Intense and continuous migratory flows are taking place along Europe’s southern borders. As of 2026, the Greek island of Crete and Gavdos, a small island located to its south with a population of approximately 50, have become destinations for hundreds of migrants arriving from North Africa. Small, makeshift boats and vessels departing from the Tobruk region of Libya have become the primary means of transport along the corridor between Libya and Greece. As a direct consequence of migration policies in the Central Mediterranean, the route from Libya to the Greek islands continues to experience active and intense migratory traffic. Strict security agreements between Italy and North African countries have pushed migrant smuggling networks towards the eastern Mediterranean and the Greek islands. This shift in migration routes, corroborated by the latest data from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), is pushing small islands such as Gavdos, which lack adequate infrastructure to cope with the influx, towards a humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, the failure to prevent migrants from departing from eastern Libya indicates that migration is being used as a direct bargaining tool vis-à-vis Europe, transforming the issue into a diplomatic crisis that extends beyond border security.
For years, migration flows originating in North Africa and heading towards the European Union had primarily targeted the Italian shores of Lampedusa and Sicily. According to data from the Italian Ministry of the Interior, approximately 42,000 irregular migrants arrived in Italy by sea between 1 January and 4 May 2023.[i] In May 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Khalifa Haftar held talks aimed at strengthening control over the borders of southern Europe and irregular migration. Within the framework of these discussions, security agreements between Italy and Libya largely closed off the previous route while opening the way for another crisis to unfold across the Mediterranean along a new route. The tightening of controls along the shores of Lampedusa and Sicily prompted migrant smuggling networks to seek alternative routes. Italy’s diplomatic initiatives did not bring the Mediterranean migrant crisis to an end; they merely redirected the flow. Crete, the Greek island closest to Libya’s Tobruk region, has emerged as a new destination and has received increasing numbers of migrants since 2023. This development clearly reflects the fact that migration flows originating in North Africa have not been brought to a halt.
Frontex’s Annual Risk Analysis 2026/2027 report clearly demonstrates that the Libya–Crete corridor has become a persistent structural pressure point, with conditions continuing to deteriorate.[ii] According to the report, migrant arrivals along this route increased more than threefold in 2025 compared with the previous year. External factors, including the large migrant population currently in Libya awaiting an opportunity to reach Europe’s borders, are driving this movement and sustaining the trend. Frontex explicitly predicts that, unless there is a positive development in Libya’s capacity to prevent irregular migration, intense pressure on the Libya–Crete corridor will continue throughout 2026.
One of the other key reasons why the migration route, narrowed by agreements between Italy and Libya, has shifted towards Crete and other Greek islands in search of alternatives is the management of operational risks. The capsizing and sinking of the fishing vessel Adriana on 14 June 2023 while travelling from Libya to Italy, resulting in the deaths of approximately 600 people, exposed the devastating scale of the risks involved.[iii] Known as the “Pylos disaster,” the incident became a deterrent for hundreds of migrants because of the long journey and high costs associated with the route. Meanwhile, migrant smuggling networks continued their operations by adopting alternative routes to preserve profit margins and save time. Increased maritime surveillance by European authorities in the Mediterranean and Italy’s security measures have proved insufficient to prevent these activities from continuing. As border controls intensified, the costly and dangerous journey to the Italian coast, which could take approximately ten days at sea, gave way to the less expensive route to Crete, which takes around two days. The shift in migration flows from Italy towards Greece reflects a strategic adaptation aimed at shortening journeys across open waters while reducing costs and the risk of interception.
As a result of the rapid adaptation of migrant smuggling networks, the increasing influx of migrants into the Greek islands has brought significant infrastructure challenges. Sparsely populated islands such as Gavdos, in particular, function merely as transit points providing basic assistance because of their limited local resources. Rescued migrants are subsequently transferred to the ports and reception centres of better-equipped islands. Despite the Greek government’s dialogue with Libya, the number of irregular migrants has not declined. On the contrary, Crete is becoming a permanent and primary destination for migration flows originating in North Africa.[iv]
The practice of allowing migrants to operate boats in exchange for low-cost or free passage highlights how responsibility is being shifted directly onto the migrants themselves. As a result of this strategy employed by smuggling networks, not only adults but also underage migrant children are accused of being people smugglers and brought before the courts.[v] Prosecuting and accusing migrant children who have been forced to operate boats does not prevent smuggling networks from continuing their activities. Indeed, the tightening of border policies, the imposition of stricter asylum rules, and the prosecution of migrants, whether adults or minors, do not stop people smugglers from operating; they merely obscure the root causes of the crisis. The Greek Coast Guard’s daily announcements that hundreds of migrants have been rescued, followed by similar reports the next day, once again demonstrate how inadequate the policies in place remain in addressing realities on the ground.
The shift in migration routes along the European Union’s southern borders from the Italian coast towards the Greek islands clearly demonstrates that security-oriented migration policies have not been entirely effective and that new, alternative threats may continue to emerge. For years, Italy served as a primary destination for migrants, but agreements with North African countries have enabled it to strengthen the protection of its coastline. In particular, Italy’s success in securing the shores of Lampedusa and Sicily has, in practice, resulted in migration flows being redirected towards the Greek islands. Consequently, the Mediterranean migrant crisis has not been halted; rather, its intensity has shifted towards Greece.
Despite diplomatic developments, migration policies, and border security measures, migrant smuggling networks continue to operate by adapting their activities to the evolving system. The relocation of migratory pressure from the Italian coast to the Libya-Crete corridor, coupled with the emergence of inadequately equipped islands such as Gavdos as transit points, demonstrates that the European Union’s migration policies have not been implemented as a comprehensive, integrated strategy. The concentration of irregular migrants along the route from Libya to Crete is not a problem that can be resolved solely through coast guard rescue operations or the arrest of migrants, particularly minors. Rather, it constitutes a critical border crisis shaped by North African countries’ political objectives in their relations with the EU.
[i] “İtalya, Libya’nın doğusundaki güçlerin lideri Hafter ile ‘Düzensiz Göç’ Konusunu Görüştü”, ABC Gazetesi, https://abcgazetesi.com.tr/italya-libyanin-dogusundaki-guclerin-lideri-hafter-ile-duzensiz-goc-konusunu-525598, (Date Accessed: 21.08.2026).
[ii] Frontex, “Annual Risk Analysis 2026/2027”, https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/2026/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2026_2027.pdf, (Date Accessed: 21.08.2026).
[iii] “Yunanistan açıklarında yılın en ölümcül tekne kazası: En az 78 göçmen hayatını kaybetti”, BBC News Türkçe, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c1d8p5x821ko, (Date Accessed: 21.08.2026).
[iv] “Coast Guard Rescues 240 Migrants in Small Boats off Crete”, Ekathimerini,https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1312287/coast-guard-rescues-240-migrants-in-small-boats-off-crete/, (Date Accessed: 21.08.2026).
[v] “Boys Aged 14-17 Charged with Piloting Migrant Boats from Africa to Crete”, Ekathimerini,https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1312573/boys-aged-14-17-charged-with-piloting-migrant-boats-from-africa-to-crete/, (Date Accessed: 21.08.2026).
