The sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines on 26 September 2022 revealed the strategic importance of protecting underwater infrastructure within the European security architecture. In the aftermath of this incident, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has sought to develop not only its traditional deterrence-based defense reflex but also multi-layered surveillance and intervention capabilities extending down to the seabed. In this context, the trial of the Anchor Alert system conducted by the NATO Research Vessel NRV Alliance in the Baltic Sea in July 2025 marks not only a technical first but also a sign of doctrinal transformation in the protection of military-civilian maritime infrastructure.[i]
With the Anchor Alert system, for the first time a ship’s anchor was identified by its acoustic signature the moment it struck the seabed and integrated into NATO’s alert system. This development is not only relevant for the security of pipelines and cables in the Baltic Sea, but also serves as a precursor to a transformative capability for infrastructure protection in strategically important regions such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the South China Sea, and the Arctic.
The Anchor Alert system is a multi-layered surveillance architecture developed to protect underwater infrastructure. It integrates and analyzes data from heterogeneous sources such as seabed-mounted acoustic sensors, AIS data, and satellite radars into a single information stream. However, the success of such a system depends on a precise coordination known as temporal coherence. Even a synchronization error of just a few seconds between data from different technological sources can lead to a suspicious vessel movement being incorrectly matched or entirely overlooked. This could, for example, make it impossible to detect an attempted act of sabotage. Therefore, temporal coherence becomes not merely a technical performance parameter, but a security vulnerability that directly affects the operational reliability of the system
To mitigate this risk, NATO employs standards such as STANAG 4817 and utilizes the CWIX network to synchronize time stamps between fixed and mobile sensors. However, the growing complexity of the system also exposes the limitations of existing protocols. In the future, the integration of quantum timing systems into NATO’s infrastructure holds the potential to resolve this issue at the millisecond level. The widespread adoption of such advanced time synchronization systems could be transformative not only in the military domain, but also in enhancing data sharing and the coordination of alert systems between NATO and its allied nations.
Failure to maintain temporal coherence could weaken NATO’s early warning systems and give rise to legal and diplomatic accountability issues. For example, if a time discrepancy is detected between fixed sensor data and the movement of a suspicious vessel, the chain of evidence regarding the perpetrator of the incident could be broken. This could have not only operational but also judicial and political repercussions. In this context, temporal coherence is regarded not merely as a technical challenge, but as a strategic reliability test.
It is expected that NATO will incorporate next-generation time management protocols, AI-assisted data prioritization algorithms, and quantum technologies into multi-source detection systems such as Anchor Alert to ensure precise time synchronization. These advancements could pave the way for the system to evolve beyond infrastructure protection, enhancing its capacity for diplomatic deterrence as well.
The technical success of the Anchor Alert system depends not only on the quality of acoustic data or the accuracy of algorithms, but also on its compliance with international law. Under the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) the primary legal instrument governing maritime law the nature of activities conducted within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) is subject to the consent of the coastal state. Systems like Anchor Alert occupy precisely this legal grey zone: while the sensors used may operate under the guise of civilian scientific research, they also enable military intelligence gathering or sabotage detection. This dual-use nature raises legal sensitivities.
To prevent potential violations, NATO installs Anchor Alert only with the explicit consent of its members and typically secures the legal basis through classified bilateral agreements. However, this approach may also prompt debates over transparency and sovereignty, particularly among non-allied states. In the future, NATO’s activities of this kind could face diplomatic protests or legal action in international courts on allegations of UNCLOS violations. In contested regions such as the Arctic, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the South China Sea, the presence of dual-use sensors could escalate regional tensions.
NATO’s legal compliance capacity in this domain may extend beyond mere passive adherence. Steps such as contributing to the development of new international norms, binding sensors to transparent recording and data-sharing protocols, and even establishing multilateral observation regimes for certain special regions could strengthen the Alliance’s technical and diplomatic legitimacy. Furthermore, the use of blockchain-based verification systems to enhance the auditability of dual-use technologies may also become a subject of future discussion.
Systems like Anchor Alert test not only technological boundaries but also legal limits. If NATO wishes to sustain the expansion of such systems, it must develop an architecture grounded in sensor policies consistent with the UNCLOS regime, transparent data management, and consent-based diplomacy. Otherwise, while enhancing infrastructure security, these systems could evolve into areas of strategic vulnerability capable of triggering regional security crises.
The successful initial deployment of the Anchor Alert system in the Baltic Sea can be regarded by NATO not merely as a technological breakthrough, but also as a new instrument of geostrategic projection. With its sabotage detection capability ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure, the system has strong potential for expansion into other strategic underwater zones where energy routes, fiber optic cables, and data-centered diplomatic infrastructure are concentrated.
The Arctic is among the most probable targets for this expansion. Melting ice caused by global warming is opening new trade routes and submarine cable corridors, while also increasing Russian and Chinese submarine activity in the region. In this context, NATO could use systems like Anchor Alert in the Arctic not only to safeguard infrastructure but also to institutionalize its strategic surveillance capacity through these operations.
