The moderate relations that have long been observed between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin continue to be a major source of concern for European countries. Before being elected to a second presidential term, Trump repeatedly stated during his election campaign that he would “end the war in Ukraine in one day.”[i] After taking office, he pursued intensive diplomatic efforts toward this goal. Throughout this period, the fact that Trump was able to develop a more constructive dialogue with Putin, in contrast to his strained relationship with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, did not go unnoticed.
In 2024, Ukraine sought to secure a $60 billion military aid package from the United States but encountered opposition from Republicans. In an effort to overcome this obstacle, European actors, particularly the United Kingdom, conducted intensive lobbying to persuade Republican senators. This led to an intense flurry of diplomatic activity along the Washington–London–Brussels axis. After returning to office for a second term in 2025, Trump once again pursued a pragmatic diplomatic approach to ending the war in Ukraine and found greater common ground for an agreement with Russia.
The war in Ukraine has also raised the question, “Who will ensure Europe’s security?” According to a report published by the Kiel Institute,[ii] among the actors providing the largest amounts of aid to Ukraine between 2022 and 2025, the United States ranked first with $130 billion, followed by the European Union with $79 billion, Germany with $25 billion, and the United Kingdom with $21 billion. Accordingly, Trump, guided by a straightforward cost-benefit principle, emphasizes that the United States no longer wishes to shoulder an even greater share of Europe’s burden and shapes his foreign policy accordingly. For example, the Trump administration seeks to pressure European allies with whom it disagrees by threatening to raise tariffs and compel them to align with its preferred position. As the actor responsible for ensuring Europe’s security, the United States also positions itself as the primary decision-maker in determining the continent’s future.
Viewed from this perspective, the rapprochement between Trump and Putin is regarded as “a geopolitical development that could weaken Europe’s security architecture.” Washington’s decision to exclude European actors from its negotiations with Moscow aimed at ending the war, together with the strategic gains Russia could secure through these negotiations, may point toward a new world order in which Europe no longer has a place at the table. In other words, the United States is now forcing Europe to make a clear choice: either Europe builds its own security order without NATO support, or the United States constructs a new Eurasian order alongside major powers such as Russia and China, with Europe excluded from the equation.
Therefore, the issue at stake is not merely Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, the terms of a ceasefire, or Russia’s expectations. The central question is who will shape Europe’s security in the postwar period and how the United States’ leadership role in the international system will evolve. According to some analysts,[iii] Trump’s rapprochement with Putin may be motivated by a desire to prevent Russia and China from joining forces in Eurasia and to avert an integrated challenge to American hegemony. From this perspective, Washington may be seeking to reduce Russia’s dependence on Beijing by normalizing economic relations with Moscow. By developing its dialogue with both Russia and China, the United States could expand its foreign policy options and thereby gain diplomatic leverage over both powers.
On the other hand, however, if Brussels distances itself from Washington and builds its own security order, Washington may fail to obtain the support it expects from Europe in its strategy to contain China in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, while attempting to drive a wedge between Russia and China on a global scale, the United States could also undermine solidarity within its own camp.
According to other analysts,[iv] Trump’s belief that he can persuade Putin to reach an agreement through economic incentives is a significant miscalculation. From this perspective, easing sanctions on Russia does not persuade Moscow to abandon its fundamental demands regarding Ukraine. Moreover, Trump’s objective may not necessarily be to make Russia relinquish these core demands. In previous statements, Trump had said that both Ukraine and Russia would have to cede territory to bring the war to an end. It can therefore be argued that Trump does not share the same position as his European allies on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. While Ukraine and other European actors insist that no concessions on this issue are acceptable, the United States may argue that Ukraine should recognize Crimea and the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions as Russian territory.[v] An analysis published by The Economist[vi] on October 23, 2026, points to a similar problem: as U.S. pressure on Kyiv intensifies, the draft agreement under discussion contains terms that are unbalanced from Ukraine’s perspective.
According to an analysis published by The Guardian[vii] on October 23, 2026, Trump portrays Zelensky as “the source of the problem” and “the actor who does not want peace,” while giving greater latitude to Putin’s demands. Furthermore, in a statement dated October 19, 2026, the Kremlin announced that a trilateral summit involving Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping could take place.[viii] This proposed trilateral summit could rapidly alter the global balance of power. Putin’s initiative can be interpreted as a strategy to determine the fate of the conflict in Ukraine and the future security architecture at a table comprising the great powers—the United States, Russia, and China—while completely sidelining Kyiv, which is directly involved in the crisis, as well as Europe. This format, to which Zelensky has not been invited, evokes the Yalta Conference of 1945 and the process of constructing a new world order. European powers, in particular, view with concern the prospect of a summit capable of shaping the future of the world through an arrangement from which they are excluded. In this respect, shaping Europe’s future at a meeting attended by Russia and China would represent an extremely dangerous scenario for Brussels. The United States may be seeking to demonstrate that a world order can be constructed without Europe.
[i] “Here are 11 things Trump has promised to carry out on Day 1 of his presidency”, NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/11-things-trump-day-1-presidency-rcna184423, (Date Accessed: 24.10.2026).
[ii] “How much have Europe and the US given to Ukraine?”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crew8y7pwd5o, (Date Accessed: 24.10.2026).
[iii] “Trump’s Putin Gambit is Aimed at Preventing Eurasian Solidarity”, The Wire, https://thewire.in/world/trumps-putin-gambit-is-aimed-at-preventing-eurasian-solidarity, (Date Accessed: 24.10.2026).
[iv] “Why Trump Can’t Sell Putin a Deal”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/10/trump-putin-ukraine-nato/689118/, (Date Accessed: 24.10.2026).
[v] “Trump’tan Ukrayna’ya Toprak Tavizi Çağrısı: Kremlin’i Sevindiren Açıklamalar”, CNN Turk, https://www.cnnturk.com/dunya/galeri/trumptan-ukraynaya-toprak-tavizi-cagrisi-kremlini-sevindiren-aciklamalar-2259618?page=1, (Date Accessed: 24.10.2026).
[vi] “US pressure coincides with push to revive lopsided Ukraine peace deal – The Economist”, Axy Media, https://axy.media/war/us-pressure-coincides-with-push-to-revive-lopsided-ukraine-peace-deal-the-economist?utm_source=chatgpt.com, (Date Accessed: 24.10.2026).
[vii] “The Trump-Putin love story’s next chapter: selling out Ukraine”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/oct/23/trump-putin-ukraine, (Date Accessed: 24.10.2026).
[viii] “Kremlin says Putin, Trump and Xi could hold a three-way meeting in China next month”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/kremlin-says-putin-trump-xi-could-hold-three-way-meeting-china-next-month-2026-10-19/, (Date Accessed: 21.10.2026).
