The Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH) Act, introduced on 2 April 2026 by Michael Baumgartner, a member of the United States (US) House of Representatives, seeks not only to restrict China’s access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment but also to align the export policies of allies such as the Netherlands and Japan with Washington’s approach. The legislation is designed to subject companies in allied countries to the same restrictions imposed on their American competitors.[i] In this way, export controls have evolved from a prohibition targeting a rival into an alignment mechanism directed at the national regulatory authority of allies. Consequently, the legislation’s primary test lies not in how effectively it can cut off China’s access to technology, but in which capital will determine the rules governing critical technological bottlenecks.
The most controversial provisions of the bill concern the deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography systems that Dutch company ASML can still sell to China, as well as maintenance services for these machines. The bill designates facilities operated by Chinese manufacturers SMIC, Huawei, Hua Hong, CXMT, and YMTC as “closed facilities,” prohibits servicing installed equipment, and gives the Netherlands and Japan 150 days to align their regulations with US rules.[ii] Once this period expires, unilateral enforcement is envisaged through an expanded Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR). The service ban extends export controls beyond the point of sale to cover the entire operational life of a machine, turning every system already sold into a permanent channel of pressure. The 150-day period functions less as a lead-in to the prohibition itself than as a countdown for negotiations, leaving allies with two options: tighten their own controls or accept the US rules.
The bill passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 April 2026.[iii] In the Senate, Republican Pete Ricketts and Democrat Andy Kim are advocating similar legislation.[iv] In September, Baumgartner argued that the bill should be enacted despite objections from the Netherlands and Japan, raising the possibility of incorporating it into the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2027.[v] Bipartisan support weakens expectations that a change of government in The Hague could ease the dispute, while the possibility of incorporating the bill into the NDAA further narrows the scope for allied countries to influence its outcome.
The Netherlands’ objection concerns the method rather than the underlying objective. Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Sjoerd Sjoerdsma has stated that his country shares US concerns about preventing sensitive technologies from reaching military end users, but does not want cooperation to turn into coercion.[vi]According to Jian Junbo, director of the Centre for China–Europe Relations at Fudan University, the objection stems primarily from the bill’s stricter requirements compared with the Netherlands’ own restrictions and its extension of “extraterritorial jurisdiction” to the United States. Jian also argues that while the two countries agree on controls over advanced equipment, they diverge over sales of less advanced equipment to China.[vii] Taken together, these two perspectives suggest that the main area of negotiation concerns not cutting-edge technology, but older-generation equipment and servicing.
Economic data help clarify the commercial costs of this dispute. China accounted for approximately 33% of ASML’s sales in 2025, while its share of net system sales fell to 19% in the first quarter of 2026 and 14% in the second quarter. As China’s share declines, the commercial cost of complying with the proposed alignment requirements decreases. This suggests that the Netherlands’ resistance is driven less by revenue concerns than by concerns over sovereignty and the precedent the legislation would establish. Meanwhile, ASML’s installed base management revenue reached €2.76 billion in the second quarter, demonstrating that servicing constitutes a stable revenue stream whose significance cannot be measured solely by China’s contribution. This figure covers all customers, not just China. For Japan, the equation involves greater commercial exposure. Since July 2023, Tokyo has subjected 23 categories of equipment—including lithography, etching, deposition, cleaning, and inspection equipment—to licensing controls. Tokyo Electron, meanwhile, derived 34.1% of its revenue from China in fiscal year 2026, exceeding the approximately 20% Chinese contribution projected for ASML.[viii]
China is framing the proposed legislation less as an alliance dispute than as a challenge to the international order. Following the committee’s approval of the bill, China’s Ministry of Commerce stated on 25 April that it opposed any abuse of export controls and warned that enactment of the legislation would damage the international economic and trade order.[ix] Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian reiterated on 13 May 2026, the day Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing began, that Washington was excessively broadening the concept of national security. China’s rhetorical objections can therefore converge with the Netherlands’ sovereignty concerns within the same discursive framework. Beijing’s decision to emphasize criticism of the methods rather than directly contest the stated objectives also suggests a deliberate strategic choice.
Beijing is also attempting to turn this friction into a diplomatic opportunity. In July 2026, Sjoerdsma travelled to Beijing with a delegation representing 17 companies, becoming the first Dutch trade minister to visit China since 2018. Dong Yifan of Beijing Language and Culture University interpreted the visit as an attempt by the Netherlands to pursue “crisis management and risk prevention.”[x] Nevertheless, the move can also be understood as an indication that Beijing expects visible steps from The Hague in return for dialogue. The fact that the Nexperia dispute was another major item on the visit’s agenda demonstrates that relations between The Hague and Beijing are themselves fragile, limiting the room for manoeuvre available to the Netherlands in balancing its relations with the two powers.
