Analysis

Can a Collective Security Organization Be Established in the Middle East

The need for a new political, economic, and military development platform centered on the Middle East is increasing day by day.
Israel’s latest attacks in Qatar have once again raised debates over the sovereignty of many Middle Eastern countries in their national airspace.
While multilateral cooperation excluding the West is accelerating across other continents, the Middle East seems unable to follow a similar path.

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Israel’s attack on Hamas in Doha, the capital of Qatar, on September 9, 2025, has once again reignited debates over the national security of Middle Eastern countries. Following this strike, member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) convened in Qatar for an extraordinary meeting to discuss potential measures against Israel as well as their national and regional security. The most significant point emphasized at the summit was the need for either a Joint Military Command Center or a Collective Security Organization to deter any future attacks from Israel.[i] This proposal, particularly stressed by Egyptian, Iranian, and Pakistani officials, has raised questions about whether Middle Eastern states can unite for collective security and defense.

Similar proposals were put forward by Egypt in 2015, leading to the formation of the “Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism,” a coalition of 34 countries spearheaded by Saudi Arabia.[ii] Alongside Arab states, Muslim countries from Africa and Asia also took part. The coalition’s goal was essentially to combat terrorism at the global level and to enhance military-security cooperation. Developed by Riyadh amid the deepening civil war in Yemen and backed by many Muslim states, this coalition conducted operations against Houthi groups in Yemen and focused on security threats in Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and East Africa.

In June 2025, Israel’s expansion of its war against Palestine into Iranian territory once again sharply deteriorated the security landscape of the Middle East. The Israeli Air Force’s F-35 jets carried out strikes on Iranian soil by crossing the airspace of multiple countries in the region, a clear sign that these states are unable to defend or monitor their national skies. Likewise, Israel’s most recent attacks in Qatar have reopened debates about the sovereignty Middle Eastern countries have—or fail to have—over their airspace.

Moreover, as seen in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, decades of war and instability have left some Middle Eastern states with collapsed defense capacities. It is also well known that Gulf states remain heavily dependent on Western products for their defense and arms industries. In contrast, according to the most recent data,[iii] Turkey’s domestic production rate in its defense industry has reached around 83% overall and as high as 90% in certain categories. Thus, apart from Turkey, it does not seem possible for Middle Eastern states to use their existing defense systems effectively in the face of an external attack. One must also note that the total capacity and efficiency of these systems would still be insufficient. More importantly, the political disputes and geopolitical rivalries—at times even escalating to the brink of war—between Middle Eastern countries remain a major obstacle to establishing such a collective security-defense organization

In Iran, a revolutionary government has been in power for the past 45 years, a factor that has deepened sectarian conflicts in the Middle East. Even if a defense organization were to be formed today under the banner of an “Islamic” identity, Iran would likely be excluded due to ethnic and sectarian rivalries (Arab–Persian divide). Moreover, leaving aside the Palestinian issue, the level of geopolitical competition among Middle Eastern states is so high that it prevents them from coming to one another’s aid. For instance, it is unlikely that Iran would provide military support to the Assad regime in Syria under the current geopolitical circumstances, nor is it plausible that Gulf states would act to safeguard Iran’s national security.

In addition, the Gulf states continue their process of normalizing relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Nor is there a consensus regarding support for Islamic resistance groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which continues to struggle for Palestine. In this context, there are disagreements within the Gulf states themselves, within the Arab states more broadly, and also between the Arab states and Iran. This situation makes it difficult for Arabs and Iranians to unite against Israel.

From a global perspective, militarily confronting Israel would, from the standpoint of Arab states and Iran, be tantamount to directly opposing the United States. Neither Iran nor the Arab states are willing to take such a risk. Since 1948, Arab states have lost every war they have fought against Israel, making it unlikely they would embark on a similar war now. Given their demonstrated military shortcomings, the establishment of a collective security organization by Arab states and Iran to safeguard their national security does not appear to be a rational option. It is equally unlikely that such an irrational proposal could take root and flourish.

While in other parts of the world—Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America—multilateral cooperation initiatives in political, economic, and security fields excluding the West are accelerating, the Middle East appears unable to follow a similar course. For example, developing countries in these regions have supported and advanced multilateral platforms or organizations under the “Global South.” In this regard, the expansion efforts of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stand out. While these are seen as major indicators of a multipolar world, Middle Eastern support for such processes has remained limited. Nonetheless, the 2024 accession of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran to BRICS can be considered significant steps in this direction. Beyond this, however, the need for a new political, economic, and military development platform centered on the Middle East is growing with each passing day.


[i] “Iran and Egypt lead push for NATO-style alliance in Middle East at emergency Islamic summit”, The Standart, https://www.thestandard.com.hk/world-news/article/311619/Iran-and-Egypt-lead-push-for-NATO-style-alliance-in-Middle-East-at-emergency-Islamic-summit, (Date Accessed: 17.09.2025).

[ii] “Suudi Arabistan öncülüğünde teröre karşı İslam ittifakı”, Hürriyet, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/terore-karsi-islam-ittifaki-40027554, (Date Accessed: 17.09.2025).

[iii] “Savunma sanayi sektöründe yerlilik oranı yüzde 83’e ulaştı!”, Donanım Haber, https://www.donanimhaber.com/savunma-sanayi-sektorunde-yerlilik-orani-yuzde-83-e-ulasti–194113, (Date Accessed: 17.09.2025).

Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk TAMER
Dr. Cenk Tamer graduated from Sakarya University, Department of International Relations in 2014. In the same year, he started his master's degree at Gazi University, Department of Middle Eastern and African Studies. In 2016, Tamer completed his master's degree with his thesis titled "Iran's Iraq Policy after 1990", started working as a Research Assistant at ANKASAM in 2017 and was accepted to Gazi University International Relations PhD Program in the same year. Tamer, whose areas of specialization are Iran, Sects, Sufism, Mahdism, Identity Politics and Asia-Pacific and who speaks English fluently, completed his PhD education at Gazi University in 2022 with his thesis titled "Identity Construction Process and Mahdism in the Islamic Republic of Iran within the Framework of Social Constructionism Theory and Securitization Approach". He is currently working as an Asia-Pacific Specialist at ANKASAM.

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