Kazakhstan has long pursued a multi-vector foreign policy to maintain its strategic autonomy by sustaining productive relations with rival powers. This strategy has become particularly important as Kazakhstan navigates the increasingly competitive geopolitical environment in Eurasia. The emergence of competing technological ecosystems poses a new challenge to this model. Artificial intelligence development is becoming increasingly dependent on critical minerals, energy, data centers, semiconductors, and secure supply chains. Therefore, AI holds special importance in this transformation. In an environment where the US and China are trying to shape these developing technological ecosystems, Kazakhstan has gained particular importance due to its resource base and geographical location.
Consequently, Kazakhstan faces an extraordinary dilemma in the emerging global competition in artificial intelligence. In 2026, Astana joined the US-led Pax Silica initiative[i] and the Chinese-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO)[ii]. These two structures are increasingly associated with competing technological ecosystems. Kazakhstan is the only country in the world to participate in both the rival American (Pax Silica) and Chinese (WAICO) AI initiatives.[iii] This situation places Kazakhstan at the intersection of a struggle that is increasingly transforming artificial intelligence from a field of international cooperation into an arena of geopolitical competition.
Astana’s simultaneous participation in these two initiatives reflects the logic of its multi-vector foreign policy. While Kazakhstan maintains access to China’s technology, infrastructure, and investment ecosystem, it also has strong incentives to attract technological investment from the US and secure access to advanced supply chains. Participation in Pax Silica offers opportunities to strengthen cooperation with Western technology and critical mineral networks, while WAICO provides Kazakhstan with an institutional platform to engage with China and other non-Western states. For Astana, simultaneous participation allows it to maximize access to competing technological ecosystems without officially aligning with either side.
However, the intensifying AI competition between the US and China strains this model. It is becoming increasingly difficult to separate technological cooperation from strategic alignment. Artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly intertwined with national security, semiconductors, critical minerals, data infrastructure, and supply chain security. As these areas become more strategically sensitive, cooperation with one major technological power may increasingly be viewed as a risk factor for cooperation with the other power.
This possibility gained particular prominence in August 2026 with reports that Washington wanted to force partner countries to choose between American and Chinese AI initiatives. According to reports, a draft letter prepared by the US Department of State argued that participation in Pax Silica was incompatible with membership in rival Chinese AI initiatives, and warned that countries maintaining relations with both sides could be excluded from future cooperation with the US.[iv] Such a stance confronts Kazakhstan with a strategic environment fundamentally different from the one in which its multi-vector diplomacy has flourished.
Therefore, the US demand for direct exclusive cooperation creates a difficult choice for Astana. Accepting such a demand could narrow the scope of Kazakhstan’s external partnerships and undermine one of the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Conversely, rejecting the demand could incur costs in Kazakhstan’s relations with Washington and potentially reduce its access to Western technology and investment networks. Thus, the dilemma is shaped not between two equally attractive alternatives, but between different forms of dependency and different opportunity costs.
Because of this, it seems unlikely that Kazakhstan will respond by explicitly choosing one side over the other. Kazakhstan will likely offer enough cooperation to maintain relations with both major powers while avoiding commitments that would irreversibly limit its options. A more likely method is strategic ambiguity. Astana may continue to reassure Washington of its interest in technological cooperation while avoiding commitments that explicitly exclude China. At the same time, it can sustain its participation in Chinese-led initiatives by presenting them not as geopolitical alignment with Beijing, but as instruments of international cooperation, technological development, or AI governance. This approach will allow Kazakhstan to postpone an irreversible decision and maintain the ability to readjust its position depending on the evolution of technological competition.
For a middle power positioned between rival great powers, strategic ambiguity can be a conscious tool of strategic autonomy. Kazakhstan does not have enough power to determine the structure of US-China competition; however, it can try to prevent this competition from dictating the entirety of its foreign policy choices. By maintaining relations with both sides, Astana can preserve its alternatives and increase its negotiating capacity for more advantageous terms.