China’s principal response, however, is industrial rather than diplomatic. According to a report published by the Chinese financial platform Jinjiao Finance, citing The Information, Shanghai Micro Electronics, based in Shanghai, plans to manufacture approximately five domestically produced immersion DUV machines this year and around 20 in 2027. The first units are expected to be delivered to SMIC, Hua Hong, and CXMT for testing. The same report notes that domestically produced machines lag behind ASML’s equipment in performance and reliability, that ASML shipped approximately 131 immersion DUV systems in 2025, and that its shares fell by 8.4% on 27 July, the date the report appeared.[xi] The market reaction suggests that investors are pricing in not so much production volumes as the possibility of a contraction in future Chinese demand.
This development supports two opposing conclusions. In a joint article published in The Washington Times on 10 August, Ricketts and Kim argued that Beijing remains dependent on foreign equipment and that every month of delay gives China more time to replace supply chains and expand domestic tool production. The same advance in domestic manufacturing, however, provides The Hague and Tokyo with a counterargument that the marginal impact of export controls is diminishing. China’s industrial progress therefore reinforces both Washington’s argument for urgency and the allies’ case for caution.
In conclusion, the MATCH Act demonstrates that the target of US technology controls against China is no longer solely the capabilities of a rival; the decision-making autonomy of allied countries has also become an issue. The rift within the alliance stems less from a disagreement over objectives than from differences over authority and timing. China is exploiting this opening through both rhetoric and industrial development. However, its available instruments are sufficient not to split the alliance, but to increase the costs of intra-alliance bargaining. As a result, the effectiveness of the export control regime will depend as much on China’s technological response as on the conditions under which The Hague and Tokyo agree to align their policies with Washington.
Two scenarios are likely to emerge in the coming period. If the MATCH Act is incorporated into the NDAA and enacted, the 150-day deadline will force the Netherlands and Japan either to expand their national controls or to face unilateral US enforcement under the FDPR. As a Dutch academic cited by Export Compliance Daily has warned, this could trigger a new trade dispute with the European Union. If the bill is excluded from the legislation, Washington is expected to maintain pressure through administrative channels and bilateral engagement, seeking to achieve alignment through negotiation rather than legislation. In either scenario, the central test will be the extent to which The Hague and Tokyo can preserve their national authority over export controls.
[i] Toby Sterling, “US targets Chinese chipmaking with proposed export restrictions on ASML and others”, Reuters, https://www.marketscreener.com/news/us-targets-chinese-chipmaking-with-proposed-export-restrictions-on-asml-and-others-ce7e51ddd089f523, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[ii] Ana-Maria Stanciuc, “China sharpens criticism of US chip-equipment bill as Trump arrives in Beijing”, The Next Web, https://thenextweb.com/news/china-match-act-chip-bill-beijing-summit, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[iii] House Foreign Affairs Committee, “Chairman Mast, HFAC, Advances MATCH Act”, U.S. House of Representatives, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairman-mast-hfac-advances-match-act, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[iv] Pete Ricketts ve Andy Kim, “MATCH Act Can Protect America’s AI Lead from China”, Washington Times, https://www.ricketts.senate.gov/news/press-releases/ricketts-op-ed-match-act-can-protect-americas-ai-lead-from-china/, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[v] Ian Cohen, “Lawmaker: US Needs to Pass Match Act Despite Dutch, Japanese Concerns”, Export Compliance Daily, https://exportcompliancedaily.com/article/2026/09/21/lawmaker-us-needs-to-pass-match-act-despite-dutch-japanese-concerns-2609170032, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[vi] “US Bill to Restrict Exports of Chipmaking Tools Could Trigger EU Retaliation, Professor Says”, Export Compliance Daily, https://exportcompliancedaily.com/topic/chip_export_news, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[vii] “Dutch minister pushes back on US bid to tighten China chip controls”, Bits&Chips, https://bits-chips.com/article/dutch-minister-pushes-back-on-us-bid-to-tighten-china-chip-controls/, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[viii] “美法案迫使盟友限制对华出口，荷兰不满，与美在“低端设备限制存分歧”, Wallstreetcn, https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3775462, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[ix] “U.S. Seeks to Extend Chip Equipment Controls to Maintenance as U.S., Japanese and Dutch Equipment Suppliers Reassess China Exposure”, TrendForce, https://datatrack.trendforce.com/blog/content/61356/u-s-seeks-to-extend-chip-equipment-controls-to-maintenance-as-u-s-japanese-and-dutch-equipment-suppliers-reassess-china-exposure, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[x] “U.S. May Push Near-Total ASML China Ban on DUV Sales and Servicing Amid China’s Domestic Lithography Push”, TrendForce, https://www.trendforce.com/news/2026/08/25/news-u-s-may-push-near-total-asml-china-ban-on-duv-sales-and-servicing-amid-chinas-domestic-lithography-push/, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
[xi] Çin Ticaret Bakanlığı, “Çin Ticaret Bakanlığı sözcüsünün MATCH tasarısına ilişkin açıklaması”, HK01, https://global.hk01.com/即时中国/60343766/美众议院通过match等出口管制法案-商务部-将坚决采取必要措施, (Date Accessed: 06.10.2026).
