase its military spending to 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[2] This is a historic step. For Japan, which has followed a passive policy since the Second World War, to suddenly turn to such high defence expenditures and transition to an active defence policy is a revolution for Tokyo.
The three published documents are the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP), respectively. The NSS generally includes the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Italy, Canada, the United States (US), Australia, India, South Korea, New Zealand, and Southeast Asian countries.[3] With these three documents, Japan lays out a new security and defence strategy and defence development plan. As part of its National Security Strategy, the Tokyo government has indicated that over the next decade it will undertake strategic overhauls in areas such as defence, economic security, diplomacy, cybersecurity, and intelligence.
DBP, known as the Medium-Term Defense Program, lays out plans for total defence spending and major equipment procurement volumes for the next five years. The DBP document plans to increase Japan’s defence spending to about $320 billion (43 trillion yen) over five years (between 2023 and 2027).[4] In other words, it is expected to reach 80 billion dollars annually by 2027.
Japan has close ties with the US and borders three countries it sees as rivals. These are China, Russia, and North Korea. North Korea is perceived as a major source of concern after firing ballistic missiles over Japan. This threat identification is also reflected in the documents.
Japan characterizes Russia as “a dangerous country that easily violates the rules of international law due to its aggression against Ukraine.”[5] The Tokyo administration described Russia’s activities around Japan and its cooperation with China, which it saw as a direct and clear threat to Europe, as a strong security concern. In this respect, Russia is a country that claims rights to the Cyrillic Islands near Japan and has deployed missile systems on some of the islands there, posing a threat to Japan. However, Russia, which is currently engaged in a war in Ukraine, is unlikely to clash with a much larger and more powerful state like Japan. Tokyo, therefore, believes that Russia, which provides it with important supplies of natural gas and oil, is not the biggest threat in the region.
China, on the other hand, plans to become the world’s superpower by 2050 and is increasing its military capacity and defence spending every year. As the main trading partner of many countries in the world, China is expanding its influence. The most important and striking part of the three documents is how Japan will deal with a rising China. In the National Security Strategy Paper, China was described by Tokyo as the “biggest strategic challenge.”
The situation in question is rather that China is not considered a threat to Japan; it can be interpreted as a diplomatic language used to prevent tension between the parties. It is important for both sides that the country’s national strategy document does not use harsh language against China, the world’s second-largest economy. Therefore, this is how Japan’s characterization of China as a “difficulty” should be viewed. Nevertheless, while China’s actions and attitudes were described as an issue related to the international community in the National Security Strategy of 2013, it was described as the biggest strategic challenge in the document of 2022, which means that a change was made in Japan’s security policies.
It can be said that there are other reasons behind Japan’s characterization of China as a strategic challenge rather than a threat. The strong ties of Komeito, one of the coalition partners of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan, with China are the most important among these. Founded by members of a group known as the Soka Gakkai Movement, this party took important steps to normalize relations with China in 1972. This comment can be made since the party is thought to have had strong ties with Beijing since the period.
Another reason may be that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, leader of Japan’s current ruling party LDP, has frequently stated that it is important to seek stable and positive relations with China. It is possible that such language was used because the Kishida administration did not want to provoke China and did not want to worsen existing relations. Moreover, defining another state as a threat in an important document such as a country’s national security document can undoubtedly cause discontent in the country concerned. Therefore, it can be said that more reasonable expressions are preferred in order not to cause such discontent.
On the other hand, Japan’s planned counterattack capability is expected to be implemented in 2026 at the earliest. For this reason, the timing/duration of the deployment of long-range Tomahawk missiles is likely to be important. Deployment of such weapons would be an abandonment of the policy of the Japanese Government of 1956, which prohibited the ability to counter-attack except as a final defensive measure. For this reason, the policy change is remarkable for the future of the region, Japan, and the world.
Japan has announced that it has entered a new era with the three documents it has announced. According to these new strategy documents, which are proof of the transition from a pacifist policy it has been pursuing since 1956 to a proactive strategy, Japan plans to double its defence expenditures and allocate a budget of 80 billion dollars every year until 2027. This demonstrates the importance Tokyo attaches to security.
As a result, it can be stated that three important documents announced by the Japanese Government are of strategic nature for the future of Japan and the region. At the same time, the published documents can also improve relations with the US. In this context, the launch of Japan-US drills against the recently frequent Russia-China drills may also be on the agenda.
[1] “Japon: la nouvelle stratégie renforcée de défense et de sécurité dévoilée”, RFI, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/asie-pacifique/20221216-japon-la-nouvelle-stratégie-renforcée-de-défense-et-de-sécurité-dévoilée, (Date of Accession: 20.12.2022).
[2] “Le Japon approuve une révision majeure de sa doctrine de défense face à la Chine”, Le Quotidien, https://lequotidien.lu/monde/le-japon-approuve-une-revision-majeure-de-sa-doctrine-de-defense-face-a-la-chine/, (Date of Accession: 20.12.2022).
[3] “National Defense Strategy 2022”, Japonya Savunma Bakanlığı, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf, (Date of Accession: 20.12.2022).
[4] Alastair Gale-Chieko Tsuneoka, “Japan to Build a More Powerful Military, Citing China as Its No. 1 Menace”, The Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-to-build-a-more-powerful-military-citing-china-as-its-no-1-menace-11671177530, (Date of Accession: 20.12.2022).
[5] “National Defense Strategy…”, op. cit.
