The electoral success of the student-led political movement in Serbia can be regarded as a significant development extending beyond the country’s domestic struggle for power, with important implications for the democratic future of the Balkans and Serbia’s relations with the European Union (EU). Emerging in opposition to the long-standing political dominance of Aleksandar Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party, the movement has brought demands for combating corruption, ensuring accountability, and safeguarding institutional independence into electoral politics. According to the preliminary results announced following the elections held on 25 October 2026, the Student List reportedly received approximately 52.7 percent of the vote and was expected to secure a parliamentary majority.[i] Nevertheless, the final confirmation of the election results and the movement’s ability to translate its electoral success into lasting political transformation remain the key factors that will determine the future course of this process.
The protests in Serbia were triggered by the collapse of the roof of the railway station in Novi Sad in November 2024, which claimed the lives of 16 people.[ii] Initially perceived as an infrastructure disaster, the incident quickly became the focal point of broader debates concerning the functioning of public administration, transparency in public procurement, and political responsibility. For students, the issue was not merely about establishing the causes of the accident, but also about questioning the model of governance that had created the conditions for such tragedies to occur. The public reaction that followed the incident evolved into a broader debate about the responsibility of state institutions towards citizens and the accountability of those in political power.
The social impact of the protests stemmed from the fact that the students’ demands were not confined to university campuses. University boycotts and mass demonstrations gradually evolved into a broader movement, attracting participation from diverse segments of society. Academics, professional groups, civil society actors, and citizens dissatisfied with government policies strengthened the movement’s social base. This expansion enabled students to move beyond their initial role as a group demanding clarification of a specific incident and to become representatives of broader objections to the country’s system of governance.
One of the movement’s most distinctive characteristics has been its adoption of an organisational and representative model that differs from traditional party politics. Rather than revolving around a prominent leader, it has emphasised collective decision-making and horizontal organisational structures, making it easier for different segments of society to identify with and support the protests. This model offers an alternative that could reduce political movements’ dependence on leader-centred structures. Nevertheless, a movement without clearly defined leadership may also encounter difficulties in post-election decision-making, assuming responsibility, and implementing a common political programme.[iii] The anti-corruption stance that brought together different viewpoints during street protests may, on its own, prove insufficient to establish a common position on issues such as the economy, foreign policy, and public administration once responsibility for governing is assumed.
For this reason, electoral success represents not the end of the movement’s journey but the beginning of a more complex phase. The most important challenge facing the student-led formation will be to translate the demands articulated during the election campaign into concrete policies.[iv] Key priorities include strengthening oversight of public procurement, ensuring independent investigations into allegations of corruption, safeguarding the judiciary from political influence, and increasing transparency in public institutions. Developing solutions to problems in education, healthcare, and social services will also be essential to maintaining the movement’s public support. The possibility that the expectations bringing together different social groups during the electoral process may turn into competing priorities once in government should not be overlooked.
Another important dimension of developments in Serbia is that the elections cannot be assessed solely in terms of vote counts and the distribution of parliamentary seats. European institutions and election observers have drawn attention to various problems concerning the quality of democratic competition in the country. Allegations of pressure on voters, the use of public resources in favour of the ruling party, media imbalances, and instances of political intimidation have raised concerns about the fairness of the electoral environment. Following the electoral process, the EU also reiterated its expectations regarding improvements to electoral legislation and the implementation of recommendations made by international observers.[v]
In this context, the democratic significance of the election results is not limited to the possibility of a transfer of power. The sustainability of democratic systems depends not only on who exercises power but also on the rules and institutional mechanisms that constrain it. The fact that new political actors enjoy a different form of public support from the incumbent administration does not mean that institutional transformation will occur automatically. The student movement’s ability to introduce lasting reforms in judicial independence, media freedom, and electoral security will be crucial to ensuring that change does not remain dependent on particular individuals. Otherwise, electoral victory may amount to little more than a change in the political personnel currently in power.
Serbia’s relations with the EU are also at the centre of this debate on democratic transformation. The country’s long-standing EU accession process has encountered various obstacles due to the slow pace of reforms in areas such as the rule of law, judicial independence, the fight against corruption, and fundamental rights. The emphasis placed by Brussels in its post-election statements on strengthening democratic institutions, media freedom, and the rule of law indicates the criteria that are likely to shape bilateral relations in the new period.[vi] Progress by the student movement in these areas could pave the way for a new chapter in Serbia’s relations with the EU.
However, it would be inaccurate to interpret the election results as definitive proof that Serbia is moving towards EU membership. The student movement’s public support is largely rooted in opposition to corruption, demands for accountability, and calls for change in the country’s governance. Although these demands are consistent with the EU’s democratic standards, the movement’s approach to foreign policy issues is more complex. A desire to improve relations with the EU does not necessarily mean acceptance of all the conditions attached to the accession process. Therefore, the main issue for Brussels will be whether the reform commitments announced following the electoral victory are actually implemented.
