During a period of intensifying global power competition, Uzbekistan has emerged as a rising central country in Central Asia with its multidirectional and balancing foreign policy. Under the administration of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan has sought to elevate its relations with the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) to the level of strategic partnership; steps such as US President Donald Trump’s invitation to Tashkent and the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) expected to be signed in Brussels on 24 October 2025 reflect its determination for institutional integration with Washington and Brussels. At the same time, by maintaining economic and cultural cooperation with Russia at the local and regional levels and preserving its influence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Tashkent has been consolidating its identity as a “balancing actor” through capacities developed in fields such as energy integration, digital economy, critical minerals, and diaspora resources.
Mirziyoyev’s invitation of Trump to the country can be read as a symbolic indicator of this multidirectional vision. Uzbekistan is striving to shift its relations with Washington from “symbolic partnership” to a strategic axis in parallel with the summit planned in Samarkand to mark the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 format. The increase in trade volume, attraction of US investments in fields such as critical minerals, digital technology, and education, as well as agreements on information sharing and military equipment in the defense sector, have strengthened Tashkent’s role as a producer of regional stability. Its mediation efforts during the Afghanistan conflict based on an “intra-Afghan solution” approach enabled it to rise to the position of an indispensable actor in the Central Asian security architecture in harmony with US interests; thus, the strategic engagement developed by President Mirziyoyev with Washington has reached the capacity to reshape not only bilateral relations but also regional power balances.[i]
This trend also aligns with the US effort to increase its geostrategic interest in the region in recent times. A possible visit to Uzbekistan, which has come to the agenda in connection with the invitation extended by Mirziyoyev in April 2025, could make Washington’s engagement in the region more visible. This would signify a geostrategic move that would further intensify Western interest following the Central Asia visits conducted between 2023 and 2025 by European leaders such as Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz, Ursula von der Leyen, and Giorgia Meloni.[ii]
The EPCA that Tashkent will sign with the EU in Brussels on 24 October 2025 stands out as the most institutional step taken by Uzbekistan towards integration with the West. This document, which became ready for signature at the end of a process that began in 2017 and was negotiated over ten rounds between 2019 and 2022, encompasses a very broad spectrum ranging from political dialogue to trade, from investment to human rights and cultural cooperation. Updating the previous PCA signed in 1996, the EPCA –as confirmed in António Costa’s congratulatory message on Uzbekistan’s Independence Day on September 1, 2025– will ensure the country’s strategic-level integration with the EU.[iii] While this step resembles the EPCA processes of Kazakhstan (signed in 2015, in force in 2020), Kyrgyzstan (signed in 2024), and Tajikistan (initialed in 2025), it stands out as part of Uzbekistan’s more balanced and nationally interest-oriented multidirectional foreign policy line. President Mirziyoyev’s participation in the SCO Summit in Tianjin around the same days and then attending the military parade in Beijing symbolically demonstrates that Tashkent has been successfully implementing its strategy of maintaining its identity as a “balancing actor” in a multipolar environment.
This multidimensional vision is supported not only by engagement with the West, but also by the institutionalization of relations with Russia at the local and regional levels. The updated roadmap signed in Tashkent on September 9, 2025 by Aleksandr Beglov and Shavkat Umurzakov –valid until 2028– aims to deepen economic, cultural, and technical cooperation at the regional level between Saint Petersburg and Tashkent.[iv]
On September 10, 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who received the delegation led by Beglov, noted that the volume of bilateral foreign trade had increased by 20 percent over the past year; he announced that a Business Center would be opened in Tashkent, a “Petersburg District” would be constructed in New Tashkent, and that a cooperation roadmap consisting of 23 projects in metallurgy, equipment production, healthcare, food, agriculture, logistics, and digital technologies had been approved. The parties agreed to maintain cultural exchanges and ensure the productive conduct of the Council of Regions meeting scheduled for October 2025.[v] In this context, as Yevgeniy Pankevich stated, the fact that tourists from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan ranked among the top groups visiting Saint Petersburg in 2025 demonstrates that cultural diplomacy is intertwined with economic interaction.[vi]
The role of the diaspora is also noteworthy for Uzbekistan’s economic sustainability. According to the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, remittances to the country reached 12.1 billion US dollars during the January–August 2025 period, of which 6.4 billion came from Russia and 1.8 billion from countries such as the United States, South Korea, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom.[vii] This data provided by the Central Bank indicates that Tashkent’s diversification of foreign policy is also expanding its economic base; despite the labor-intensive diaspora in Russia, the rapid increase in resources from the West strengthens the country’s economic independence.
The Tashkent administration also pursues an active and inclusive approach to regional issues. The meetings of the Central Asian Coordinating Council for Electric Power held in Cholpon-Ata on September 4-5, 2025 advanced the goal of integrating regional energy systems and establishing a common electricity market.[viii] Dadacon Isakulov, the Uzbek representative, emphasized that new power plants, modernization, and renewable energy investments would contribute not only to his country’s but to all of Central Asia’s energy security.
The normative pillar of this foreign policy approach is grounded in interfaith tolerance and inclusivity. The Second International Declarations Dialogue Forum held in Tashkent on September 10-13, 2025 brought issues such as combating faith-based discrimination and protecting religious minorities to the global agenda.[ix] The recognition of the Bukhara Declaration adopted at the first forum in 2022 by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has reinforced the legitimacy of this soft power diplomacy. This current diplomatic initiative supports Tashkent’s ambition to become a global normative actor not only on a geopolitical but also on a geocultural level.
