Georgia, in the mid-2020s, is passing through a critical juncture characterized by both deepening polarization in domestic politics and the delicate balance it seeks to maintain in foreign policy between the West and Russia. The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) has consolidated its societal support by placing territorial integrity and nationalist reflexes at the core of political legitimacy; however, the monopolization of this discourse has generated new tensions within the country and led to the erosion of democratic institutions.
Relations with the European Union (EU) have turned into a sharp confrontation centered on the “foreign influence transparency law”, as Brussels’ emphasis on democratic standards has been perceived in Tbilisi as an infringement upon national sovereignty, while at the same time Russia’s presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has exacerbated the country’s security deficit. In the economy, despite rising exports to Bulgaria, dependency on Moscow for wheat imports and the weakening of Georgia’s transit role in China-centered freight traffic have reinforced its vulnerability. Nevertheless, new transport projects such as the Trump Route, which do not bypass the country but instead bolster its logistical value, keep Tbilisi’s aspiration of becoming a regional hub alive. In conclusion, Georgia pursues neither a full alignment with the West nor a complete dependence on Moscow, but rather continues on its path with a fragile yet flexible hybrid foreign policy model.
1. Polarization in Domestic Politics and the Nationalist Current
In domestic politics, the opposition, particularly with its pro-EU orientation, seeks to put pressure on the government, whereas the government portrays such demands as Western interference in Georgia’s internal affairs. The 2008 Russia–Georgia War remains a constant point of reference in this struggle. The opposition accuses the government of “remaining passive in the face of Russia”, while GD frequently emphasizes, in line with nationalist reflexes, that no concessions will ever be made regarding territorial integrity. This sensitivity, which is strongly embedded in public opinion, has led to the perception that any potential concession would amount not only to a political but also to a societal catastrophe.
In this context, United States President Donald Trump’s proposal of a “territorial concession” concerning Ukraine has found no acceptance whatsoever in Georgia. Public opinion in Georgia perceives any possible territorial loss as “political suicide” and closely scrutinizes the government on this matter. This situation narrows the government’s room for maneuver in foreign policy while simultaneously reinforcing nationalism in domestic politics.
Nevertheless, the government’s monopolization of nationalist discourse, centered on territorial integrity, has also created new tensions at home. A particularly striking example in this regard was the statement given to The New York Times by Davit Razmadze, head of the Gori Municipal Council from GD. Razmadze argued that the 2008 Russia–Georgia War was the responsibility of then-President Mikheil Saakashvili, stressing that his party was not “pro-Russian.” However, his remarks regarding the Russian army’s entry into Gori during the war—“They came here as a peacekeeping force, and it was a good thing they did, because Misha’s bandits were looting all over the city. They even stole a priest’s car, can you believe it? If the Russians hadn’t come, who knows how much more damage they could have done.” [i] – sparked wide public debate.
Razmadze’s words led to heated controversy between the government and the opposition. Former President Salome Zurabishvili described these statements as “shameful”, igniting a new polemic in politics.[ii] Subsequently, Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze intervened, accusing Zurabishvili of being “aligned with foreign agents” and portraying her as an example of the opposition serving as an instrument of external powers.[iii]
Kaladze’s stance may be interpreted as an attempt to damage the opposition’s credibility by projecting Salome Zurabishvili’s radical line onto the broader public sphere. In this regard, Kaladze frames figures like Zurabishvili as a continuation of the “pro-Western” radical politics pursued by Saakashvili in 2008, implying that they aim to transform Georgia from a balanced actor prioritizing national interests into a dependent country guided solely by EU objectives. In this way, the government seeks to reinforce its delegitimization of the opposition not only through political discourse but also by drawing upon economic vulnerabilities and statements centered on territorial integrity, thereby consolidating its standing in public opinion.
2. Strained Relations with the European Union
Tensions in relations with the European Union (EU) have escalated particularly over the “foreign influence transparency law.” Brussels demanded that Georgia safeguard democratic standards, end pressure on the opposition, and repeal the law in question. However, the government defended the law as a tool to prevent “destructive activities” by foreign-funded NGOs and refused to back down. In a declaration issued by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Georgia was warned that it could face expulsion from membership if it continued along authoritarian tendencies.[iv]
At this point, GD frames Western pressure as interference in national sovereignty and foregrounds a “sovereigntist” discourse to mobilize public opinion. While this strategy strengthens the nationalist base in the short term, it risks weakening Georgia’s EU membership perspective and narrowing the country’s foreign policy maneuvering space in the medium and long term. The statements of Parliamentary Speaker Shalva Papuashvili reveal the fundamental contradiction in Georgia’s relations with the EU. Papuashvili argued that the EU’s expectation for Georgia to take steps leading to conflict with Russia contradicts its claim of being a peace project, stressing that the country should “not inflict physical or spiritual harm on itself.”[v]
The government’s rhetoric has also transformed into harsher language that accuses the West of attempting to sow chaos in the country. Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze characterized Western actors as a “deep state” and raised allegations that the United Kingdom was preparing young Georgian activists for clashes with the police.[vi] Indeed, Georgia perceives Western demands in its relations with the EU as “impositions conflicting with its national interests.” While this approach presents a sovereigntist stance in the short run, in the long run it risks undermining the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time, Kaladze’s discourse shows that GD is increasingly developing rhetoric reliant on “anti-Western conspiracy theories.” This approach is part of the government’s strategy to delegitimize the opposition. However, in the long term, such discourse could damage Georgia’s international reputation and negatively affect investor confidence.