The Eastern Mediterranean has become a geopolitical nexus due to energy discoveries and pipeline projects. However, jurisdictional disputes among actors such as Türkiye, Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration, and Israel make the deployment of surveillance systems like Anchor Alert more complex. Nevertheless, should NATO succeed in fostering a coordinated consensus among its allies, such systems could serve as early warning mechanisms against sabotage, thereby enhancing deterrence in the realm of energy security.
The spread of Anchor Alert-type systems across these regions holds significance not only for military deterrence but also as a guarantee for energy diplomacy, a means to strengthen resilience against cyber-physical threats, and a foundation for normative security cooperation. Yet, the success of such expansion hinges on ensuring data sharing, synchronization among allies, and respect for the sensitivities of regional powers.
In the future, Anchor Alert could represent NATO’s invisible yet effective presence not only in the Baltic but also in these high-tension zones of multipolar security competition. Such a scenario would enhance the Alliance’s operational and normative strength, while also carrying risks of regional backlash and strategic miscalculations. Therefore, the expansion of Anchor Alert should be interpreted not merely as a technology transfer, but as a geopolitical positioning move.
In conclusion, NATO’s launch of the next-generation acoustic surveillance initiative through the Anchor Alert system creates a complex interplay between high technology, diplomacy, and law—distinct from traditional military capabilities. The system’s ability to effectively address challenges in sensor fusion and temporal coherence could pave the way for the emergence of a new normative framework for underwater security in the future. However, its success and broad adoption will depend not only on technical accuracy but also on multifaceted conditions such as trust among allies, respect for data sovereignty, and compliance with international maritime law norms.
In the coming period, it appears feasible for NATO to integrate quantum timing technologies into the Anchor Alert system to minimize millisecond-level deviations in data synchronization. Achieving instantaneous synchronization of sensors through quantum clocks could enhance the system’s reliability not only in relatively controlled environments such as the Baltic Sea, but also in the polar challenges of the Arctic or the high-traffic zones of the Eastern Mediterranean. Such technological deepening could also lay the groundwork for the establishment of standardized time protocols and data-sharing norms among NATO member states.
Furthermore, the integration of AI-driven behavioral analysis systems into sensor fusion architectures could transform platforms like Anchor Alert from reactive to proactive systems. In other words, beyond detecting ongoing attacks or acts of sabotage, such a system could anticipate suspicious behavioral patterns and automatically transmit these signals to command centers. This would mark NATO’s evolution not only as a military alliance but also as a data-driven surveillance and early-warning platform.
However, this technological evolution will also bring diplomatic and legal debates to the forefront. The dual-use nature of the sensors employed in the Anchor Alert system transforms them from purely scientific devices into intelligence-gathering tools. Consequently, the deployment of such sensors within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of coastal states may necessitate new interpretations under UNCLOS. While NATO currently installs these sensors only with the consent of member states, in the future, exceptional measures such as expediting or suspending approval processes on national security grounds could be considered in regions experiencing heightened regional crises.
In such a scenario, new diplomatic tensions could arise between NATO and third-party countries (e.g., China, Russia, Iran) over issues such as subsea sovereignty and the definition of cyber-physical threats. In particular, China’s characterization of its undersea cable networks in the South China Sea as an extension of its “sovereign rights” could carry a risk of geopolitical escalation if systems like Anchor Alert were to be deployed in this region. Such circumstances would test NATO not only at the technical level but also in terms of strategic communications and alliance diplomacy.
That said, the geostrategic expansion potential of the Anchor Alert system enables NATO to develop a new deterrence doctrine centered on infrastructure security, distinct from its traditional military presence. In this context, the system could function not only as a structure that detects attacks but also as a psychological security architecture sending the message to allies: “We are watching, protecting, and reporting.” Such a system could provide a more sustainable, surveillance-based response to hybrid threats targeting civilian infrastructure, especially energy pipelines and fiber optic cables.
In the long term, platforms like Anchor Alert could potentially be integrated into the security architectures of non-NATO entities such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Such multi-system integration could position NATO not only as a military alliance but also as a global actor in infrastructure and data security. However, this scenario could also spark new debates within NATO itself. Questions over which ally controls the data, sensors, and alert systems, for what purposes, and to what extent, could raise issues related to intra-alliance power dynamics and trust.
In conclusion, the successful implementation of the Anchor Alert system could play a transformative role for NATO not only in achieving technological capacity gains in critical infrastructure security but also in terms of geopolitical positioning, legal flexibility, diplomatic maneuverability, and the ability to shape normative frameworks. The future evolution of this system should be closely monitored, as it represents not only a military necessity but also a multidimensional tool of international policy.
[i] “CMRE – Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation”, Anchor Alert – NRV Alliance detects undersea threats in Baltic first, https://www.cmre.nato.int/anchor-alert-nrv-alliance-detects-undersea-threats-in-baltic-first/, (Date Accessed: 02.08.2025).
