The South Caucasus geography has been witnessing serious political crises in recent years. At the centre of this crisis is Georgia, which is caught between the West and the East and forced to make a choice. The country is stuck between balancing between the Western World and Russia or pursuing sharply pro-Western policies. At the centre of these debates is the “Foreign Agent Law”.
In March 2023, the “Draft Law on Registration of Foreign Agents” was put to vote and adopted by the Georgian Parliament. Subsequently, large-scale protests against the law were organised by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) on 6-7 March 2024. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, who was unofficially in the United States of America (USA) at the time, supported the protesters participating in the rallies through social media and asked them not to leave the streets. This situation further radicalised the intra-governmental divisions. The then Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Garibashvili and members of the ruling Georgian Dream Party opposed this behaviour and stated that the law was an important step towards the country’s independence.
In the process, in May 2024, the law was again put to a vote in the parliament and 84 deputies supported the law in the 150-member parliament, while 30 deputies voted against it.[1] The new Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who took office after the resignation of Giorgi Garibashvili, does not hesitate to take radical decisions in domestic and foreign policy compared to Garibashvili.
In March 2023, Salome Zurabishvili, who supported the protests in March 2023, reiterated her support this time and announced her veto of the law on 18 May 2024.[2] However, it will be recalled that the number of votes achieved in the parliamentary vote on 14 May 2024 is said to have been sufficient to override the veto.
The law, which was voted in the Georgian Parliament, caused great reactions again, just like last year. The European Union (EU) and the United States have warned that they may impose visa restrictions against Georgia. In his press statement on 23 May 2024, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the events in Georgia could “undermine democracy” and that if this situation continues, they may impose visa restrictions on the majority of Georgian citizens.[3]
The Georgian Dream Party did not show a big reaction to the visa restriction. This is because Georgian citizens prefer Western countries rather than Russia as a labour force. Considering the economic and foreign currency inflow of this labour force to Georgia, the abolition of visa liberalisation would pose serious problems for the country’s domestic welfare.
In response to such a harsh reaction from Washington, the Tbilisi government may radically change its image from “pro-US Georgia” to “European Georgia” in the future.
The threat of visa restrictions imposed by the West may lead to crises in Georgia and its domestic politics. Georgia may try to persuade the EU to minimise the damage from this crisis. Seeking to develop smooth bilateral relations with both the West and Russia, the Georgian Dream Party aims to emphasise its potential by evaluating its regional policy within the framework of the current conjuncture.
Before the war in Ukraine, EU-Russia relations were based on economic and energy foundations and were progressing in a positive direction. With the war, two fronts and conflicts have emerged within the EU. These sides are: The pro-US countries and the countries that tend to remain neutral.
At this point, the draft law voted in the Georgian Parliament has caused differences of opinion in the West. In other words, two fronts have emerged within the EU. These fronts are the EU countries, such as the US, which adopt a radical stance, and the countries that want Georgia not to interfere in its internal affairs. For example, on 13 May 2024, the EU negotiated the “EU27” declaration condemning the Tbilisi government in accordance with the law, but no final conclusion was reached within the organisation. This was because Hungary and Slovakia opposed the resolution. The reason for their opposition is that they believe that “it is not right for the EU to intervene in the internal politics of a third country”.[4] At the same time, Balazs Orban, Political Advisor to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, posted on his official page on the X platform that his aim was not to veto the Georgian law, but rather to encourage the introduction of similar laws across the EU.[5]
The reason for Georgia’s insistence on this issue is to eliminate the danger of possible intelligence gathering within the country. A report published in 2020 claims that almost 90 per cent of the funding of CSOs in the country comes from outside.[6]
At the same time, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream Party, made a statement on NGOs, claiming that these organisations are funded by forces that want to open a new front in the Russian-Ukrainian war through Georgia and bring the country into the war.[7]
Within the framework of the current events, three political scenarios are likely to be realised. The first one is an attempt to suspend the draft law by withdrawing it from the parliament, as Georgia did after the protest rallies of 6-7 March 2023. The likelihood of this possibility is high within the framework of the current international conjuncture. Because the withdrawal of many international companies may lead to a critical economic crisis in Georgia. Indeed, the parliamentary vote on 14 May 2024 and the EU’s “call for the withdrawal of the law” to the Georgian government officials on 15 May 2024”[8] and the subsequent rise in the dollar exchange rate against the Georgian Lari may be a sign of this. Therefore, there is a high probability that Georgia will shelve the law again.
The second scenario, even if it is unlikely, also has a share of reality. This possibility could be the realisation of trilateral talks between the EU-Georgia-Russia behind closed doors, and within the scope of the agreement reached, the law could be drafted in a way to be accepted by the EU and passed by the parliament. As mentioned above, within the EU, Slovakia and Hungary’s position in favour of Georgia indicates that there is a difference of opinion within the organisation.
The third and first scenario is considered more rational than the second possibility. The third possibility is that in the run-up to the parliamentary elections to be held in October 2024, the Georgian Dream Party has taken a pulse on the public and the international community. Although the protesters are out on the streets in large numbers, there are just as many who do not want to be exposed to Georgia’s radical pro-Western policy and become the second front in a possible Russia-Ukraine war. Therefore, the Georgian Dream Party may want to create the perception that it is “the only party that cares about the survival and full independence of the country” before the parliamentary elections by confronting both NGOs and the international public opinion with the aforementioned pulse survey. Thus, the Georgian Dream Party aims to maintain its current majority in the parliament in the 2024 elections.
[1] “Georgian Parliament approves bill on transparency of foreign influence in final hearing”, Agenda.Ge, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2024/39122, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
[2] “Georgian President vetoes law on transparency of foreign influence”, Agenda.Ge, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2024/39194, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
[3] Antony J. Blinklen, “Announcement of a Visa Restriction Policy for Undermining Democracy in Georgia and Comprehensive Review of All U.S.-Georgia Cooperation”, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/announcement-of-a-visa-restriction-policy-for-undermining-democracy-in-georgia-and-comprehensive-review-of-all-u-s-georgia-cooperation/, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
[4] Alexandra Brzozowski, “EU scrambles to adopt common position as Georgian parliament passes ‘foreign agent’ law”, Euractiv, https://l24.im/3Nn15ep, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
[5] Balázs Orbán, “Our intention is not to veto #Georgia’s Law on the Transparency…”, X, https://l24.im/gwGLbBU, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
[6] Lenny Lopatto ve Masa Ocvirk, “Georgian Democracy Is Under Threat”, Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/georgian-democracy-under-threat, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
[7] “Bidzina Ivanishvili Backs Anti-Western Policies, Threatens Repressions”, Civil Georgia, https://civil.ge/archives/602348, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
[8] “Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell with the European Commission on the adoption of the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law in Georgia”, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_2628, (Access Date: 26.05.2024).
