Mali was swept into a major fuel crisis in October 2025. Queues of fuel stretching for miles across the whole country, signaled a war that had taken on a new form, going beyond economic hardship.[i] In the past few weeks, various Jihadist groups, particularly the Al-Qaeda affiliated “Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has developed a new tactic which goes beyond military violence and targets the economy itself. This strategic targeting move appears as a form of an “economic blockade” by replacing classic terrorist acts and thus, creating simultaneous pressure mechanisms on the Malian state, society, and the market.
The blockade has been targeting strategic trade routes in the west of the country since the early September, making it impossible for the oil tankers approaching from the ports of Abidjan and Dakar to cross into the country due to jihadist ambushes and attacks.[ii] These routes are vital to supply Bamako with energy reserves, and the burning of tankers, the blocking of roads, the kidnapping of drivers are thus causing disruption to transport and undermining the state’s logistical integrity. Unlike classic guerrilla tactics, this operation by JNIM demonstrates a strategic orientation targeting the daily life of the community.
The fuel crisis keeps on rapidly spreading. The basic pace of life is being disrupted in many cities, particularly Bamako. Markets, hospitals powered by generators, water distribution systems and transportation networks are facing successive outages. A large part of Mali’s electricity system is dependent on diesel-powered generators, which risks turning the fuel shortage into an energy security crisis that goes beyond transportation issues. As power outages persist, daily life is increasingly getting difficult; with dark neighborhoods, empty pumps and silent engines emphasizing on the country’s fragility. This situation demonstrates that jihadist actors can also destabilize the country through economic means.
The psychological repercussions of the crisis have collided with its economic consequences, likely triggering feelings of fear and helplessness among the population with the blockage of JNIM. The phrase “Ninety million CFA francs went up in smoke”, uttered by an operator who lost two tankers in the attacks, reflects not only a material loss but also the vulnerability of Mali’s fragile economic structure. Transport companies are avoiding risk, and insurance policies exclude coverage for such attacks. Each attack drains not only fuel but also confidence. For jihadist groups, this process can become an effective means of psychological pressure and may continue for some time.
A parallel reality has emerged in the market structure. While the official price is seen as 775 CFA, black market prices can be as high as 3.000 CFA francs per liter. This variation in prices could lay the groundwork for a new socio-economic divide within society, making those with low incomes lose their means of transportation while the wealthy starts to stockpile. The economic blockade could have consequences that target both state institutions and the social structure.
The government’s response has been caught between rhetorical resistance and practical difficulties. Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga’s statement to “carry the fuel with spoons, if necessary”, aims to project an image of political resilience, yet conditions on the ground contradict this rhetoric; although the Malian Army’s increased operations in the western corridors have heightened activity on the ground, jihadist groups retain freedom of movement in vast rural areas. Therefore, it appears difficult for the government to break the blockade in the short term.
Crisis seen in the energy supply chain could also be mirrored in foreign policy preferences. The Bamako administration’s tendency to distance itself from the West and its efforts to establish closer relations with Moscow could bring new collaborations to the agenda in the framework of energy security. In an environment where Russia’s influence is being reshaped, external support capacity is likely to remain limited. Examples of regional cooperation, such as electricity imports from Ghana, may provide short-term relief; however, these solutions may not be sufficiently effective in blockades become permanent.
Humanitarian aid is also affected by the disruptions. Flights by the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) have been severely limited due to fuel shortages, only being able to have flights to Gao and Mopti for emergency medical evacuations, which demonstrates the severely weakened capacity to deliver aid and the disruption of internal connections. Health services can potentially be disrupted if rural hospitals are left without generators. A prolonged blockade could lead to a deterioration in human conditions.
This tactic implemented by JNIM represents a more sophisticated strategic profile than classic terrorist practices. Disrupting fuel flows not only paralyzes vehicles but can also be detrimental to the state’s functionality. This approach could set an example for other groups in the Sahel region. Similar structures in Niger or Burkina Faso may adopt comparable attrition strategies by targeting energy, food, or electricity lines. This scenario could transform the regional security environment into an energy-oriented conflict arena.
Organizations’ economic pressure strategy has the potential to redefine field power, as appearing as actors that provide basic needs of the people in the areas where the state can’t access, can grant these groups local legitimacy. Structures like JNIM can assume parallel governance functions through service provision or supply control. This situation can narrow the state’s sphere of authority a legitimacy.
The social resilience is getting tested by the long queues and the constant waiting. People question whether each disruption is a temporary glitch or a permanent situation. If the crisis drags on for months, the government’s authority may be questioned; local protests may increase, and economic dissatisfaction can turn into political instability. This process may trigger the risk of radicalization among young people, as their hopelessness increases.
Mali’s resilience on the international arena will determine the geopolitical orientation of the Sahel. The actions of actors attempting to fill the void left by France’s withdrawal from the region are affecting continental balances. China’s infrastructure investments and logistics capacity could play a critical role in reorganizing fuel transportation routes. Beijing’s involvement in this area could create a strategic opportunity for Mali, but the expected positive effects of these investments would remain limited without rebuilding security.
Economic blockade can have profound effects on agricultural production, logistics networks, and the education system. Long-term supply constraints can reduce production; supply chain disruptions can interrupt daily operations. This impact has the potential to increase unemployment and create despair among the younger generation; in such a place, the risk of radicalization could rise.
In conclusion, the fuel crisis in Mali presents a multidimensional attack that began with the disruption of energy supply lines and targeted the national psyche. JNIM’s move may signal an evolution in the dynamics of conflict in the Sahel. This new form of conflict demands that states reshape their defense and development strategies. If Mali wants to overcome this siege, it can focus on strengthening its logistical capacity and increasing social resilience beyond military intervention. Otherwise, the cycle of “oil and fear” risks reinforcing the country’s long-term fragility. This case holds important clues about how the Sahel will shape up in the future. The actor controlling the energy lines can exert a significant influence over the state’s critical functions. Mali is currently experiencing this reality; the new front in the war might not be in the armories, but in the supply lines.
[i] Matteo Maillard ve Aly Asmane Ascofaré, Pénurie de carburant au Mali : « La situation s’aggrave de jour en jour », Jeune Afrique, 3 Ekim 2025, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1727595/politique/penurie-de-carburant-au-mali-la-situation-saggrave-de-jour-en-jour/, (Access Date: 09.10.2025).
[ii] Ibid.
