Recently, Poland has embarked on a large-scale rearmament process that has attracted attention in the geopolitical transformation of Eastern Europe. This trend can be observed in a wide range of areas, from the country’s perception of security to its defence policy, and from military spending to civil-military interaction. It is possible to describe the policy pursued by Poland as natural. This is because Poland’s geopolitical decisions have emerged as a direct response to Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine. Russian military activities and the security policies of neighbouring countries have created a serious threat perception in Poland. This situation has led to increased emphasis on the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) eastern flank.
In this context, Poland’s role within NATO is progressing towards becoming a military base and defence line for the alliance rather than a buffer state. Due to its geographical location, Poland faces a serious risk in terms of security vulnerability.
Firstly, outside the common NATO defence umbrella, Poland does not participate in regional initiatives such as the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) or NORDEFCO in its immediate vicinity. Poland’s participation is limited to certain frameworks. Secondly, Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, recently warned that establishing a separate EU army alongside NATO would be ‘extremely dangerous’ and stated that such a step could lead to confusion in the chain of command during times of crisis. While discussions on the future defence capabilities of the European Union continue, Kallas has opposed the establishment of a common European army, stating that she finds the idea risky.[1]
Taking all these factors into account, Warsaw’s reliability in terms of the common European Union defence may weaken. This situation is understandable. Furthermore, the seemingly positive approach adopted by neighbouring Slovakia, the newly formed government of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic, and Hungary towards Russia could be perceived as a sign that Poland is becoming isolated in its own region (Eastern Europe). The policy pursued by these countries, which emphasise dialogue with Moscow and a reduction in aid to Ukraine, appears understandable in terms of their own national interests. For Hungary, which is heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies, tension with Moscow is a difficult situation to accept. However, this approach does not provide any assurance against threats that may arise from Russia in the near or distant future.
Another noteworthy point is the plan to end all natural gas and LNG imports from Russia to Europe by the end of 2027. This situation has led to the Yamal–Europe natural gas pipeline becoming completely inoperative and effectively decommissioned. The closure of this pipeline, which also passes through Polish territory, has resulted in a transformation of Poland’s role as an energy transit country for Western European states.
From Brussels’ perspective, it is particularly noteworthy that Poland is positioned as a ‘frontline state’ against Russia. Considering historical and cultural elements, it should also be noted that Poland’s claim to be a leading actor in European geopolitics is not exceptional. Indeed, this situation could pave the way for the emergence of a new arena of competition for some European countries.
Therefore, the process taking place in Poland can be assessed not only as an increase in military capacity but also as the reconstruction of a comprehensive national security and defence strategy. In this context, it can be observed that Warsaw prioritises broader formats involving multiple countries as well as more limited and bilateral military cooperation.
The agreement signed between Poland, Germany and the Netherlands to facilitate the mobility of military forces; the strategic security partnership between Poland and Sweden; and the bilateral defence agreement established between Poland and the Netherlands constitute concrete examples of this policy. However, a noteworthy cooperation agreement has been concluded with France. This agreement aims to strengthen the Poland–France alliance by establishing mutual assistance (including military support) in the face of external threats. Polish Prime Minister Tusk stated that this agreement would create a framework enabling the two countries to support each other in the event of a potential attack.[2]
This agreement is also significant for France. The arrangement will contribute to strengthening France’s geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe. It also serves to bolster France’s military industry and expand the reach of its nuclear umbrella strategy. It appears that Warsaw aims to broaden its security partnerships beyond the United States to encompass a wider strategic framework.
In addition, Poland continues its military cooperation with South Korea as a non-European country. Poland has signed a defence agreement worth 3.3 billion euros (3.8 billion dollars) with South Korea, which envisages the joint production of medium-range precision-guided missiles. According to TVP World, the contract was signed between the Polish Armament Agency and a consortium consisting of South Korea’s Hanwha and Poland’s WB Group.[3] The agreement covers the joint production of more than 10,000 CGR-080 medium-range missiles for Poland’s Homar-K multiple rocket launcher systems. Officials have stated that the project will further deepen defence cooperation between the two countries.[4]
Consequently, developments in Poland are taking shape at a juncture where historical experiences, regional threat perceptions and strategic roles within the alliance converge. It would be wrong to view this situation merely as an ‘arms race’. Behind it lie complex factors such as geographical location, historical memory and changing perceptions of security.
[1] Sertac Aktan, “Kallas denies rift between NATO and EU, rejects calls for a European army”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/02/02/kallas-denies-rift-between-nato-and-eu-rejects-calls-for-a-european-army, (Date Accessed: 18.02.2026).
[2] “Poland, France sign new cooperation treaty”, Polskie Radio, https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/7785/artykul/3521524,poland-france-sign-new-cooperation-treaty, (Date Accessed: 18.02.2026).
[3] Necva Tastan Sevinc, “Poland signs $3.8B deal with South Korea to manufacture medium-range missiles”, Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/poland-signs-38b-deal-with-south-korea-to-manufacture-medium-range-missiles/3784614, (Date Accessed: 18.02.2026).
[4] Ibid.
