The United States’ (U.S.) initiatives to expand military training activities in Panama, Honduras, and Colombia indicate that a security-centered approach is once again gaining prominence in Washington’s Latin America policy. The military operations conducted by the Donald Trump administration as part of its efforts to combat drug trafficking go beyond targeting transnational criminal organizations. They are also part of a broader regional security strategy aimed at strengthening the United States’ strategic position in the Western Hemisphere. These developments are significant in terms of the place of the Monroe Doctrine in contemporary U.S. foreign policy, the sovereignty of Latin American countries, and the future of Washington’s regional hegemony.
The plan to deploy approximately 600 soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division for training activities in Latin America reflects Washington’s efforts to expand military cooperation in the region. Following training exercises in the forested areas of Panama, joint activities with the armed forces of Honduras and Colombia are planned. However, different accounts have emerged regarding the number of military personnel involved. The U.S. Embassy in Panama has rejected claims that 600 soldiers were deployed to the country simultaneously, stating that 120 soldiers are participating in the current activities and that the two-week training program will conclude on October 25, 2026. Former U.S. Ambassador John D. Feeley, by contrast, has stated that a total of 600 soldiers will participate in the training through five separate rotations of 120 personnel each. Therefore, the central issue is not merely the number of soldiers involved, but also the potential link between these training activities and future operational deployments.[i]
Washington’s military initiatives are being viewed in the context of the Trump administration’s renewed emphasis on the Monroe Doctrine in its foreign policy agenda. First introduced in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine has historically been associated with the United States’ efforts to protect its strategic interests in the Americas and limit the influence of external powers in the region. The renewed prominence of this approach under the Trump administration signals that Latin America is being positioned as a priority region for U.S. national security. Indeed, the administration’s rhetoric about reasserting American dominance in the Western Hemisphere indicates that drug trafficking, organized crime, and regional security threats are being addressed within a broader geopolitical framework.
In this context, the Trump administration’s policies highlight the relationship between security cooperation and the expansion of regional influence. The military intervention in Venezuela, attacks on vessels in the Caribbean allegedly involved in drug trafficking and increased economic pressure on Cuba demonstrate Washington’s ability to employ different foreign policy instruments simultaneously. Nevertheless, military interventions, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure differ significantly in legal and political terms. Although these instruments can be viewed as components of a common regional strategy, each measure must be examined separately in terms of international law and state sovereignty.
The United States’ efforts to institutionalize its security framework in Latin America are also noteworthy. Established in March 2026, the Shield of the Americas aims to coordinate joint action against drug cartels and strengthen military cooperation among participating countries. The Coalition of American Countries Against Cartels (A3C), associated with this initiative, includes 18 Latin American countries, among them Panama, Honduras, and Colombia. Furthermore, discussions about establishing a new military command structure headquartered in Miami, along with the creation of a unit within the Pentagon to oversee operations against drug cartels, are strengthening the institutional dimension of regional security cooperation.
These initiatives raise differing security and sovereignty considerations in Latin American countries’ relations with Washington. From the U.S. perspective, joint training exercises, intelligence sharing, and operational coordination are viewed as tools that could help strengthen military capabilities in the fight against transnational criminal organizations. At the same time, the expansion of foreign military personnel’s activities in the region has sparked debate over the limits of host countries’ decision-making authority and their foreign policy autonomy. In particular, the distinction between military training and direct participation in operations is one of the key factors determining the legal nature of security cooperation.
The case of Colombia illustrates the constitutional and political dimensions of this distinction. While foreign military personnel may participate in advisory and training activities under certain conditions, direct operational activities and the status of foreign troops in the country require more extensive legal assessment. Previous rulings by Colombia’s Council of State have established that temporary training activities conducted by foreign soldiers without carrying weapons, exercising command authority, or participating in operations cannot be treated as legally equivalent to the entry of military units into the country. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s statements that the Colombian government had authorized joint operations have raised further questions regarding the powers of the legislature. Therefore, the legal authorization underpinning these activities is as important as the scope of military cooperation itself.[ii]
Another dimension of these developments is the increasing use of military assets in the fight against drug trafficking. The deployment of Reaper-type unmanned aerial vehicles to Colombia and Ecuador, along with efforts to develop special operations capabilities in forested areas, demonstrates the importance Washington places on military capabilities in combating criminal organizations. Nevertheless, drug trafficking is not a security issue that can be addressed through military means alone. Transnational financial networks, money laundering activities, institutional capacity challenges, and international demand for drugs also play a role in sustaining this system. Therefore, the effectiveness of military operations depends on the extent to which they can be integrated with legal cooperation, financial oversight, and policies to combat organized crime.
The expansion of Washington’s regional security activities has also brought the relationship between hegemony and legitimacy in Latin America back into focus. While strengthening U.S. military capabilities may increase its influence over the regional order, translating this influence into political legitimacy depends on the consent of regional countries, institutional cooperation, and respect for their sovereign rights. From this perspective, military capability and the establishment of legitimacy are regarded as distinct processes. Security cooperation can strengthen institutional relations when it is based on the shared interests of participating countries. However, if perceptions of unilateral intervention become more widespread, it can also lead to diplomatic tensions.
In conclusion, the U.S. military training initiatives centered on Panama, Honduras, and Colombia indicate that the Trump administration views Latin America once again as one of the priority strategic regions of American foreign policy. The integration of the Monroe Doctrine into contemporary security policies, the expansion of regional military cooperation, and the enhancement of operational capabilities in the fight against drug trafficking represent different dimensions of Washington’s efforts to consolidate its position in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, the impact of this approach on the regional order will be shaped not only by the scope of U.S. military activities but also by the political and legal responses of Latin American countries to these initiatives. Therefore, the key issue in the period ahead will be not so much the extent to which Washington expands its military presence, but rather the implications of expanding security cooperation for regional sovereignty, institutional legitimacy, and interstate relations.
[i] González, Jesús Sérvulo, and Juan Esteban Lewin. “Estados Unidos aumenta su presencia militar en América Latina con entrenamientos en Panamá, Honduras y Colombia”, El País, https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2026-10-17/estados-unidos-aumenta-su-presencia-militar-en-america-latina-con-entrenamientos-en-panama-honduras-y-colombia.html, (Date Accessed: 18.10.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
