Beyond Containers: The Unseen Driving Force Behind the $100 Billion Turkish–American Trade Target

The goal of increasing trade between Türkiye and the United States (US) to $100 billion has remained one of the most prominent objectives of bilateral economic relations since 2019. Reaffirmed in talks held in April 2026, this goal reflects a shared recognition that the current economic relationship falls short of its true potential. Yet while the target has remained unchanged, the structure of global trade has evolved. Economic value is no longer generated solely through containers passing through ports, machinery recorded in customs declarations, or energy shipments. Production analytics supplied remotely to a factory, aircraft maintenance, cloud software used by a company, brand licensing revenue, an online education platform, or an engineering team working across borders are also part of international trade. The central question of the roadmap for bringing Turkish–American trade to $100 billion should therefore not simply be “Which products can we sell more of?” It should also address the question: “What knowledge, technology, and expertise can we jointly develop, mutually commercialize, and bring to third-country markets?”

The Unseen Quarter on the Road to the Target

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, trade in goods and services between Türkiye and the US reached approximately $48.9 billion in 2025. Of this, $36.8 billion consisted of goods and $12.2 billion of services. Services thus accounted for roughly one-quarter of total economic exchange.

Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative and US Department of Commerce. Totals may differ slightly from the sum of components due to rounding.

This table reveals two important facts: First, current total trade must more than double to reach the $100 billion target. Second,despite their limited public visibility, services are already a significant rather than secondary component of the bilateral economic relationship. Nevertheless, discussions of bilateral trade mostly focus on steel, automotive products, textiles, defense, energy, and agricultural products. These sectors clearly remain important. However, a growth strategy based solely on goods trade remains vulnerable to tariffs, freight costs, trade policy measures, and fluctuations in global demand. Services complement goods and increase their economic value rather than replacing them. A Turkish company’s sale of machinery to the US may generate a single transaction. Adding installation, staff training, remote monitoring, maintenance, data analytics, and a software subscription to that same machine, however, turns a one-off sale into a long-term revenue relationship. Similarly, an American technology company working with Turkish engineering and integration firms rather than merely selling licenses to Türkiye can enable that technology to gain a deeper foothold in Türkiye and expand into neighboring markets. Future trade policy should therefore aim not only to export more products but also to promote the “servicification” of exports.

Statistics Have Yet to Find a Common Language

One of the first issues to resolve before expanding services trade is how the relationship is measured. US data put US services imports from Türkiye at $5.4 billion in 2025. Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, however, reports that Turkish services exports to the US, excluding travel, reached $8.3 billion that year. The discrepancy may stem from methodological factors such as determining where a service is produced, companies’ residency status, transaction timing, sales through affiliates, and service classifications. Although similar discrepancies in “mirror data” occur in international services trade, two countries sharing a $100 billion target need a more consistent framework for deciding which economic activities they measure and how. Otherwise, they may advocate the same target while referring to different totals. Türkiye and the US should therefore jointly prepare an annual “Economic Relations Balance Sheet.” This balance sheet should distinguish goods trade from services trade and publish separate indicators for digitally deliverable services, bilateral direct investment, corporate acquisitions, joint ventures, licensing revenue, and jobs created. Such a balance sheet would provide more than statistical transparency. It would also show which sectors are growing, which regulations restrict trade, and whether public support produces tangible results. Success could thus be measured by the economic value generated rather than by the number of meetings held.

Türkiye’s Problem Is Not Capacity, but Its Value-Added Mix

Türkiye is not starting from scratch in services trade. According to Ministry of Trade data, Türkiye’s services exports rose by 6.5% to $124.9 billion in 2025, generating a $63 billion surplus. The US was Türkiye’s largest market for services exports excluding travel.

Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, 2025 international trade in services results.

The data above show that Türkiye’s main strengths in services exports lie in travel on the one hand and logistics and transport on the other. Together, these two areas account for more than 82% of total services exports. Thus, although Türkiye’s services exports are strong, they are concentrated in particular sectors. Nevertheless, growth of 25.3% in telecommunications, computer, and information services points to a new area of transformation. Similarly, double-digit increases in construction services and revenue from intellectual property use show that Türkiye need not remain an economy selling only tourism and transport services. The central challenge is to channel Türkiye’s existing service capacity into technology-intensive, scalable activities that generate recurring revenue. Turkish–American economic relations can provide a strong practical foundation for this transformation.

Three Strategic Services Corridors

The first growth area is software, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and enterprise technology services. Türkiye’s young engineering workforce and emerging technology ventures complement US capital, access to global customers, and capacity to scale. However, this model should not aim to turn Türkiye into a low-cost outsourcing hub. Turkish firms should become intellectual property partners in product development, patents, licensing, and revenue sharing.

The second area is industrial services and engineering. Türkiye’s manufacturing experience in automotive, machinery, textiles, home appliances, and defense can be combined with production analytics, robotics integration, energy efficiency, and predictive maintenance services. American technology can thus be deployed in Türkiye, improved in terms of cost and performance, and offered to third countries using Turkish firms’ regional field experience. Civil aviation and maintenance and repair services are particularly important in this context. Türkiye’s geographic location, expanding aviation ecosystem, and technical workforce, combined with American aviation technologies, could create a maintenance, training, and engineering hub serving the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.

