At a historical juncture when the global security architecture is facing its greatest challenges since the end of World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is entering a critical turning point with the summit of heads of state and government it will hold in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026. Given that, within the discipline of international relations, alliances are inherently shaped by perceptions of external threats, the Ankara Summit goes beyond being a mere diplomatic gathering, it serves as a test of institutional continuity that will redefine the Western bloc’s strategic orientation and internal cohesion. Especially today, as signs of a transition to a complex and multipolar system become increasingly evident, this summit will be decisive both in repairing the alliance’s internal fissures and in strengthening deterrence against revisionist actors on a global scale.[i]
For Türkiye, this summit goes down in history as the largest and highest-profile international gathering ever hosted in the history of the republic. Having last hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit, which embodied the alliance’s vision of expansion and partnership, Türkiye is once again reaffirming its geopolitical weight and indispensable role within the alliance with the 2026 Ankara Summit. What makes the summit’s diplomatic dimension even more striking is the participation of U.S. President Donald Trump. As the first U.S. president to visit Türkiye in exactly 17 years, since Barack Obama’s visit in 2009, Trump’s presence represents a historic milestone for the trajectory of bilateral relations and the future of the Turkish-American strategic partnership.[ii]
To understand NATO’s institutional compass, it is important to examine the evolution of the Strategic Concepts, the Alliance’s highest-level official policy documents that define its fundamental purpose, security missions, and the challenges it faces. Adopted in the 1990s, a period when the Alliance was experiencing an existential identity crisis following the end of the Cold War, the 1999 Strategic Concept expanded NATO’s geographic focus to the Euro-Atlantic area, and integrated new elements into its doctrine, such as crisis management, peacekeeping operations, and partnership mechanisms with former Warsaw Pact members. This period reflects the golden age of the liberal international order, during which “out-of-area” operations became the alliance’s primary source of legitimacy.[iii]
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks ushered in a new era in which asymmetric threats took precedence over state-sponsored threats in the perception of international security, and this paradigm shift was directly reflected in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The 2010 document went down in history as an overly optimistic text that placed issues such as counterterrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the center of the alliance’s focus, while emphasizing efforts to establish a strategic partnership with Russia. However, the Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War, the annexation of Crimea, and ultimately the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War have completely undermined the assumptions of the 2010 concept and forced NATO to return to its roots, namely, classic territorial defense.[iv]
The institutional manifestation of this historic turning point is the 2022 Madrid Strategic Concept, which is currently in effect and shapes the Alliance’s current vision. This transformative document has reframed NATO’s raison d’être around three core missions: Deterrence and Defense, Crisis Prevention and Management, and Cooperative Security. The “Deterrence and Defense” mission has been designated as the top priority, and a decision has been made to increase the Alliance’s military presence and defense capabilities on its eastern flank to an unprecedented level. This represents a new version of the Cold War-era “forward defense” concept, adapted to today’s technological and hybrid warfare dynamics.[v]
The most fundamental feature that radically distinguishes the 2022 Strategic Concept from previous documents is the clarity and categorical firmness of its threat definitions. The Russian Federation has been defined as the “most significant and direct threat” to the security, peace, and stability of allies in the Euro-Atlantic region, thereby officially putting an end to the 2010 illusion of a “strategic partnership.” At the same time, for the first time in the alliance’s history, China has been included in the concept document; it has been acknowledged that China’s growing influence, coercive policies, and strategic ambitions constitute a “systematic challenge” to NATO’s interests, security, and values. This development demonstrates that NATO has evolved from being merely a regional defense organization into one of the primary platforms of global power competition.[vi]
The new strategic priorities are not limited to state-centric actors; they also encompass a new generation of threats that, by their very nature, know no borders. In the context of hybrid and cyber threats, the document has, for the first time, established a legal basis for the assertion that the cumulative impact of operations conducted in cyberspace could trigger the invocation of Article 5, which forms the existential backbone of the Alliance. Furthermore, climate change has been defined as “the defining challenge of our time” and integrated into NATO’s operational plans across a broad spectrum, ranging from operational planning to the resilience of military bases. This expanded threat vision is the most concrete evidence that NATO has begun to perceive security beyond the traditional military framework.[vii]
One of the most contentious topics of discussion at the Ankara Summit is undoubtedly burden-sharing and defense spending. Within the framework of the collective action problem, a frequent topic in alliance theory, structural tensions between the United States and its European allies persist. The astronomical defense spending target of 5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), adopted at the previous summit held in The Hague, Netherlands, in June 2025 (with 3.5 percent allocated to traditional defense and 1.5 percent to technology and related expenditures), will lead to a serious showdown at the Ankara summit. Given the economic stagnation and fiscal constraints in European economies, the feasibility of this target is highly questionable. Indeed, even the host country, Türkiye, has declared that it plans to reach this radical target only by the end of 2030.[viii]
