In 2017, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) expanded by admitting Pakistan and India, which not only extended the organization’s geographical boundaries but also broadened its political influence, thereby increasing the potential for conflicts of interest. This expansion continued with Iran’s accession in 2021 and Belarus’s in 2024. However, when the potential full memberships of dialogue partners such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey came under discussion, it became clear that the SCO still faced certain limitations. In this context, it has been suggested that Armenia’s potential membership was blocked by Pakistan, while Azerbaijan’s was obstructed by India.[i] Thus, the organization may have reached the maximum extent of its possible enlargement.
While Russia and China can mostly find common ground regarding the expansion of the SCO, it is considerably more difficult for actors such as Pakistan and India, who have divergent geopolitical interests, to reach consensus and make joint decisions. This situation creates deadlocks in the SCO’s decision-making process and can negatively affect the organization’s interests. Today, the difficulties surrounding the memberships of Armenia and Azerbaijan may also arise in the future regarding the potential memberships of Nepal and Sri Lanka. Indeed, the accession of these countries will only be possible if the interests of India and China converge. In this context, it is evident that certain geopolitical axes may emerge within the SCO, particularly stemming from the sharp conflicts of interest between Pakistan and India. Therefore, it is useful to examine India’s foreign policy orientations in greater detail.
In history, India was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and in today’s foreign policy it claims to act within the framework of “strategic autonomy,” without binding itself to any particular axis. However, New Delhi’s foreign policy behavior can at times take the form of rejecting cooperation requests from “certain” countries while confronting “some” others. This reflects a mode of conduct consistent with the “zero-sum game” mentality in international relations. In this perspective, “the gain of the other side is perceived as one’s own loss,” or vice versa. Therefore, this approach stands in direct contrast to the “win-win” mentality.
In practice, India prioritizes cooperation with Russia, Armenia, and Iran in the north–south transportation corridors, while also seeking to develop positive relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states along the same routes. In the east–west corridors, however, India’s strongest objection is directed toward the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Similarly, the integration of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into the Middle Corridor—linking to the Caspian region and the South Caucasus (the Zangezur Corridor)—as well as its extension to Iran through the Southern Corridor, represent initiatives that do not align with India’s interests. This also includes projects connecting CPEC to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Consequently, India holds the potential to enter into “geopolitical conflicts” with almost numerous countries across Asia.
India’s primary objective in joining the SCO is to eliminate extremist, separatist, and terrorist groups fueled by the Ferghana Valley, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, and to advance cooperation with regional states toward this goal. In this context, India attaches great importance to the cooperation conducted within the framework of the SCO’s “Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS),” to summit meetings, and ultimately to addressing security problems stemming from Kashmir. However, due to the geopolitical calculations mentioned above, India has only been able to develop limited cooperation with SCO member states. In this regard, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi often appears distant toward neighboring leaders from Pakistan and China during SCO summits and avoids meeting them face-to-face. This is why Modi’s meeting with his counterpart Xi Jinping at the 2025 SCO Leaders’ Summit in China came as a major surprise. Indeed, looking at the past two years of summits, Modi did not attend the 2024 SCO Summit held in Astana, Kazakhstan, with India being represented instead at the foreign ministerial level.
In 2023, India hosted the SCO Summit for the first time; however, since it was held virtually, heads of state did not meet in person. India’s selective participation in the SCO, depending on changing geopolitical circumstances, has significantly disrupted harmony within the organization. With the 2027 SCO Summit expected to take place in Pakistan,[ii] the question of whether Modi will attend remains a matter of curiosity.
On the one hand, China and Russia support the expansion of organizations such as the SCO and BRICS; on the other hand, these enlargement processes bring to light the conflicting interests of member states. Structural, bureaucratic, and geopolitical obstacles stand in the way of the SCO’s transformation from a regional organization into a truly global one. The organization’s founding purpose has primarily been to address regional security issues. Beyond resolving border disputes, its aims include eliminating extremist, separatist, and terrorist groups, as well as enhancing regional cooperation in tackling security challenges. In addition, the notion, emphasized frequently in recent years by Russia and China, that “security should be addressed on a global scale” has not yet been fully accepted or internalized among Asian states. The adoption and implementation of this approach by Pakistan and India, in particular, is of great importance, since the security issues originating from Kashmir are closely linked to global security.
As part of this approach, which addresses regional and global security together, actors such as Iran and Belarus have joined the SCO. In line with the evolving concept of globalized security, the full membership of other observer or dialogue partner states in the SCO may also resurface as a topic of discussion. In the future, potential new memberships may become constrained by geopolitical calculations, potentially halting the SCO’s expansion. India’s adherence to a “zero-sum game” mentality is likely to play a significant role in this outcome. While the “win-win” approach is gaining increasing prevalence in a globalizing world, the SCO’s entanglement in geopolitical power competition slows the growth and expansion of the Global South. Major powers such as Russia and China strive for the SCO to expand and become an integral part of the Global South, however, the internal conflicts of interest among regional actors are delaying the construction of a multipolar world.
[i] “Azerbaijan claims Russia helped India block SCO membership bid”, OC Media, https://oc-media.org/azerbaijan-claims-russia-helped-india-block-sco-membership-bid/, (Access Date: 16.09.2025).
[ii] “Pakistan to host next SCO summit in 2027, says Shehbaz Sharif”, India Today, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-to-host-next-sco-summit-in-2027-says-shehbaz-sharif-glbs-2786572-2025-09-13, (Access Date: 16.09.2025).
