86% of the waters of the Nile River originate in Ethiopia. Despite this, the country can only benefit from 5% of the water. With an agreement made between England and Egypt in 1929, 92.3 percent of the Nile water usage rights were given to Egypt and 7.7 percent to Sudan. After gaining independence, Sudan made a new agreement with Egypt in 1959 and increased its usage rights to 25 percent. Although 85 percent of the Blue Nile, one of the tributaries feeding the Nile, is located on Ethiopian territory, the country was not included in either the 1929 or 1959 agreement. [i]
Other states in the basin could not become parties to either agreement because they were colonies at that time. Following the declaration of independence, these states asked for a new pact, but Egypt refused them. In 2010, six basin countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) came together to share Nile water more equally and signed a joint agreement that removed Egypt’s veto power. However, Egypt and Sudan rejected this agreement because they did not want to give up their existing water use rights.[ii]
In the periods after the First and Second World Wars, the countries of the region started national development programs after the political borders were determined as a result of agreements. Although Ethiopia owns a large portion of the Blue Nile waters, it is the country with the fewest usage rights. That’s why it has been the country that has expressed the greatest reaction throughout the historical process. Although Ethiopia is rich in mineral resources, the failure to complete electrification in the country has hindered the development of the industrial industry. According to 2018 International Energy Agency (IEA) data, Ethiopia, which consumes 8,986 GW/h of electricity annually, ranks 110th in the world in terms of consumption.[iii]
After the 2011 Arab Spring, Ethiopia in the Central African region started development moves to solve the water and electrification problems. As a result of these, the construction of the “Renaissance Dam,” which started on April 2, 2011, caused a great reaction from Egypt and Sudan. The dam, which is 1800 meters long, 140 meters deep, and has a water storage capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, appears to be the way out to solve Ethiopia’s water crisis.[iv]
The dam is planned to have a total installed power of 750 MW in 16 turbine systems and to produce 15 GW/h of electricity annually. The completion of the dam project plays a major role in completing the transition to an interconnected system of electricity transmission and distribution throughout the country. The Addis Ababa government announced that 1 billion dollars of profit will be made annually because of the dam operating at full capacity. Ethiopia has a serious need for electricity, and 65% of its population is not connected to the grid.
On the other hand, when the results of the dam construction are examined, it is estimated that Egypt and Sudan will lose 25 billion cubic meters of water, and the electricity production in Egyptian dams will decrease by 20–40%.[v] At the center of the disputes are water resources and the energy produced from them. Egypt and Sudan are concerned that control of the flow of the Nile River will pass to Ethiopia. Egypt obtains nearly 90% of its water access directly from the Nile River. The agreements signed in 1929 and 1959 gave Egypt and Sudan rights to almost all Nile waters.
These colonial-era agreements also gave Egypt veto power over projects by other countries that would affect its share of its waters. Both agreements did not take into account the water needs of other water basin countries that are not parties to the agreement and do not have the Blue Nile, which provides the majority of the river waters. Ethiopia argued that it would not abide by the agreement made decades ago and began building its dam at the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 without consulting Egypt. [vi]
One of the main concerns of North African countries is that if the water flow decreases, it may affect Lake Nasser, where the Aswan Dam is located. However, this only accounts for a small portion of Egypt’s electricity. Ethiopia stated that one of the previous conditions set by Egypt for the agreement was that the dam should be connected to Aswan. The amount of water coming from the Nile is of great importance for Egypt, which receives almost all of its agricultural and drinking water from the Nile River, especially during dry seasons. Egypt insists that the dam be filled later and by releasing more water during the dry season. The Khartoum administration, on the other hand, firmly opposes Ethiopia’s unilateral step on the grounds that the dam’s surroundings host a very significant population and that filling and operating the dam without understanding technical and legal issues poses risks to regional security.
Neighbouring countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and Eritrea are likely to benefit from the energy produced by the dam. Many of these countries face major electricity deficits. Ethiopia’s strategic advantage over the waters of the Blue Nile creates a difficult situation for Egypt and Sudan. This presents a difficult choice: submitting to Ethiopian control or approving an agreement that institutionalizes Ethiopia’s unlimited rights over this precious water resource. Regarding the operation of the dam, Ethiopia argues that a comprehensive agreement is important to alleviate Egypt’s water security concerns while securing its energy goals.
Ethiopia suggests that BRICS could serve as an intermediary for multilateral diplomacy and lead negotiations given its members’ relationships and goals with both African countries. However, Ethiopia emphasizes that this intervention should be different from previous intervention attempts by countries such as the USA, Russia, Algeria, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. It is very important that Ethiopia sell excess electricity to Egypt, establish an integrated energy market by partially offsetting the dam’s impact on water flow, and that Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan enter into a data sharing agreement to help manage water flow from the dam. [vii]
Another tension between Ethiopia and Somalia has been added to the water and dam crisis in the region. The memorandum of understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland for port use and sea access on the first day of 2024 caused a crisis both between Somalia and Ethiopia and the Somaliland government. When the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia is completed, Ethiopia will be the first state to recognize Somaliland as “independent.” Somalia strongly opposed the step that allowed Ethiopia to operate commercially and militarily on the Somaliland coast, on the grounds of “interference in its internal affairs.” The Arab League and the African Union condemned this step, which caused a new regional crisis as we enter 2024. [viii]
[i] Mürsel Bayram, “İsrail-Güney Sudan İlişkilerinin Siyasal Ekolojisi”, Ahi Evran Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 1 Aralık 2017. 1(1), s. 67.
[ii] Ibıd.
[iii] “Elektrik Tüketimine Göre Ülkelerin Listesi”, Wikipedia, https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elektrik_t%C3%BCketimine_g%C3%B6re_%C3%BClkelerin_listesi, (Date of Accession: 24.09.2023).
[iv] “3 Ülkede Kriz Çıkaran Hedasi Barajı Sorununda Yeni Dönem Başladı”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/3-ulkede-kriz-cikaran-hedasi-baraji-sorununda-yeni-donem-basladi/2508317, (Date of Accession: 21.02.2022).
[v] “Etiyopya ile Kriz Aşılamadı! Mısır’dan Hedasi Barajı Açıklaması”, Haber 7, https://www.haber7.com/dunya/haber/3354957-etiyopya-ile-kriz-asilamadi-misirdan-hedasi-baraji-aciklamasi, (Date of Accession: 24.09.2023).
[vi] “Egypt-Ethiopia Row: The Trouble Over A Giant Nile Dam”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50328647, (Date of Accession: 13.01.2020).
[vii] “Navigating The Nile A Win-Win For Egypt And Ethiopia”, Arab News, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2366146, (Date of Accession: 02.09.2023).
[viii] “Afrika, 2024’e Eski Sorunlar ve Yeni Umutlarla Girdi”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/afrika-2024e-eski-sorunlar-ve-yeni-umutlarla-girdi/3104730, (Date of Accession: 10.01.2024).
