One of the actors whose position in the U.S.–Israel–Iran War, which began on February 28, 2026, has been closely followed and widely questioned is India. Prior to the war, India had various forms of cooperation with all three actors mentioned above, which raised curiosity about how it would position itself in this conflict. One of the most striking aspects is that these attacks occurred approximately 48 hours after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tel Aviv. During the war, the United States carried out an attack on an Iranian naval vessel that had departed from India, resulting in the death of at least 104 Iranian soldiers. Regarding this issue, India admitted that it had shared the location of the Iranian vessel, which invited as an “honorary guest” to the MILAN 2026 exercise, with Israel.[1] Commenting on the matter, Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi stated, “As Israel’s strategic partner, it was our duty to report the exact location of the vessel to Israel.”[2] This admission essentially indicates that India adopted a stance in the war in favor of Israel and the United States.
However, India has traditionally been known for its strategic autonomy in foreign policy. Under the Modi administration, India has begun to follow a more nationalist trajectory in its foreign policy. Border disputes and political tensions with Pakistan have deepened, while efforts have been made to maintain balance by pursuing a more pragmatic line in relations not only with Israel and the United States but also with Russia, China, and Iran. In the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, India’s initial silence drew attention. However, after Iran launched attacks on American bases in the Middle East, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Modi’s post on his X account condemning these attacks raised questions regarding New Delhi’s neutrality.[3]
Following these developments, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement[4] expressing deep concern about the recent developments between Iran and Israel. The statement noted that “India urges both sides to refrain from steps that could escalate tensions. Existing channels of dialogue and diplomacy should be utilized to de-escalate the situation and resolve underlying issues.” It also emphasized that “India maintains close and friendly relations with both countries and stands ready to offer any support.”[5] Although this diplomatic position may appear neutral, in practice it can be interpreted that India has taken a closer stance toward Israel, the UAE, and the United States, particularly by revealing the position of the Iranian vessel to Israel, thereby clearly demonstrating its position in the war.
This stance is closely linked to New Delhi’s interests in energy, trade, and transportation. India, which meets two-thirds of its crude oil demand through the Strait of Hormuz, had increased oil imports from Russia in addition to Saudi Arabia and the UAE to ensure energy security. Due to the recent customs tariff crisis with the United States, India had pledged to reduce its purchases from Russia and had increased its imports from Gulf countries. However, following the U.S.–Israel–Iran War, India announced that it would temporarily resume oil purchases from Russia.[6] Having been compelled to turn back to Russia for energy due to this crisis, India has been careful to conduct the process in coordination with the United States and does not wish to face another crisis with the Trump administration due to its energy cooperation with Russia.
India’s failure to demonstrate any stance supporting Iran in this war may also be considered an indication that the trade and transportation project related to the Chabahar Port, whose progress has come to a near standstill in recent years, has now completely lost its importance. For the past 25 years, India had viewed Iran’s Chabahar Port as a strategic hub within the north–south transport corridor extending toward Russia and in the transportation project opening toward Afghanistan, and it had supported the development of the port. However, due to developments in Afghanistan and the slow progress of transportation corridor projects in Iran over the past quarter century, this corridor has largely lost its importance, leading India to focus instead on developing the IMEC project extending to the West through the Middle East. The primary partners in this project are Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. When this geopolitical reality is taken into consideration, India’s positioning alongside these actors appears to fit within an understandable framework.
Under these new geopolitical conditions, India’s foreign policy has also been undergoing transformation. Although India continues to emphasize neutrality in official rhetoric, energy security concerns, trade corridors, and strategic partnerships with Western powers are gradually bringing India closer to the axis of the United States and Israel. This situation indicates that India may position itself in the future as a more active actor in Middle Eastern geopolitics, albeit one operating with a bloc-politics mentality. New Delhi’s cooperation with Tel Aviv and Washington can be placed within an understandable framework. However, it is not easy to explain why New Delhi has altered its approach toward Tehran so rapidly and sharply. Regardless of the diplomatic statements attempting to maintain neutrality, when examining New Delhi’s actions and stance in this war, particularly the example of informing Israel about the Iranian naval vessel, it becomes clear that certain ruptures in Tehran–New Delhi relations had already occurred or may occur in the future.
Yet, when the current geopolitical balances in South Asia are examined, India’s need for Iran has not diminished; on the contrary, it has increased significantly. While conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan continue, Iran remains a neighboring state capable of maintaining relatively balanced relations with both the Taliban and Pakistan despite certain fluctuations. Due to this characteristic, Iran has always been regarded geopolitically as an actor that India needs and must engage with. Nevertheless, India’s interests largely overlap with those of Israel, the United States, and the Gulf countries, leaving relations with Iran in the background.
India’s orientation is also largely related to the renewed intensification of global power competition. China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region and the changing regional balance of power encourage New Delhi to pursue closer cooperation with the United States in its security strategy. In addition, the developing defense and technological partnership with Israel has become an important factor influencing India’s regional preferences. The role played by Israel’s defense industry in India’s military modernization and the security cooperation mechanisms developed with the United States demonstrate that this rapprochement has acquired not only a diplomatic but also a structural character. Therefore, New Delhi’s relations with Tel Aviv and Washington can be placed within an understandable framework based on strategic and economic considerations.
Nevertheless, there has been a sharp change in tone in India’s policy toward Iran. In particular, the reporting of an Iranian naval asset to Israel indicates serious erosion in the relationship of trust between the two countries. Such developments may point to a deeper strategic rupture that cannot be explained merely by immediate crisis responses. Therefore, the transformation in India’s Iran policy should be evaluated not only in the context of the pressures created by the current war but also in relation to the geopolitical and economic dynamics that have accumulated in recent years. Although relations with Iran have not reached the point of complete rupture, they appear to have settled into a more fragile and limited framework of cooperation compared to previous periods. In the future, it can be anticipated that India’s Iran policy will continue to experience pragmatic fluctuations.
[1] “Hindistan: İran gemisinin konumunu İsrail’e biz verdik”, Son Dakika, https://www.sondakika.com/dunya/haber-hindistan-iran-gemisinin-konumunu-israil-e-biz-19638635/, (Access Date: 10.03.2026).
[2] Ibid.
[3] “Modi’s silence on Iran lost India’s voice in the Middle East”, Asia Times, https://asiatimes.com/2026/03/modis-silence-on-iran-lost-indias-voice-in-the-middle-east/, (Access Date: 10.03.2026).
[4] “Iran-Israel war: Will India need to pick a side?”, DW, https://www.dw.com/en/india-israel-iran-war-pakistan/a-72983963, (Access Date: 10.03.2026).
[5] Ibid.
[6] “ABD, Hindistan’ın Rus petrolü alımına geçici olarak izin verdi”, AA, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/enerjiterminali/petrol/abd-hindistanin-rus-petrolu-alimina-gecici-olarak-izin-verdi/55214, (Access Date: 10.03.2026).