The statements of Ahror Burhanov following the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) summarize Uzbekistan’s line based on the principles of “multivectorism, independence, and pragmatic dialogue.”[x] As Burhanov also emphasized, Tashkent does not belong to any military-political bloc and views international relations not as a zero-sum competition but as a sphere of win-win cooperation. This approach enables Uzbekistan to inclusively expand its relations with regions of the Global South such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, making the country a central actor of stability, development, and peace in Central Asia. In light of all these developments, Uzbekistan is becoming a rising central state at both regional and global levels by successfully implementing a national interest-centered balance policy in a period of intensifying global power competition.
In the upcoming period, it is highly likely that Uzbekistan will assume the role of a “reliable strategic partner” in Central Asia by placing its developing relations with the US and the EU on a more institutional footing. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s invitation of Donald Trump to Tashkent and the signing of the EPCA on October 24, 2025 will accelerate Tashkent’s process of transforming its relations with Washington and Brussels from symbolic partnership into strategic partnership. This will allow Uzbekistan to attract more Western investments in fields such as critical minerals, digital technology, and education, thereby strengthening its economic independence and consolidating its position as a permanent actor in the regional security architecture. Moreover, a possible visit by Trump, which could take place in parallel with the US’s growing interest in Central Asia, may further elevate Tashkent’s visibility on the global diplomatic stage.
Tashkent’s continued institutionalization of its relations with Russia at the local and regional levels will ensure the sustainability of its multidirectional foreign policy strategy. The roadmap signed on September 9, 2025 by Aleksandr Beglov and Shavkat Umurzakov, which includes 23 cooperation projects, enables Uzbekistan to develop a pragmatic partnership with Russia without becoming dependent on Moscow by deepening economic and cultural interactions. This parallel line of multidirectionality, while preserving Tashkent’s active position in the SCO, will allow it both to expand its relations with regions of the Global South such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and to strengthen its identity as a “balancing actor” in Central Asia.
In conclusion, Uzbekistan has become a primary carrier of stability and development in Central Asia thanks to its multidirectional and balancing foreign policy pursued during a period of intensified global power competition. While the administration of Shavkat Mirziyoyev accelerates its integration with the West by institutionalizing its relations with the US and the EU at a strategic level, it simultaneously strengthens its position as a “balancing actor” within the multipolar system by maintaining economic, technical, and cultural cooperation with Russia at the local and regional levels. Its growing capacity in areas such as energy integration, digital economy, critical minerals, and diaspora resources –combined with its soft power diplomacy that emphasizes faith-based tolerance and inclusivity– consolidates Tashkent’s status as a reliable and flexible central state on the global stage. In this respect, Uzbekistan is expected in the coming period to become a permanent strategic balancing element at the geopolitical center of Central Asia by both deepening its institutional partnerships with the West and diversifying its regional collaborations.
[i] Viktoriya Panfilova, “Trampa Zhdut s Vizitom v Samarkande”, Nezavisimya, https://www.ng.ru/cis/2025-09-07/2_9332_uzbekistan.html, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[ii] Alexander Thompson, “Uzbekistan Vies for Trump Visit as US President Seems to Float Kazakhstan Trip”, Eurasianet, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-vies-for-trump-visit-as-us-president-seems-to-float-kazakhstan-trip, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[iii] Catherine Putz, “Date Set for Uzbekistan to Sign Enhance Partnership Agreement With the European Union”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/date-set-for-uzbekistan-to-sign-enhance-partnership-agreement-with-the-european-union/, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[iv] “Glavy Tashkenta i Sankt-Peterburga Podpisali Obnovlennyy Plan Sotrudnichestva”, TASS, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/25006855, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[v] “Prezident Uzbekistana Otmetil Vazhnost Prakticheskoy Realizatsii ‘Dorozhnoy Karty’ Sotrudnichestva s Sankt-Peterburgom”, UZA, https://uza.uz/ru/posts/prezident-uzbekistana-otmetil-vazhnost-prakticheskoy-realizacii-dorozhnoy-karty-sotrudnichestva-s-sankt-peterburgom_758657, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[vi] “Bolshe Vsego Gostey iz SNG Yedut v Peterburg iz Belorussii, Kazakhstana i Uzbekistana”, TASS, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/24998075, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[vii] “Denezhnyye Perevody v Uzbekistan Dostigli $12 Mlrd s Nachala Goda”, Exlusive, https://exclusive.kz/denezhnye-perevody-v-uzbekistan-dostigli-12-mlrd-s-nachala-goda/, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[viii] “Central Asia Electric Power Coordination Council convenes in Kyrgyzstan”, Kazinform, https://qazinform.com/news/central-asia-electric-power-coordination-council-convenes-in-kyrgyzstan-5253b7, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[ix] “Dialog Deklaratsiy Propagandiruyet Tolerantnuyu Politiku Uzbekistana”, UZA, https://uza.uz/ru/posts/dialog-deklaraciy-propagandiruet-tolerantnuyu-politiku-uzbekistana_758751, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
[x] “Uzbekistan ne Razdelyayet Konfrontatsionnyye Podkhody – Press-Sekretar MIDa”, Gazeta, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2025/09/10/mfa-sco/, (Access Date: 13.09.2025).