Serbia’s foreign policy is shaped not only by its objective of European integration but also by its relations with Russia and China. Russia remains important to Belgrade, particularly because of bilateral ties in the energy sector and its diplomatic support regarding the Kosovo issue. China, meanwhile, has become an influential actor in the country’s external relations through its economic investments and infrastructure projects.[vii] Serbia’s efforts to advance its EU membership aspirations while maintaining relations with these countries form part of its long-standing pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy balance.
The student movement’s approach to these issues will constitute one of the most significant policy challenges it would face if it came to power. Issues such as sanctions against Russia and the status of Kosovo demonstrate that relations with the EU involve much more than democratic reforms alone. The tension between Serbia’s refusal to recognise Kosovo’s independence and its pursuit of European integration is not an issue that a new government could easily resolve. Similarly, decisions concerning the future of relations with Russia will require a balance between energy security, perceptions of national interest, and the objective of integration with European institutions.[viii] Consequently, whether the student movement has a pro-European orientation should be assessed not merely through its rhetoric but also through the responses it provides to these concrete foreign policy challenges.
These developments also constitute a test for the EU. The Union’s enlargement policy aims to encourage the strengthening of democratic institutions in candidate countries. However, the failure of the accession process to produce tangible progress over many years can raise questions about the credibility of European integration in candidate countries. In Serbia’s case, the electoral success of a social movement advocating democratic reforms offers the EU an opportunity to translate this support into a concrete policy framework. Nevertheless, it will not be sufficient for Brussels simply to welcome the political change. Progress in the accession process must be based on clear benchmarks, consistent conditions, and a feasible timetable to preserve the credibility of European institutions in promoting democratisation.
The quality of democratic transformation could also be undermined if the EU’s relationship with Serbia’s new political actors is shaped exclusively by geopolitical interests. Serbia’s relations with Russia and China, energy resources, and regional security considerations occupy an important place in Brussels’ strategic calculations. However, allowing these priorities to take precedence over democratic standards could create a situation that contradicts the fundamental values of European integration. The EU’s approach must therefore combine the promotion of reforms with consistency in its expectations concerning the rule of law and fundamental rights.
The regional implications of the student movement in Serbia also merit close attention. In the Western Balkans, the quality of democratic institutions, the fight against corruption, and European integration have long been interconnected areas of debate. The electoral success of the student-led movement demonstrates that demands for political change do not necessarily have to be articulated through traditional opposition parties. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Serbia’s experience offers a single model that can be directly replicated in other countries. Each country has its own political institutions, social structures, and external relations. The regional significance of the movement lies not so much in providing a ready-made solution as in demonstrating that civic participation and demands for accountability can produce tangible political outcomes.
In conclusion, the electoral success of the student-led movement in Serbia represents the translation of a powerful societal challenge to the country’s long-standing model of governance into institutional politics. However, transforming this success into lasting democratic change will depend on the movement’s ability to turn its shared demands into viable policies, strengthen independent institutions, and address the democratic shortcomings brought to light during the electoral process. Relations with the EU will constitute an important part of this process. Serbia’s ability to advance its objective of European integration will be determined not only by its foreign policy choices but also by the steps it takes domestically to uphold the rule of law and ensure democratic accountability. Accordingly, the success of the student movement should be measured not merely by its potential to change the existing political order but also by its ability to make the exercise of power more transparent and accountable. Ultimately, what matters most is whether the expectations of political change that emerged on election night will translate into tangible improvements in everyday politics and the functioning of state institutions.
[i] Guy de Launey, “‘It’s the smell of freedom’: Belgrade cleans up after Student List triumph”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/27/belgrade-cleans-up-after-student-list-triumph-serbia, (Accessed: 28.10.2026).
[ii] Jon Henley, “What is at stake in Serbia’s election? The key players, main issues and potential fallout”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/22/serbia-election-student-protests-explainer-key-issues, (Accessed: 26.10.2026).
[iii] Aleksandar Matković, “A leaderless revolution has swept Serbia. The world should be watching”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/oct/27/a-leaderless-revolution-has-swept-serbia-the-world-should-be-watching, (Accessed: 28.10.2026).
[iv] Paul Kirby, “How a movement of students brought down Serbia’s Vučić”, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c574pvy82k0mo, (Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[v] Luca Bertuzzi, “Serbia’s student victory raises hopes of an EU reset”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/26/serbias-student-victory-raises-hopes-of-an-eu-reset, (Accessed: 27.10.2026).
[vi] Ashifa Kassam, “In Serbia, a new type of democracy is taking hold, and Europe is watching closely”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/28/in-serbia-a-new-type-of-democracy-is-taking-hold-and-europe-is-watching-closely, (Accessed: 28.10.2026).
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Ibid.
