On October 20, 2026, the Libyan House of Representatives unanimously approved the maritime jurisdiction areas memorandum signed with Turkey in 2019, and annulled the 2020 decisions that rejected the agreement and severed political ties with Ankara.[i]This decision emerging from Benghazi carries a broader meaning than the delayed approval of a legal text. The political line established on “anti-Turkey” sentiment in eastern Libya is changing, and the maritime jurisdiction map is transforming from being a document defended solely by the Tripoli administration into an area of common interest that finds resonance on both sides of the country.
The weight of this change is better understood when the stance in 2020 is remembered. At that time, institutions in eastern Libya saw Ankara on the opposing front and rejected military and political relations. Today, however, the same circles argue that the agreement will produce strategic opportunities in terms of economy, politics, and national security. Representatives of the administration in Tripoli and military actors in the east also welcomed the decision, converging on the emphasis of protecting maritime rights and long-term partnership. Thus, the memorandum transcends the appearance of a foreign policy preference belonging to only one of the parties.[ii]
Behind this transformation lies the recalculation of interests rather than ideological proximity. While eastern Libya maintains its alliances from the war years, it has begun to read Ankara’s weight in the Mediterranean, its defense capacity, and economic opportunities more realistically. Turkey, while maintaining its ties with Tripoli, has also expanded its contacts with the decision-making centers in Benghazi. Mutual visits, the resumption of flights, and commercial negotiations did not eliminate the lack of trust all at once; however, they established a calmer relationship ground where the parties accept each other as a permanent reality.
The new phase of the agreement is therefore related to the sphere of legitimacy within Libya before the coordinates drawn at sea. One of the main objections raised against the 2019 memorandum was that although it was signed by the government in Tripoli, it did not receive the approval of the House of Representatives. The recent decision narrows this debate in terms of internal dynamics. In Ankara’s official assessment, it was stated that the memorandum has been in effect since 2019 and observes the mutual rights and interests of the two countries on the basis of international law and principles of equity. The parliamentary approval strengthens the institutional basis of this approach in Libya.[iii]
However, political approval will not automatically resolve disputes in the maritime domain. There are different legal interpretations in the Eastern Mediterranean regarding the continental shelf, the maritime jurisdiction of islands, and how opposite coasts should be calculated. The consensus in Libya may strengthen Ankara’s hand; however, objections from other states and overlapping claims of rights persist. The robustness of the new phase depends on conducting a resolute defense of rights together with technical diplomacy. Keeping negotiation channels open that can manage tension as much as preserving the map will also serve the long-term interests of both countries.
The energy dimension can be read through implementation conditions rather than expectations. Determining the maritime jurisdiction area creates a legal and political ground for exploration activities. On the other hand, seismic research, licensing, financing, and commercial reserve determination are separate processes. Libya’s onshore oil production does not mean that offshore fields will rapidly generate revenue. This achievement is about preserving the maneuvering room for the future energy projects of the two countries. If joint teams are established, field data is shared, and investment risks are distributed with clear contracts, the agreement can transition from a border on paper to economic cooperation.
The change in the east’s approach also opens doors to non-energy fields. While the reconstruction needs around Benghazi create a market for Turkish contractors; the eastern administration seeks partnerships in port, airport, health, and transportation investments. For Turkey, gaining access to eastern Libya can make its economic presence more resilient against political changes. Thus, the maritime memorandum will not remain merely a sectoral agreement; it will turn into the political guarantee of a comprehensive relationship encompassing trade, transportation, and infrastructure.
A similar balance is seen in the security field. While Ankara’s military and institutional presence in the west continues; structures in the east maintain their ties with Russia, Egypt, and the Gulf States. The decision of the House of Representatives indicates a quest to diversify partnerships rather than a signal of breaking away from these relations. What is important for Turkey is that the contacts developed with the east progress without generating distrust among partners in the west. Ankara, able to speak to both sides of the country, can be less affected by sudden ruptures in Libyan politics and offer constructive contributions to the unification of national institutions.
Regional reaction reminds us of the diplomatic test ahead of the agreement. Following the approval, Greece and Egypt reiterated their maritime jurisdiction claims, announcing on October 22, 2026, that they were discussing the possibility of extending current border arrangements towards Cyprus.[iv] This development carries the risk of blocs hardening once again in the Eastern Mediterranean. The gain of Ankara and Libya will be permanent not by producing polarization, but to the extent that they can defend their theses in regular technical negotiations. Energy companies also invest more comfortably in fields where legal uncertainty is limited and political tension is manageable.
The decision’s impact on Libyan politics is also significant. Institutions in the east and west experience disagreements on fundamental issues such as the Central Bank, budget, security structures, and the election calendar. Although the maritime memorandum does not end this division, it shows that common economic interest can bring rival centers together. If a similar approach can be established for the sharing of oil revenues, infrastructure budgets, and foreign investments, foreign policy consensus can feed institutional convergence. For this, decisions need not remain as bargains of ruling circles, but must reflect on the Libyan society in the form of income and employment.
The most decisive factor in the upcoming period will be implementation. The operationalization of the joint maritime commission, harmonization of technical coordinates in official records, transparent preparation of potential exploration licenses, and tying economic projects in the east to a concrete calendar will show the value of the decision. It is also important that Ankara observes a measured balance between its relations with both Tripoli and Benghazi. While policies relying on the temporary superiority of one of the parties remain fragile; an approach addressing the whole of Libya can produce a more permanent partnership.
By returning to the same map as Ankara, eastern Libya has removed a six-year political obstacle. The meaning of the decision lies in the national ownership of the maritime jurisdiction agreement. While the new phase offers Turkey the opportunity to defend its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean with broader Libyan support; it provides Libya with the opportunity to transform its maritime space into a tool for energy, investment, and institutional convergence. With active and prudent diplomacy, this memorandum can move from being a document between two governments to a common strategic ground.
[i] “House of Representatives Approves Maritime Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey and Repeals Decisions Rejecting It and Severing Relations,” Libyan News Agency, https://lana.gov.ly/post.php?id=368105&lang=en, (Date of Access: 22.10.2026).
[ii] “Libya Approves Contentious Turkey Deal Over Mediterranean Waters,” Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/c734515393b2eb9a9b66e69c21467831, (Date of Access: 22.10.2026).
[iii] “No: 202, Türkiye ile Libya Arasındaki Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Mutabakat Muhtırası Hk.,” T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-202_-turkiye-ile-libya-arasindaki-deniz-yetki-alanlarinin-sinirlandirilmasina-iliskin-mutabakat-muhtirasi-hk.tr.mfa, (Date of Access: 22.10.2026).
[iv] “Greece, Egypt in Talks to Extend Maritime Zone Further East”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/greece-egypt-talks-extend-maritime-zone-further-east-2026-10-22/, (Date of Access: 22.10.2026).
