For the past thirty years, Central Asian states have conducted a balancing policy among Russia, China, the West, and increasingly, Turkey and the Gulf countries. The multi-vector policy has emerged as the region’s most successful tool of state management in the region. An important question here is whether this balance diplomacy, which defines the region’s foreign relations, can be similarly applied to artificial intelligence. Traditional multi-vectorism relies on the balanced elements being divisible: a defense arrangement established with one power does not prevent an energy arrangement with another. However, artificial intelligence operates somewhat differently. Chips, cloud infrastructure, foundational models, and the regulatory standards governing them often come together. Consequently, the identity of the primary technology partner carries more structural weight compared to other sectors. This situation does not mean that the multi-vector policy is inapplicable in the field of AI; but it does mean that the region’s diversification efforts deserve to be evaluated within their own context, rather than assuming they will replicate past successes.
China’s relationship with Central Asia regarding artificial intelligence expanded significantly throughout 2026. In July, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan joined the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization headquartered in Shanghai.[i] Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised China’s research outputs and proposed Astana as the regional center for the new organization. For Kazakhstan and its neighbors, investment of this scale provides infrastructure and technical capacity that would take a very long time to build domestically. Central Asia’s broader digital strategy also feeds from multiple models. China’s approach is centralized and state-corporate centric. This approach prioritized speed and scale, as reflected in Beijing’s 2021 Personal Information Protection Law and its regulations targeting large platform companies. Central Asian governments have combined Chinese-origin hardware and infrastructure with their own designed public digital services, placed within a regulatory framework inspired by the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation.[ii]
The European Union is strengthening its strategic engagement in Central Asia through the ‘‘Global Gateway Initiative’’. Prominent projects include the Trans-Caspian Fiber Optic Cable project, developed within the framework of the Digital Silk Road to facilitate secure digital connectivity between Central Asia and Europe. This initiative strengthens the region’s position on data governance and the diversification of connectivity, and adds a new dimension to Central Asia’s overall technology relations alongside its partnerships with China and other actors.
Beijing, on the other hand, offers Central Asian countries a complete digital package encompassing telecommunications networks, smart city platforms, surveillance technologies, and fintech solutions. While these systems can accelerate digital development, they also pose the risk of ‘‘vendor lock-in,’’ where countries become dependent on a single supplier for maintenance, future updates, and the technical standards that shape their digital infrastructure.
Kazakhstan has stood out as a ‘‘smart-follower’’ strategist among Central Asian countries. The country’s response has taken the form of combining structural measures with an emphasis on regulatory diplomacy. In his opening speech at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference on July 16, 2026, President Tokayev called for the establishment of common testing and certification standards for AI systems, closer coordination among national regulatory agencies, and joint action against cyberattacks, deepfakes, and digital fraud; positioning governance not just as a software issue, but a matter encompassing the entire technology ecosystem.[iii] In this way, he presented AI governance as an issue that extends beyond software to cover the whole digital ecosystem. The statement ‘‘No country should remain merely a consumer of artificial intelligence’’ also reflects Kazakhstan’s ambition not only to build technological capacity but also to shape the rules governing emerging technologies.
This approach is also visible in Kazakhstan’s domestic politics. The Alatau digital city project, the proposed AI legislation and Digital Code, and the selection of Almaty to host a UN regional digital solutions center indicate a broader strategy aimed at strengthening the country’s digital governance while positioning it as a regional innovation hub. This is a coherent strategy, and it is worth noting why it holds significance beyond the region. If successful, Kazakhstan could assume the role of an intermediary between competing technological ecosystems, where Chinese-made digital infrastructure operates within regulatory frameworks acceptable to European partners. In a broader sense, this demonstrates that a middle power can benefit from technological cooperation without surrendering its ability to shape its own regulatory and normative agenda.
In addition to its relations with China, Europe, and the Gulf, Central Asia has also engaged with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as an additional channel for AI cooperation. In May 2026, Kazakhstan hosted the informal OTS summit in Turkestan with the theme ‘‘Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development,’’ bringing together the leaders of Turkey, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan; commitments emerged for a joint Turkic large language model, a proposed AI university, and Uzbekistan’s ‘‘Five Million Artificial Intelligence Leaders’’ workforce initiative.[iv] President Tokayev described these efforts as necessary to avoid remaining ‘‘on the margins of progress’’; a statement consistent with the broader multi-vector approach Kazakhstan applies to its relationship with China.
Central Asia’s artificial intelligence diplomacy reflects a genuine commitment to a multifaceted foreign policy. However, this diplomatic balancing effort has not yet translated into a corresponding diversification in practice. China continues to dominate the region’s digital landscape through its extensive investments and infrastructure projects. The future of Central Asia’s digital multi-vectorism will depend on several factors, such as the continued pace and conditions of Chinese investments, whether European and Turkic initiatives will evolve from political declarations into well-funded projects, and the region’s ability to translate its regulatory ambitions into effective and enforceable standards.
[i] “Central Asian states following China’s lead on AI”, Euroasianet, https://eurasianet.org/central-asian-states-following-chinas-lead-on-ai, (Date of Access: 23.07.2026).
[ii] “Digital Geopolitics and AI Strategy in Central Asia”, The Times of Central Asia, https://timesca.com/digital-geopolitics-and-ai-strategy-in-central-asia/, (Date of Access 23.07.2026).
[iii] “President Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev holds talks with President Xi Jinping”, AkordaPress, https://www.akorda.kz/en/kassymjomart-tokayev-holds-talks-with-president-xi-jinping-2064454, (Date of Access: 23.07.2026).
[iv] “Turkic leaders drive their alliance towards an ‘influential geopolitical power centre”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/17/turkic-leaders-drive-their-alliance-towards-an-influential-geopolitical-power-centre, (Date of Access: 23.07.2026).
