Following the end of the Cold War, the international system took on a unipolar structure in which the United States (US) rose to become the dominant actor in the global order. During this period, owing to its economic and military superiority, the US took on a normative and institutional leading role in spreading liberal-democratic values and building a global security architecture. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, the US’s hegemonic superiority has come into question, and since the second decade in particular, the international system has undergone a clear transformation towards a multipolar structure.
China’s economic and technological rise, Russia’s military and political revisionist challenges, and the growing influence of regional powers such as India and Brazil have led to an erosion of the United States’ relative power and caused the current order to be reshaped. In this context, the European Union (EU) has embarked on an effort to reposition itself in global politics through both its economic capacity and its normative power. Thanks to its economic size, the volume of its common market, and its regulatory powers, the EU has come to the fore in shaping international norms and is consolidating its identity as a “normative power” through environmental policies, human rights, data protection standards, and trade agreements.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU’s foreign policy mechanisms were institutionally strengthened, and efforts to become a more visible and coordinated actor at the global level, particularly through the office of the High Representative, became more pronounced. However, despite its economic and normative capacity, the EU’s global role faces significant limitations. The main reasons for this limitation are the lack of military capacity, strategic dependence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the difficulty of forming a common geopolitical will due to the different foreign policy priorities of member states. This situation limits the EU’s capacity to intervene in global crises, provide security guarantees, and establish international influence. Therefore, to the extent that the Union cannot complement its value-based influence with military capacity, it remains distant from strategic autonomy. Moreover, whenever the EU fails to respond effectively to crises, it loses the opportunity to strengthen its rule-setting role and weakens its claim to be an independent power center in the international order.
Today, among the fundamental strategic priorities facing the EU in the changing international system are redefining relations with the US, managing complex interactions with China that are shaped by both competition and cooperation, developing resilience against Russia’s revisionist challenges, and ensuring stability in its immediate neighborhood. In this context, although transatlantic ties retain a decisive position in the security architecture, unilateral tendencies that came to the fore, particularly during the Trump administration, have led the EU to question its dependence on the US. Although relations have seen a relative recovery under the Biden administration, Washington’s increasing shift of its global strategic priorities towards China has strengthened discussions of “strategic autonomy” in Europe and made the Union’s need to increase its own capacity and effectiveness in the international system more visible.
In this context, China is positioned as both an indispensable economic partner and a “systematic rival” at the normative and strategic levels for the EU. Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative’s impact on European markets and infrastructure systems, coupled with global competition in high-tech sectors, has compelled the Union to develop more cautious, questioning, and balancing policies toward Beijing. In contrast, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have created a fundamental shift in the EU’s security perception. These developments have led to the acceleration of strategies to reduce energy dependence, the implementation of comprehensive sanctions packages, and the provision of unprecedented levels of financial and military support to Ukraine. Thus, while the EU’s tendency to turn to hard power elements, traditionally kept in the background, has become more visible, the dynamics of instability in the Western Balkans, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Africa, combined with multidimensional problems such as migration movements, terrorism, and energy security, have necessitated a more comprehensive, effective, and proactive foreign policy design for the EU.
The EU’s capacity to be an effective global actor is limited not only by external factors but also by its own internal dynamics. Differences in the foreign policy priorities of member states weaken joint and rapid decision-making processes. For example, France’s diplomacy and conflict resolution-based approaches in Africa and the Middle East and Germany’s economic interest-focused policies often diverge rather than complement each other, limiting the Union’s ability to produce a common strategy.
In addition, the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the Union in 2004 and thereafter diverge from the relatively more cautious and dialogue-seeking approaches of Western European countries with their tougher security-focused policies stemming from their historical experiences. While Poland and the Baltic states demand strong deterrence and sanctions against Russia, Hungary’s energy dependence and pragmatic relations with Moscow make it difficult for the EU to develop a comprehensive foreign policy. This divergence was clearly evident during the Ukraine War, with some countries calling for tougher measures against Russia, while Hungary acted as a factor slowing down the process.