3. Balancing Policy with Russia and Frozen Conflicts
In its relations with Russia, Georgia pursues a balancing strategy that avoids direct confrontation. Mamuka Mdinaradze, executive secretary of GD, while commenting on Russia’s accusations regarding the attack on the Crimean Bridge, emphasized that every country acts in line with its own interests and therefore Tbilisi should interpret Moscow’s statements through the “perspective of Russia’s interests.”[vii]
Nevertheless, the issue of Georgia’s territorial integrity remains unresolved. The separatist administrations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to exist with Moscow’s support, thereby deepening the country’s security deficit. French President Emmanuel Macron’s remark that “Putin does not want peace”[viii] indicates that Georgia, in the absence of security guarantees from the West, may again face the threat of aggression.
Furthermore, the so-called administration in Abkhazia citing the United States’ refusal to sign a United Nations (UN) Security Council document as a precedent in its favor has raised concerns in Tbilisi about a weakening of Western solidarity.[ix] This development has brought to the fore the possibility that Georgia could become further isolated on the international stage. Moreover, while the government’s balancing strategy helps to avoid escalation with Moscow in the short term, it remains insufficient to resolve sovereignty issues in the long term. The West’s reluctance to provide security guarantees exacerbates Georgia’s vulnerability.
4. Economy, Logistics and Regionalism
Economic indicators also form the backdrop of Georgia’s foreign policy strategy. In the first seven months of 2025, exports to Bulgaria increased by “1,748 percent”, with precious metals and copper ores constituting the main items.[x]However, during the same period, wheat imports rose by 73.5 percent, reaching 218.2 thousand tons, 70 percent of which were supplied by Russia.[xi] This situation clearly demonstrates Georgia’s continued dependence on Moscow in terms of food security.
From a logistical perspective, most of the cargo arriving from China is transferred to Europe solely through Georgia, putting the country at risk of losing its role as a transit bridge. Although 9,000 tons of cargo flow were recorded in the second quarter of 2025, almost none of the shipments remained in Georgia.[xii]
Economic fragility is also evident in the monetary markets. In 2025, the National Bank of Georgia set the exchange rate at 2.7051 Georgian Lari (GEL) for 1 US dollar and 3.1366 GEL for 1 Euro. These fluctuations show that dependence on foreign trade directly reflects upon monetary policy.[xiii]
In terms of political legitimacy, the local elections of 4 October 2025 are noteworthy. Out of a total of 50 independent initiative groups that applied, only 6 mayoral candidates were officially registered.[xiv] At the same time, according to a report by the European Center for Anti-Corruption Research, Georgia ranked among the top twenty in Europe with respect to the independence of its judiciary.[xv]
Economic indicators limit Georgia’s capacity for independent action. The weakening of its logistical role and its dependence on Russia for food security make it imperative for Georgia to strengthen its regionalism strategy.
In domestic politics, it is highly probable that nationalist reflexes will become even stronger in the coming period, and the government will continue to use this for the continuity of social support. GD is likely to bring forward “anti-Western” rhetoric more forcefully in its strained relations with the EU, while the opposition will remain on a pro-EU line, thereby reinforcing polarization. Under these conditions, the government may intensify its political language that labels the opposition as “foreign agents.” In the medium term, this dynamic could reinforce a trend toward authoritarianism that limits political competition. However, the growing visibility of independent candidates in local elections makes it possible for a new political alternative to emerge beyond the traditional government–opposition axis. Therefore, despite existing polarization, it is highly likely that in 2026 and beyond the system in Georgia will not become completely blocked, and independent, regionally based politicians will gain social support.
In foreign policy, Georgia’s balancing strategy will become even more pronounced. While the approach of avoiding direct confrontation with Russia will be maintained, pragmatic cooperation rather than membership perspectives will come to the fore in relations with the West. At this point, the Trump Route (formerly known as the Zangezur Corridor) will be a critical factor. While in its earlier conception without U.S. involvement it was considered an additional route to the Modern Silk Road, it has now been reshaped into a completely independent corridor with U.S. participation, one that will not bypass Georgia in the context of the Middle Corridor. This development shows that Tbilisi will not entirely lose its role as a transit country; rather, the corridor will function as a complementary route that supports Georgia’s logistical value.
At the same time, rising exports to Bulgaria and continued commercial ties with Europe will prevent Georgia from completely severing its economic relations with the West. In this framework, Tbilisi will seek to pursue limited integration with the West, a forced balancing with Russia, and participation in regional economic networks simultaneously. Ultimately, the most likely scenario is that Georgia, instead of full dependence or full rupture, will sustain its claim to be a regional logistical hub through a fragile yet flexible balance.
