Canada’s efforts to deepen its relations with the European Union (EU) represent an emerging form of integration in which middle powers come together to demonstrate solidarity on the global stage. In September 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed that Canada become the EU’s “first associate member”[i] opening a new chapter in transatlantic relations. While Canada seeks to reduce its excessive economic and security dependence on the United States, Europe is keen to rebuild its weakening transatlantic ties on a stronger footing. Achieving this requires Brussels to establish a resilient and strategic framework for cooperation along the London–Ottawa–Berlin axis.
However, this ambitious political vision encountered the EU’s own institutional and political constraints at an early stage. The removal of the term “associate membership” from the joint declaration at the EU–Canada summit held in Montreal in late October revealed that von der Leyen’s proposal had yet to secure sufficient support among European capitals. In this context, it has been reported that certain reservations, particularly those expressed by Berlin, led to changes in the wording of the joint Canada–EU declaration.[ii]
The reservations expressed by France, Italy, and Germany can be examined under three main headings:
- First, the preservation of decision-making authority. The EU’s institutional structure is based on member states transferring certain powers to common institutions to varying degrees. Granting a non-member country a status close to that of a member raises new questions about how the EU’s decision-making mechanisms would operate.
- Second, the risk of setting a precedent. A special status created for Canada could serve as a model for Ukraine, Moldova, and other countries seeking to strengthen their relations with Europe in the future. The question of which countries could benefit from such a model and under what conditions could directly affect the EU’s enlargement strategy.
- Third, the balance of powers between the European Commission and the member states. Von der Leyen brought the proposal forward without prior consultation with member states or securing a comprehensive consensus. Consequently, abandoning the “Associate Membership” initiative has once again demonstrated the EU’s difficulty in overcoming its internal institutional consensus-building mechanisms.
While the EU seeks to become a more influential actor in the international system and increase its strategic flexibility in foreign policy, it continues to face challenges in its model of institutional integration. The absence of an explicitly defined “associate member” status in the EU treaties, such as the one proposed for Canada, lies at the heart of the objections raised by Germany, France, and Italy.[iii] The legal ambiguity surrounding such a status could lead to irreversible institutional consequences. This is because uncertainty remains over the extent to which a country outside the Union would participate in EU decision-making mechanisms, which obligations it would assume, and which rights it would enjoy.
The Montreal Summit, held on 29–30 October 2026, marked a critical turning point in determining the direction of this process.[iv] Although the proposal for associate membership had already been significantly weakened ahead of the summit, Canada and the EU announced a new strategic cooperation framework under the title “Alliance for the Future” at the conclusion of the meeting. This alliance aims not only to strengthen relations between Canada and the EU but also to establish a broader platform for cooperation that other like-minded countries could join. In the long term, this strategic initiative could enable certain middle powers to become more closely integrated into Europe’s wider sphere of cooperation. From this perspective, London’s renewed rapprochement with Europe is also noteworthy.[v] Developments along the Brussels–Ottawa–London axis suggest that the Europe-centred area of cooperation that emerged after Brexit could expand further. In the long run, this model could also be described as the rise of middle powers.
The potential advantages this model could offer middle powers include:
- More extensive participation in selected EU policy areas and programmes.
- More systematic cooperation in defence and security policies.
- Joint projects in artificial intelligence, digital technology, and critical raw materials.
- Improved access to the European market and deeper economic integration.
- More regular political consultations and coordination with EU institutions.
Rather than offering a pathway to EU membership, the proposed model constitutes an institutionalised strategic partnership. From this perspective, the initiative can be viewed as an attempt to develop a new approach to the EU’s international relations. In Canada’s case, although the associate membership formula was excluded from the joint declaration due to objections from European countries, a broader process of cooperation between Canada and the EU has nevertheless been initiated. From this point onward, the proposal for associate membership will need to be placed on a more politically and legally viable footing. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has set June 2027 as the target date for the partnership process. In the coming months,[vi] the parties will therefore need to define the scope, obligations, and institutional dimensions of this relationship. June 2027 will be a critical milestone not only for completing technical negotiations but also for determining whether the political expectations of both sides can be reconciled on a realistic basis.
Ultimately, the emerging picture points to a transformation of traditional Western alliance relations into a more multipolar and flexible structure. Canada’s initiative to establish an associate membership arrangement with the EU has raised an important question: “How far can the EU pursue deep political and economic integration with countries that remain outside its full membership framework?”
In this regard, Germany’s objections and its demand for legal and institutional clarity are also essential to ensuring the long-term sustainability of any model that may be established. However, the EU’s tendency to shape all its decisions around the pursuit of consensus limits its strategic capacity to act at a time when global competition is intensifying. If middle powers wish to rise more rapidly, they may seek to chart their own course in the long term without becoming constrained by the EU’s institutional bottlenecks.
[i] “Is von der Leyen’s ‘associate membership’ for Canada already dead?”, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/29/is-von-der-leyens-associate-membership-for-canada-already-dead, (Accessed: 02.11.2026).
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] “EU halts association agreement with Canada because ‘associated state’ status does not exist in European treaties”, Lavaullure, https://laveulliure.ad/en/news/eu-halts-canada-association-agreement-associated-state-status-not-recognised-treaties, (Accessed: 02.11.2026).
[iv] “Canada and EU announce new alliance open to like-minded countries”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/30/canada-european-union-alliance, (Accessed: 02.11.2026).
[v] “Starmer says UK must get closer to Europe as US relationship changes”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/oct/31/keir-starmer-uk-europe-us-relationship-trump, (Accessed: 02.11.2026).
[vi] “Canada and EU announce new alliance open to like-minded countries”, a.g.e., (Accessed: 02.11.2026).