A similar diversity is evident in the EU’s Middle East policies. There are particularly marked differences among member states on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Spain and France generally defend the rights of the Palestinian people, while also striving to maintain their strategic and economic relations with Israel. On the other hand, Germany, Hungary, and the Czech Republic take a pro-Israel stance, making it difficult for the EU to develop a common position. Furthermore, Poland and some Baltic countries provide strong diplomatic support to Israel, while taking a cautious approach to steps towards recognizing Palestine as a state. In contrast, countries such as France, Spain, Ireland, and Belgium tend to recognize Palestine as a state and take a more critical stance towards Israel’s policies. These conflicting stances limit the EU’s capacity to develop a balanced and consistent policy toward both Israel and Palestine, weakening the Union’s value-based effectiveness at the global level.
Internal differences and this diversity also limit the EU’s effectiveness in crisis management and conflict resolution. Military capacity shortfalls and unresolved sensitivities regarding national sovereignty in the defense sector still make the Union largely dependent on NATO. For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the EU is attempting to defuse the conflict through diplomatic and economic means, but its capacity to independently use hard power or deterrence elements is limited. Therefore, although “strategic autonomy” is discussed at a theoretical level, it finds limited practical application due to differences in political priorities between Western Europe and new member states, as well as the pragmatic preferences of countries such as Hungary and Poland. These internal inconsistencies simultaneously constrain the EU’s strategic and value-based capacities, making it difficult to position the Union as an independent and credible actor on a global scale.
Ongoing debates within the EU on democratic openness, transparency, and the rule of law risk undermining the Union’s value-based influence on a global scale and the credibility of its foreign policy. For example, the violations of judicial independence and restrictions on media freedom observed in Poland and Hungary in recent years make it difficult for the EU to formulate a consistent common foreign policy narrative and limit its capacity to make quick decisions in times of crisis. Similarly, democratic backsliding in the domestic politics of member states reduces the EU’s capacity to implement its normative discourse in the field of foreign policy. This situation risks weakening the EU’s normative power and credibility on a global scale, while the deepening US-China competition in the external environment is pushing the EU into the position of a geopolitically squeezed actor. This interaction between internal inconsistencies and external pressures is narrowing the Union’s independent room for maneuver and calling into question the credibility of its claim to be a global actor.
In short, despite its economic and normative capacity, the EU’s claim to global leadership faces serious challenges in the changing world order. Although the Union has achieved a noteworthy position in international politics thanks to its regulatory power and normative influence, its quest for strategic autonomy remains limited due to both external pressures and internal constraints. Structural dependence on the US, its ambivalent position (a mix of cooperation and competition) vis-à-vis China, Russia’s direct security threat, and instability in its immediate neighborhood make it difficult for the EU to act as a consistent and independent actor in global politics. Furthermore, divergences in foreign policy priorities among member states, shortcomings in the defense sector, and debates over democratic legitimacy stand out as the main factors preventing the EU from effectively transforming its strategic autonomy goal into a strong and independent geopolitical capacity.
Therefore, certain policy steps are critical for strengthening the EU’s capacity as a global actor. First, it is necessary to deepen the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mechanisms and increase effectiveness by relaxing the unanimity rule in decision-making processes. In this regard, determining minimum common ground among member states on foreign policy priorities and strengthening crisis management capacity will increase the Union’s ability to act collectively. Second, increasing investment in military capabilities (e.g., activating Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO) and deepening integration in the defense industry will reduce the EU’s strategic dependence on NATO and give concrete form to the goal of autonomy. Thirdly, strengthening institutional transparency and democratic accountability will renew EU citizens’ trust in decision-making processes, reinforce the Union’s normative power, and increase its credibility in foreign policy. Finally, defining its strategic interests more clearly in the context of global competition and developing a long-term, independent vision, particularly in areas such as energy security, technological independence, migration management, and climate change, will make the Union a more stable and effective actor at the global level.
Ultimately, the EU’s claim to global leadership can only gain strength to the extent that it achieves a balanced and complementary synthesis between strategic autonomy and normative consistency. An EU that can integrate its hard power capacity with its normative power, overcome internal cohesion issues, and develop geopolitical awareness will be able to realize its potential to emerge as not only a complementary but also a decisive and guiding actor in a multipolar world order.