In conclusion, Georgia domestically makes national and conservative reflexes the main foundation of political legitimacy, while externally following a multidimensional course of maneuver by neither completely severing ties with the West nor engaging in direct confrontation with Moscow. Nonetheless, new transportation projects such as the Trump Route, rather than weakening the Modern Silk Road, create alternative pathways that help Tbilisi preserve its transit role. Strengthening trade ties with Europe, ongoing economic dependence on Russia, and regional cooperation push Georgia away from one-dimensional choices and toward a hybrid foreign policy model. Therefore, in the near future the country is unlikely to exhibit either a full rupture or total submission; rather, it is highly probable that it will continue to exist along a fragile but flexible trajectory.
[i] Scott Anderson, “How Georgia Went From the Vanguard of Democracy to the Front Lines of Autocracy”, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/20/magazine/georgia-russia-autocracy-dictatorship.html, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[ii] “Salome Zurabishvili Goris Sakrebulos Tavmjdomaris Gantskhadebaze Es Aris Sirtskhvili Sakartvelostvis Sruliad Upasukhismgeblo Gantskhadeba”, Interpressnews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/846800-salome-zurabishvili-goris-sakrebulos-tavmjdomaris-gancxadebaze-es-aris-sircxvili-sakartvelostvis-sruliad-upasuxismgeblo-gancxadeba/, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[iii] “Kakha Kaladze – Kvela Gantskhadeba, Romelsats Visment Sakartvelostan Mimartebit, Emsakhureba Imas, Rom Daazianon Kveqnis Imiji da Sakartvelos Khelisupleba”, Tiflis News, https://l24.im/cYxBg, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[iv] “PACE-s Deputatebi tu Sakartvelo Avtoritarul Kurss Ar Sheicvlis Movutsodebt Asambleasa da Ministrta Komitets daitskon Sakartvelos Gazevebis Protsesi”, Interpressnewss, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/846653-pace-s-deputatebi-tu-sakartvelo-avtoritarul-kurss-ar-sheicvlis-movucodebt-asambleasa-da-ministrta-komitets-daicqon-sakartvelos-gazevebis-procesi, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[v] “V Tbilisi Otvergli Prizyvy YES ob Eskalatsii v Otnosheniyakh s Rossiyey”, RBC, https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/68a5b92b9a794718c8011048, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[vi] “V Gruzii zayavili, Chto İnostrannyye Gosudarstva Vnov Pytayutsya Ustroit Revolyutsiyu”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24809621, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[vii] “V Gruzii Schitayut, Chto Soobshcheniye o Predotvrashchenii Terakta Sootvetstvuyet İnteresam RF”, Rambler, https://news.rambler.ru/world/55159523-v-gruzii-schitayut-chto-soobschenie-o-predotvraschenii-terakta-sootvetstvuet-interesam-rf, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[viii] “Macron Warns of Putin’s Threat Without Ukraine Security Guarantees”, Business Media, https://bm.ge/en/news/macron-warns-of-putins-threat-without-ukraine-security-guarantees, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[ix] “Abkhaziya Nazvala Otkaz SSHA ot Podpisaniya Dokumenta v Podderzhku Gruzii Pokazatelnym”, TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24837049, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[x] “Qartuli Produqtis Eqsporti Bulgaretshi 1748%-it Gaizarda, Sad da Ras Vyidit”, Commersant, https://commersant.ge/index.php/news/economic/qartuli-produqtis-eqsporti-bulgaretshi-1748-it-gaizarda-sad-da-ras-vyidit, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[xi] “Sakartveloshi Khorblis Importi 73,5%-it Gaizarda”, BPN, https://www.bpn.ge/article/142778-sakartveloshi-xorblis-importi-735-it-gaizarda/, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[xii] “‘Sakartveloshi Shemosuli Tvirtebis Didi Natsili Evropashi Gaedineba Chveni Kvegana Ertgvari Khidis Rols Asrulebs’ – Iase Zautashvili”, BPN, https://www.bpn.ge/article/142773-sakartveloshi-shemosuli-tvirtebis-didi-nacili-evropashi-gaedineba-chveni-kveqana-ertgvari-xidis-rols-asrulebs-iase-zautashvili/, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[xiii] “Ashsh Dolaris Opitsialuri Girebuleba 2,7051 Lari Gakhda”, Interpressnews, https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/846856-ashsh-dolaris-opicialuri-girebuleba-27051-lari-gaxda/, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[xiv] “Tsesko Archevnebshi Monatsile Partiebistvis da Amomrchevelta Sainitsiativo Jgufebistvis Merobis-kandidatebis Tsardgenis Tsesebs da Amastan Dakavshirebit Arsebul Siakhleebs Ganmartavs”, Fortuna, https://fortuna.ge/cesko-archevnebshi-monawile-partiebistvis-da-amomrchevelta-sainiciativo-jgufebistvis-merobis-kandidatebis-wardgenis-wesebs-da-amastan-dakavshirebit-arsebul-siakhleebs-ganmartavs/, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
[xv] “Index of Public Integrity: European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building”, European Commission, https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/explorer/indices/ipi/index-of-public-integrity, (Access Date: 22.08.2025).
