Russia’s Efforts to Maintain Initiative on the Afghan Issue

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After 20 years of occupation, the United States (US) and its allies withdrew from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, and the Taliban, who took control of Kabul on August 15, 2021, dominated the entire country from September 2022, when they also gained control of the Panjshir Valley. Although more than 1.5 years have passed since the beginning of the second Taliban era, the Taliban administration has not been officially recognized by any state. The states of the region, which are likely to be directly affected by the risks inherent in the Afghan Issue, have sought to develop de facto cooperation with the Taliban administration and taken steps to include Afghanistan in various projects.

In this sense, these countries are concerned that the risks posed by the rise of radicalization and terrorism in Afghanistan may spread to them. Because radicalization and terrorism have the capacity to affect Central Asia through the Wahan Corridor and the Muslims of Russia through the Central Asian states. As a matter of fact, it is known that many radical groups operating as terrorist organizations by the states of the region have declared their loyalty to the so-called Emirate of Khorasan (ISKP) of the terrorist organization al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham (Daesh). This leads the region to develop a collective attitude towards the Afghan Issue. In this sense, it is possible to say that Russia wants to keep the initiative in the Afghan Problem under its control.

As it will be remembered, while many states closed their embassies in Afghanistan during the days when the Taliban entered Kabul, Russia was the first state to announce that it would keep its diplomatic mission in Kabul open. As a matter of fact, the Kremlin administration hosted the Taliban in Moscow before the Taliban entered Kabul. This was the first sign that Russia’s influence in Afghanistan would increase during the second Taliban period.

Indeed, Russia, on the one hand, sat the same table with the states of the region at the Moscow Format Meeting in 2021; on the other hand, the 18th edition of the event, which was held from 18 to 21 October 2021. At the Valday Think Tank Forum , Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the Taliban could be removed from the list of countries recognized by Russia as a terrorist organization.[1]

Despite this environment, it was seen that the Taliban was not invited to the Moscow Format Meeting in 2022. The reason for this can be mentioned as two main reasons that shaped Russia’s attitude in the said period. The first of these is that the Taliban, which could not overcome the problem of recognition, established contact with the US and its allies during the period in question. In this sense, it can be said that the Kremlin felt the need to send a message to the Taliban. Second, Russia wanted to show its frustration that the Taliban ignored calls for an inclusive government in conference diplomacy conducted by the states of the region.

In September 2022, the ISKP’s attack on the Russian Embassy in Kabul and the increase of Daesh’s attacks targeting diplomatic missions caused Russia to reduce its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. However, as of April 2023, Moscow has again intensified its diplomatic contacts with the Taliban.

As a reflection of the situation, Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov announced the activation of the Russian Consulate General in Mazar-i Sharif on April 4, 2023.[2] Of course, this situation can be interpreted as the development of diplomatic relations between the parties.

As it will be remembered, Russia recently handed over the Moscow Embassy of Afghanistan to a diplomat appointed by the Taliban. Therefore, it can be stated that the Moscow-Taliban line has returned to the atmosphere in August 2021. In addition, upon the call of Kabulov, under the leadership of Russia, a conference on Afghanistan was held in Uzbekistan on April 13, 2023, and it was seen that the states of the region participated in this meeting.[3]

On the other hand as Kabulov points out, organized by Russia; However, the summit was held in Uzbekistan shows that the “Afghanistan without Central Asia”[4] format proposed by Russia in the recent past cannot be implemented. As it will be recalled, on February 12, 2023, Kabulov proposed a format on the Afghan Issue in which Russia, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan would participate. Therefore, the summit on April 13, 2023 means that Moscow has accepted that it will not be possible to push the Central Asian countries out of the process.

As a result, as of April 2023, the atmosphere in Russia-Taliban relations in August 2021 has been recaptured. The summit was held in Uzbekistan on 13 April 2023 confirms this. Developments reveal that Moscow wants to keep the initiative in the Afghan Issue. However, another reality revealed by the meeting is the Kremlin’s admission that it is not possible to solve the Afghan Issue by excluding the Central Asian states.


[1] Nilgün Hande Öztürk, “Rusya Taliban’ı Terör Örgütleri Listesinden Çıkaracak mı?”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/rusya-talibani-teror-orgutleri-listesinden-cikaracak-mi/, (Date of Accession: 06.04.2023).

[2] “Russian Consulate General Open in Mazar-e-Sharif: Kabulov”, TASS, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-182821, (Date of Accession: 06.04.2023).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Şeyma Kızılay, “Russia’s Equation for Afghanistan Without Central Asia: The Five Format Proposal”, ANKASAM, https://www.ankasam.org/russias-equation-for-afghanistan-without-central-asia-the-five-format-proposal/?lang=en, (Date of Accession: 06.04.2023).

Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN
Dr. Doğacan BAŞARAN, 2014 yılında Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nden mezun olmuştur. Yüksek lisans derecesini, 2017 yılında Giresun Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda sunduğu ‘’Uluslararası Güç İlişkileri Bağlamında İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Hegemonik Mücadelelerin İncelenmesi’’ başlıklı teziyle almıştır. Doktora derecesini ise 2021 yılında Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı‘nda hazırladığı “İmparatorluk Düşüncesinin İran Dış Politikasına Yansımaları ve Milliyetçilik” başlıklı teziyle alan Başaran’ın başlıca çalışma alanları Uluslararası ilişkiler kuramları, Amerikan dış politikası, İran araştırmaları ve Afganistan çalışmalarıdır. Başaran iyi derecede İngilizce ve temel düzeyde Farsça bilmektedir.

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