At the heart of this burden-sharing crisis lies U.S. President Donald Trump’s skeptical approach to foreign policy toward the alliance. Trump’s criticism that Europe is not paying its fair share for its own security, coupled with the U.S. tendency to gradually reduce its role in European defense, is creating a deep sense of existential anxiety across continental Europe. The fact that the leaders of five European countries gathered in Germany prior to the Ankara Summit to engage in a “search for coordination” is the result of a reflex to form a united European bloc against the U.S. The Ankara Summit will be one of the biggest geopolitical stress tests to determine whether the transatlantic bridge will be destroyed or not.[ix]
One of the innovative steps taken at the Ankara Summit is making the Defense Industry Forum an integral part of the official program. This forum, to be held on July 7 at the Ankara Chamber of Commerce Congress Center, is of critical importance for the integration of NATO allies’ military-industrial complexes. Particularly in light of the tactical lessons learned on the battlefield in Ukraine, the forum aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities in the areas of missile capabilities, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). This forum is an institutional reflection of the allies’ efforts to find common ground both politically and regarding the production and standardization of operational technology.[x]
The course of the war in Ukraine remains the most urgent and pressing item on the summit’s agenda. The meeting at the foreign ministers’ level in the NATO-Ukraine Council format, along with the participation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, demonstrates the Alliance’s continued political and military commitment to the government in Kyiv. Behind closed doors, however, the sustainability of this conflict, which has turned into an endless war of attrition, is being questioned among the allies. At the Ankara Summit, while efforts will be made to secure mechanisms for Ukraine’s long-term resilience, it is also expected that back-channel strategies for diplomacy and peace negotiations will be openly discussed.[xi]
For Türkiye, as the host country, this summit serves as a perfect showcase for Ankara’s multifaceted and proactive foreign policy. While Türkiye continues to fulfill its commitments to NATO’s eastern flank and the fight against terrorism as a loyal ally with the alliance’s second-largest military, it also stands as the sole “balancing” power capable of maintaining open channels of communication with Russia and Middle Eastern actors. A potential bilateral meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and U.S. President Donald Trump presents a historic window of opportunity to resolve chronic issues such as the F-16 procurement process and the energy geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean.
In conclusion, the 2026 NATO Ankara Summit is the most critical institutional gathering of a period in which hegemonic stability in the international system has been shaken and a new balance-of-power architecture is being painstakingly constructed. Having rediscovered its identity through the 2022 Madrid Strategic Concept and clearly defined the threats it faces; the alliance is now facing the challenge of transforming its theoretical framework into an operational reality on the ground. However, the greatest obstacle to this challenge is not external enemies, but structural fissures within the alliance itself. The economic costs imposed by the 5% defense spending target, coupled with the incompatibility between the U.S.’s isolationist reflexes and Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy, have the potential to erode the alliance’s collective spirit.
[i] “NATO’s future and Türkiye’s hosting role”, Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/opinion/natos-future-and-turkiyes-hosting-role/3938829, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[ii] “NATO Defence Ministers make good progress ahead of the Ankara Summit”, NATO, https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/06/18/nato-defence-ministers-make-good-progress-ahead-of-the-ankara-summit, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[iii] “Strategic Concepts”, NATO, https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/strategic-concepts, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[iv] “From Lisbon to Madrid: The Evolution of NATO’s Strategic Concept”, Medium, https://euh-editorial.medium.com/from-lisbon-to-madrid-the-evolution-of-natos-strategic-concept-1e0469d55a84, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[v] “NATO’s New Strategic Concept”, NATO, https://www.ndc.nato.int/natos-new-strategic-concept/, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[vi] “Debunking the Myth of a Unified China-Russia Threat”, Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-03/features/debunking-myth-unified-china-russia-threat, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[vii] “Collective defence and Article 5”, NATO, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/collective-defence-and-article-5, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[viii] “The Hague Summit Declaration”, NATO, https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[ix] “The Trump-Shaped Hole in the European Security Strategy”, Carnegie, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2026/06/the-trump-shaped-hole-in-the-european-security-strategy, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[x] “NATO Ankara Zirvesi’nin gündeminde neler var?”, DW, https://www.dw.com/tr/nato-ankara-zirvesinin-gündeminde-neler-var/a-77701022, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
[xi] “Ukraine’s Long War: Changing Strategies and Great Power Competition”, Transatlantic dialogue Center, https://tdcenter.org/2025/11/07/ukraines-long-war-changing-strategies-and-great-power-competition/, (Date of Access: 26.06.2026).