The third area is logistics and supply chain technologies. Türkiye’s $42.6 billion in logistics and transport services exports provides considerable scale. Yet future competition in logistics will not be won through truck, ship, port, or rail capacity alone. Digital customs systems, cargo tracking, port software, cybersecurity, electronic documents, and AI-assisted route optimization will also be decisive. Combining Türkiye’s physical networks with American digital technologies could make Türkiye not only a transit country but also a center for managing regional logistics systems.

Three Obstacles, Three Practical Solutions

Identifying the potential of services trade is not enough. It is also necessary to explain why this potential has not yet been fully commercialized.

The first issue is regulatory uncertainty and the costs of digital trade. Cross-border data transfers, taxation of digital services, licensing, and local presence requirements can impose additional costs on companies. The OECD’s 2026 Services Trade Restrictiveness Index reports that Türkiye’s overall level is above the OECD average. According to an estimate cited in the OECD Economic Survey of Türkiye, the cost of regulatory barriers to business services in Türkiye can be equivalent to a 78% tariff. A “Türkiye–US Digital Trade and Services Working Group” could be established to address this issue. This body should prepare joint technical guidance on data transfers, digital taxation, intellectual property, online payments, and licensing. Success should be measured by reductions in companies’ compliance costs, shorter data transfer procedures, and the value of cross-border digital contracts rather than by the number of meetings held.

The second issue is the mobility of specialists and recognition of professional qualifications. In services trade, the product is often human knowledge and expertise. When engineers, software specialists, consultants, or technical staff cannot reach a project site on time, service delivery is directly affected. Expedited business travel procedures for specialists working on joint projects and pilot schemes for mutual recognition of qualifications in selected professions could therefore be developed. Universities, professional bodies, and companies could establish joint certification programs.

The third issue is financing services exports and the cost of entering the US market. The main assets of software and consulting firms are human resources, customer contracts, and intellectual property rather than machinery or real estate. Traditional collateral arrangements therefore do not always meet service exporters’ financing needs. Instruments such as services export receivables insurance, contract-based working capital, and first-customer financing could be developed through Türk Eximbank and relevant institutions. In addition, “supported market entry,” or “soft-landing,” programs could be established for Turkish firms in US states. These programs should provide one-stop support for company formation, legal and tax matters, office space, staffing, customer validation, and state incentives. The OECD’s cross-country modeling indicates that reforms equivalent to a 0.05-point improvement in the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index can increase services trade by 20% to 50% over the medium to long term, depending on the sector. The same study estimates that services reforms could raise average labor productivity in linked manufacturing sectors by 8.4% in the air transport scenario, 6.5% in telecommunications, and 2.3% in financial services. These figures are not definitive forecasts for Türkiye. They nevertheless show that services trade reforms can strengthen not only service companies but also manufacturers that use logistics, finance, telecommunications, and aviation services as inputs. Facilitating services trade therefore also constitutes a policy for industrial and export competitiveness.

Conclusion: Redesigning the $100 Billion Target

The $100 billion target should be broken down from a single aggregate figure into separate indicators for goods trade, services trade, digital services, and investment. Direct investment should not be added to trade volume, but should be tracked as a separate pillar reflecting the quality of the economic relationship. The new performance scorecard should address the following questions:

• How many long-term services contracts have been signed between the two countries?
• How many Turkish companies have secured regular customers and recurring revenue in the US?
• How many American technologies have been localized in Türkiye?
• How many joint patents and licenses have been generated?
• How much revenue have joint ventures generated in third countries?
• How many skilled jobs have been created in the two countries?
• What share of services trade has come from technology-intensive sectors?

This approach could turn the $100 billion target from a political aspiration into a measurable economic transformation program. Growth in trade driven solely by global prices or a few high-value product categories may not signify a deepening of bilateral relations. By contrast, jointly developed software products, maintenance contracts, engineering projects, and licensing revenue can create interdependence that is more resilient to political fluctuations.

Türkiye has substantial production capacity in services trade, while the US has capital, technology, and the ability to achieve global scale. The central task ahead is to bring these two capabilities together within a common commercial architecture. What this requires is not more general declarations of intent, but shared data systems, regulatory alignment, financing instruments, and institutional mechanisms that facilitate companies’ market entry. The future of Turkish–American economic relations should be measured not only by the number of containers passing through ports, but also by the value of the code, knowledge, engineering, licenses, and long-term services contracts exchanged between the two countries.

References

1. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Republic of Türkiye Trade Summary
2. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, Reaffirmation of the $100 Billion Trade Target with the US
3. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, Türkiye’s 2025 Services Export Results
4. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Services Tables
5. OECD, Services Trade Restrictiveness Index 2026: Türkiye
6. OECD Economic Surveys: Türkiye 2025
7. OECD, New Evidence on the Economic Effects of Services Trade Reform
8. USTR, 2026 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
9. SelectUSA, 2025 Investor Guide