In the discipline of international relations, hegemony is measured not only by the quantitative superiority of military or economic capabilities, but also by the breadth of consent that the dominant power generates within the global system. The most recent findings from a long-term dataset conducted by the Pew Research Center, covering 36 countries and dating back to 2002, indicate a profound rupture in the ideological foundation of the American-centric unipolar world order established after World War II.
China’s emergence with a more positive global image than the United States is a critical threshold symbolizing a structural transformation of the international system, beyond a mere popularity contest. While American hegemony has historically been built on liberal democratic values and institutional predictability, current statistics show that Washington is rapidly losing these structural advantages. This paradigm shift is directly linked to the deepening perceptual divide between the Global South and the core countries.[i]
When evaluated within the context of Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power,” which he introduced to international political literature, the historical appeal of the United States has been based on normative discourses in its foreign policy. However, recent data proves that the practical application of these normative discourses is increasingly being questioned by global public opinion. The finding of a perceived advantage in favor of China in 25 out of the 36 countries participating in the study confirms that the erosion of American soft power is accelerating. Even the fluctuations observed in the final years of the George W. Bush administration in 2008 and the early stages of the Donald Trump administration in 2017 did not create a picture where China surpassed America so clearly. The increasing positive momentum towards China even in traditional European countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece indicates that cracks are forming in the social foundation of the transatlantic alliance.[ii]
Instability in foreign policy-making processes is a fundamental factor undermining the credibility of global actors. As Carnegie China scholar Chong Ja Ian aptly points out, extreme fluctuations in American policies, threats of military force, and the resulting economic damage are unsettling global actors. During the period covered by the survey, the US’s radical rhetoric regarding the annexation of Greenland, its interventionist stance towards Venezuelan leadership, and the risk of a hot conflict with Iran demonstrate that Washington has evolved into an “unpredictable” actor. The international community of states, especially medium-sized powers, need a predictable international system to conduct their strategic planning. The shaping of American foreign policy by reactive and populist impulses rather than institutional reasoning has minimized its hegemonic credibility.[iii]
At the heart of China’s strategy to fill this ideological void lies the doctrine of “non-interference in internal affairs.” According to Pew data, while 75% of respondents believe the US interferes significantly or excessively in the internal affairs of other countries, this figure is around 45% for China. This statistical difference summarizes how vital the Westphalian concept of sovereignty is in international relations, especially for middle-income countries. Regime change operations or threats of economic sanctions carried out under the guise of liberal interventionism have become the main artery fueling anti-American sentiment in developing countries. Beijing, on the other hand, has managed to project a more “secure” partner profile by conducting its commercial and diplomatic relations with its counterparts on a purely rational-transactional basis.[iv]
Economic stratification in the global perception map constitutes one of the most striking sociological findings of the research. While negative perceptions of China prevail in affluent, developed core countries, a strong positive sentiment in favor of China is sweeping through middle-income and developing countries. Developed democracies code China’s technological and economic rise as an ontological threat to the existing status quo and the liberal world order. Developing countries, on the other hand, view China as a development model, an infrastructure financier, and a vital partner against Western financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) through massive infrastructure projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Within this structural dichotomy, Singapore stands as a perfect example of pragmatic foreign policy. Despite having the highest per capita national income among the countries surveyed, Singapore’s highly positive attitude towards China proves that geographical determinism and ethno-cultural ties can determine strategic orientation regardless of economic status.
The Asia-Pacific region, where geopolitical fault lines are most intensely felt, embodies both the peak and the trough of China’s image. The massive 90% approval rating for China in Pakistan, contrasted with the marginal 11% acceptance rate in Japan, can be directly explained by the “balance of threats” concept of international alliance theory. For Pakistan, China is the only strategic guarantee and economic development partner that balances existential security concerns stemming from India. From Japan’s perspective, China is the primary perpetrator of historical animosities, direct territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and the struggle for regional hegemony. This sharp polarization demonstrates that China has not been able to produce a homogeneous soft power globally, and that specific strategic interpretations are decisive for each country.
The asymmetry between leadership profiles and state image presents a profound contradiction requiring analysis from a political science perspective. The research reveals that global trust in both US President Donald Trump and Chinese Leader Xi Jinping remains well below the 50% mark. However, the relative trust in Xi Jinping being higher than in Trump is a result of the perception of institutional predictability rather than individual charisma. In the Chinese context, public perception is divided: on one hand, increasing authoritarianism, human rights violations against minorities, and revisionist rhetoric are directly identified with Xi Jinping’s person and therefore negatively evaluated. On the other hand, technological breakthroughs such as artificial intelligence, 5G, and space exploration, along with massive infrastructure exports, are coded as the “systemic success” of the Chinese state. The developing world rewards the economic and technological pragmatism offered by China, separating the handicaps of individual leadership from the overall vision of the state.
The current exceptions in Washington’s favor are directly linked to traditional security dilemmas stemming from the anarchic nature of the international system. The fact that only six countries (Poland, the Philippines, South Korea, India, Japan, and Israel) prefer America to China is not a coincidental statistic. The common denominator among these six countries is that they have tied their existential security to the umbrella of American nuclear and conventional deterrence. For Poland, it is Russia; for the Philippines and Japan, it is China; and for Israel, it is regional threat perceptions that rationalize their dependence on American power. This situation is the most concrete evidence that the US’s global appeal has ceased to be an ideological model and has been reduced to merely a rigid “security provider” status.
In conclusion, this historical data set presented by the Pew Research Center confirms that global politics evolved towards a permanent “multipolarity” in the second quarter of the 21st century. The shifts in American foreign policy, the fatigue created by interventionist practices, and the radical changes in decision-making mechanisms have created an environment of uncertainty that is difficult for the rest of the system to tolerate. One of the most fundamental assumptions in the history of international relations is that a hegemony that is beginning to lose its ideological dominance cannot maintain its systemic leadership for long solely through military capacity. The fundamental conflict dynamic of the coming decades will be shaped around how sustainable Beijing can be in maintaining its pragmatic image and whether Washington can rebuild the institutional predictability it has lost.
[i] “More people around the world now favour China over the US, Pew study suggests”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd959q11g54o, (Date of Access: 15.07.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
