In 2021, the “EuroAsia Interconnector” memorandum signed between the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), Israel, and Greece once again revealed that energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean are not merely economic initiatives but also strategic and geopolitical tools. Later renamed the “Great Sea Interconnector,” this electricity cable is designed to start in Israel, pass through the GCASC, reach Crete, and finally connect to mainland Greece. The project aims to establish the first-ever subsea electricity connection between Europe and the Middle East. However, this development has reignited long-standing maritime jurisdiction disputes and energy policy debates among regional actors.
In 2025, an agreement between the GCASC and Israel to implement the project without the Greece leg significantly shifted geopolitical balances. This new development has been interpreted as a partial acknowledgment of Turkey’s longstanding security and sovereignty concerns regarding the project. Turkey has officially declared that the proposed route crosses its continental shelf, issuing diplomatic notes to the concerned countries—primarily the GCASC and Greece—stating that any steps taken without Ankara’s consent would violate international law. The cancellation of the Greek segment was welcomed by Turkey, which viewed the change as a move toward a more sustainable and stability-oriented version of the project.
Turkey’s stance highlights how energy corridors are increasingly functioning not only as economic routes but also as strategic and political instruments. In Turkey’s foreign policy, energy projects—especially in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean—have become a battleground. In this regard, energy initiatives in the region reflect not only access to natural resources but also attempts to bolster regional influence. Indeed, regional power dynamics are being reshaped through energy infrastructure projects, which directly impact diplomatic relations, alliance structures, and security architectures among regional countries.
The European Union’s strategic support for this project is closely tied to its goal of reducing Southeastern Europe’s energy supply dependency.[1] This underscores the EU’s emphasis on the geopolitical value of energy routes in its foreign policy. The EU supports such initiatives under the Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E) policy, promoting energy integration. As a result, beyond its technical dimensions, the EU’s energy diplomacy is showing increasing interest in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece joined the project through its electricity transmission operator ADMIE (Independent Power Transmission Operator), acquiring a 25% stake. This involvement aimed to connect the cable to the Greek mainland via Crete and integrate it into the European energy network, effectively turning it into an EU infrastructure project. However, in light of recent developments, the suspension of the Greek leg indicates that this integration objective has temporarily stalled.
Turkey’s reactions to these developments further reveal how energy projects can trigger military and diplomatic activity in the region. The trilateral cooperation between Greece, the GCASC, and Israel could open a new front that risks isolating Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Energy security is no longer limited to supply concerns but has become central to regional geopolitical equations and international legal frameworks.
France has also joined the agreement process. A €1.43 billion contract was signed with the French cable manufacturer Nexans, shedding light on the technical and economic dimensions of the Eastern Mediterranean energy network. The agreement assigns Nexans the task of manufacturing and laying the subsea electricity cables between the GCASC and Israel. With a 2000-megawatt transmission capacity, this infrastructure will become one of Europe’s largest subsea electricity links.
Nexans’ involvement is significant in demonstrating private sector confidence in regional energy projects.[2] The company’s prior experience in complex projects such as the North Sea Link between Norway and the UK positions it as a well-prepared actor for the Great Sea Interconnector’s technical challenges. The cable-laying process is expected to be completed by 2026. In this context, increasing private sector investment strengthens the project’s financial sustainability and indicates the continued potential for energy cooperation despite political tensions in the region. Additionally, the EU’s €757 million contribution to the project further demonstrates the confidence of international financial mechanisms in its success.
As of 2025, the Great Sea Interconnector project has undergone significant phases. Initiated in 2021, this ambitious venture has faced several challenges despite technical progress and international agreements.[3] The project’s location in a geopolitically critical region remains a major obstacle to its swift advancement. Turkey continues to object to the project, turning energy corridors into a domain of diplomatic maneuvering as much as technical planning.[4]
From a financial perspective, despite the €657 million provided through the EU’s Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the question of how the remaining costs will be financed remains unresolved. However, the involvement of private actors like Nexans offers positive signals regarding financial viability. Yet, supply chain crises, rising construction costs, and global economic uncertainties have caused delays in the implementation schedule. Furthermore, it is evident that the political coordination among Israel, the GCASC, and Greece has not been fully mirrored in on-ground technical execution. While recent statements from the GCASC indicate continued political commitment, various bureaucratic obstacles and environmental impact assessment processes are also contributing to delays.
All these factors create uncertainty about the project’s future. Nevertheless, they also reveal how sensitive and multilayered the Eastern Mediterranean energy architecture truly is. This project has become a critical testing ground not only in terms of energy supply security but also in regional diplomacy and international law.
[1] “Cyprus, Greece, Israel electricity link gets EU funding”, Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/eet/news/cyprus-greece-israel-electricity-link-gets-eu-funding/, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[2] “Nexans wins record-breaking contract for the Great Sea Interconnector”, Nexans, https://www.nexans.com/press-releases/nexans-wins-record-breaking-contract-for-the-euroasia-interconnector/ (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[3] “Cyprus faces uncertain future as electricity link with Greece stalls”, Kathimerini, https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/cyprus-faces-uncertain-future-as-electricity-link-with-greece-stalls (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
[4] “Güney Kıbrıs ile İsrail arasında elektrik anlaşması: Türkiye, projenin Yunanistan ayağına karşı”, Euronews, https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/05/guney-kibris-ile-israil-arasinda-elektrik-anlasmasi-turkiye-projenin-yunanistan-ayagina-ka, (Access Date: 23.05.2025).
