The geopolitical significance of Central Asia and the South Caucasus has traditionally been interpreted through the influence of major powers in the region. Russia’s historical influence, China’s economic expansion, and the growing interest of the West and the United States in the region have reinforced the perception that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are objects of great-power competition. It is true that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan do not possess the same level of economic or military capabilities as Russia, China, or other major powers. However, at a time when competition in the field of artificial intelligence and the struggle for critical resources is intensifying, major powers increasingly need various assets possessed by these three countries. Energy resources, strategic geography, transportation routes, and expanding markets provide these countries with strategic leverage that extends beyond traditional indicators of national power. Therefore, rather than becoming middle powers in the conventional sense, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are developing as “mini-middle powers”[i] by transforming strategically important but limited assets into instruments of influence that major states cannot easily replace.
Following independence, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan possessed strategically important geography but had limited capacity to effectively capitalize on this position. Their economies and infrastructure had been shaped within the Soviet system. Railways primarily connected the region to the north, while pipelines integrated energy production into Soviet networks. Industrial supply chains were also largely structured around the Soviet market. Consequently, although these countries exercised sovereignty over valuable territory, a significant portion of their infrastructure remained dependent on Russia.
To transform this arrangement, the three countries pursued different strategies. Azerbaijan developed routes that bypassed Russia by utilizing its energy resources. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline has transported Caspian oil to the Mediterranean through Georgia and Türkiye since 2006. The Southern Gas Corridor subsequently connected Azerbaijani gas to European markets. As a result, Azerbaijan has become an important transit country through which other states can reduce their dependence on alternative routes.
Kazakhstan’s geographical position between Russia and China has made a complete strategic disengagement from Moscow and Beijing unrealistic. Astana has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy while developing economic relations with China, Europe, and the United States. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, followed a different path during the early period of its independence. Tashkent prioritized sovereignty and the limitation of external commitments. While this approach helped preserve political autonomy, it also constrained regional economic integration. After 2016, the administration of Shavkat Mirziyoyev began improving relations with neighboring countries, increasing trade, and opening the economy to the outside world. In a broader sense, this transformation can be understood as a gradual shift from protecting the region from external influence toward using geography as an economic asset.
Today, Azerbaijan occupies an important transit position connecting the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and Europe. Kazakhstan combines its significant energy and mineral resources with a major land connection between China and the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan, while having the largest population in Central Asia and one of the region’s largest markets, is also located at the center of the regional overland transportation network. None of these countries possesses the comprehensive capabilities of a traditional middle power or great power. Nevertheless, their contemporary strategic significance derives not primarily from their overall scale, but from the concentration of resources, geography, and connectivity in specific domains.
The Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan triangle reveals an important transformation in Eurasian geopolitics: geographical significance is increasingly being converted into strategic autonomy and agency. Traditional measures of national power generally focus on factors such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), military capacity, population, and diplomatic reach. However, these indicators do not fully explain why a relatively small state can become strategically valuable to actors that are much larger than itself. The emerging concept of “mini-middle powers” provides an important framework for explaining the rise of these three countries as significant actors and for understanding the distinction between overall power capacity and functional strategic leverage. Mini-middle powers are states that cannot shape the international agenda as comprehensively as traditional middle powers, but possess significant leverage in specific areas such as energy, transportation, geography, regional security, mediation, or access to important actors.[ii]
A mini-middle power does not need to possess comprehensive power capabilities in order to induce larger states to accommodate its preferences. Instead, it needs to be sufficiently strategically important to create incentives for those major states to maintain cooperation with it. The influence of mini-middle powers is therefore largely issue-specific, conditional, and relational. One of the most distinctive characteristics of mini-middle powers is the factor of “need.” The strategic influence of a mini-middle power increases when other actors need something that it can provide and that cannot easily be obtained from alternative sources. The importance of Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas resources becomes even greater when buyers are seeking alternative sources of energy. The Middle Corridor has also benefited from disruptions to trade routes through Russia. At the same time, governments along the route are aware that if commercial relations between the West and Russia are restored, some freight traffic could shift back toward northern routes. These countries will not be able to determine the conditions of the next international order on their own. However, actors seeking to shape the international order will often need access to their routes, resources, or diplomatic networks. The absence of cooperation from these countries will make it more difficult for major powers to achieve their objectives.[iii]
The real significance of these three “mini-middle powers” lies in the interaction of their distinct and complementary sources of leverage. Azerbaijan functions as a transit power due to its energy infrastructure and its position between the Caspian Sea and European markets. Kazakhstan combines resource power with transit power through its natural resources and continental geography. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, offers market and demographic power through its economic scale, demographic capacity, and central position in Central Asia. In this context, strong cooperation is the factor that can make each country’s strategic assets more valuable. An integrated network of functioning railways, ports, markets, energy infrastructure, and logistics hubs would make it more difficult to bypass individual routes. Therefore, one of the fundamental objectives of these states is to connect their respective national assets. If they succeed, the strategic value of the region will also change. Major powers will not merely compete over Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; they will also have to cooperate and negotiate with them in order to gain access to the networks controlled by these countries.
In conclusion, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan demonstrate how states with limited overall capabilities can achieve a higher level of strategic influence by focusing on assets valued by major powers. Azerbaijan’s energy resources and transit position, Kazakhstan’s natural resources and continental geography, and Uzbekistan’s market size and demographic weight provide each country with a distinctive form of strategic leverage. The long-term influence of these countries will depend on the extent to which they can connect and make these advantages sustainable. While cooperation can increase the value of their individual positions, attempts to transform their functional significance into a regional hierarchy could strengthen tendencies toward diversification and weaken existing patterns of interdependence. The significance of these three countries does not stem from their ability to attain the same capabilities as major powers, but from their capacity to shape the conditions under which those powers must operate while pursuing their interests in Eurasia.
[i] “Don’t dismiss the mini-middle powers”, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/c2ee0910-ee7d-4a36-bf5e-697c7ade93a2, (Date Accessed: 23.09.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