The Chinese dimension of the dilemma is particularly important in this context. Beijing does not necessarily need to force Kazakhstan into a clear choice. China’s influence operates through established economic, technological, and infrastructural ties that make severing relations difficult even without formal political pressure. Chinese investments, technology companies, digital infrastructure, and trade networks create forms of long-term dependency. As these relations deepen, the cost of Kazakhstan excluding China from its technological development steadily increases.
This situation reveals a significant difference between the two forms of pressure. The US may try to increasingly shape Kazakhstan’s choices through access to reliable technology networks and restrictions placed on cooperation with Chinese initiatives. China, on the other hand, can rely more on the depth of its existing economic and technological presence. Therefore, Kazakhstan must manage both the external pressure to make a choice and the internal costs that such a choice would entail.
On the other hand, this dilemma also creates some opportunities for Kazakhstan. As long as Washington and Beijing wish to maintain their influence in Central Asia, Astana can leverage the competition between the two powers to secure investment, technology, infrastructure, and political support. Its critical mineral resources, geographical location, and expanding digital ambitions make Kazakhstan important to both technological ecosystems. Thus, multi-vectorism can function not only as a mechanism for avoiding dependency but also as a source of bargaining power.
However, this bargaining power also depends on the strategic competition between the US and China continuing at its current level. If the US and China increasingly demand exclusive technological alignment from Kazakhstan, Astana’s ability to capitalize on the rivalry between the two powers diminishes. The further integration of AI with strategic supply chains, national security, and critical infrastructure makes it increasingly difficult for Kazakhstan to simultaneously sustain relations with both sides without making a politically meaningful choice.
Kazakhstan’s traditional multi-vector foreign policy may enter a new phase exactly at this point. Instead of disappearing, multi-vectorism may transform into a constrained multi-vectorism. Astana will continue to engage with multiple great powers; however, the cost of sustaining these relations simultaneously will increase. In this case, the goal will no longer be solely to diversify Kazakhstan’s external partnerships, but to manage the points where these partnerships begin to conflict and to prevent any single partner from gaining decisive influence over Kazakhstan’s technological development.
The implications of this situation extend beyond Kazakhstan. As AI, digital infrastructure, critical minerals, and advanced technologies become increasingly involved in great power competition, other Central Asian states may face similar pressures. Regional governments will likely maintain strong incentives to avoid exclusive alignment, as diversification provides both economic opportunities and greater political autonomy. However, if major powers increasingly demand exclusive technological partnerships, Central Asian states may be forced to develop more sophisticated forms of strategic ambiguity and issue-based balancing.
Therefore, the fundamental issue is not merely whether Kazakhstan will choose Washington or Beijing. The more important question is the extent to which Washington and Beijing will continue to allow Kazakhstan to avoid making a choice. If both sides continue to accept overlapping relations, Astana can maintain its multi-vector strategy and leverage great power competition to strengthen its own position. However, if technological competition turns into rigid bloc formation, Kazakhstan’s room for maneuver will narrow significantly.
In conclusion, Kazakhstan’s simultaneous participation in Pax Silica and WAICO represents a broader test of multi-vectorism in an era of intensifying technological competition. Astana’s fundamental challenge in the emerging AI order is to preserve its strategic autonomy by avoiding exclusive alignment. At the same time, it must prevent its cooperation with rival technological powers from turning into dependence on either side.
[i] “Kazakhstan Joins the Pax Silica Initiative to Develop AI Infrastructure and High-Tech Manufacturing”. Gov.kz, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/maidd/press/news/details/1248924?lang=en, (Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
[ii] “Kazakhstan became one of the founders of the World Organization for Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence”, Gov.kz, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/maidd/press/news/details/1259704?lang=ru,(Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
[iii] “Xi pitches China as leader of new global AI order, challenging US dominance”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-xi-promotes-chinas-commitment-ai-access-speech-shanghai-conference-2026-07-17/, (Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
[iv] “US to tell partners they must pick sides in AI race with China”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-tell-partners-they-must-pick-sides-ai-race-with-china-2026-08-14/, (Date of Access: 20.08.2026).
