The Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, located west of Baghdad International Airport, was handed over to the Iraqi authorities under an agreement signed on 24 September 2026. The agreement concerning the facility, which had come under rocket and drone attacks during the year, was signed by Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Hussein Bahr al-Uloom and United States (US) Chargé d’Affaires Steven Fagin. It marks one of the final steps in the coalition withdrawal scheduled for completion on 30 September.[i] The handover raises broader questions about who will provide security and under what authority.
When the keys to the airport facility pass to Iraqi officials, ownership of a military compound changes hands, but the security relationship as a whole does not end. The roadmap announced by Baghdad and Washington in 2024 envisaged ending the coalition’s military mission in Iraq while shifting cooperation towards bilateral security partnerships.[ii] The arrangements that emerge on the morning of 1 October will therefore mark a change in command structures, the legal framework and the distribution of responsibilities, rather than the disappearance of external support.
The multilateral coalition provided Iraq with a joint command structure, intelligence sharing, training and air support. Under the bilateral model, these functions will no longer be brought together within a single framework; instead, they will vary according to the scope of the agreement concluded with each country. Baghdad may thus gain greater control over the areas in which it cooperates and the partners it works with. At the same time, bringing together different training systems, arms suppliers and intelligence channels could place a heavier coordination burden on Iraqi institutions.
For Iraq, this change represents a visible gain in sovereignty. For many years, the foreign military presence has been a source of domestic political pressure on successive governments and has fuelled the rhetoric of armed groups. Moreover, every attack on US facilities has called Baghdad’s control over its own territory into question and drawn the country into regional confrontations. Taking over the centre may ease these tensions, but a lasting outcome will depend on the state’s ability to protect the site it has assumed responsibility for and establish an effective chain of command over all armed actors.
As the coalition withdraws, most of the hundreds of US troops remaining in the north are expected to be redeployed to Jordan and other locations in the region, while the air defence systems in Erbil are also expected to be removed from Iraq. To address the resulting gap, Baghdad has moved closer to procuring new systems from South Korea, Türkiye and the United States.[iii] Although procurement decisions matter, making radars, interception systems and command centres work together takes time. A transition lasting several months could create significant vulnerabilities, particularly for energy facilities and airports around Erbil.
The future of armed groups presents a more complex challenge. The coalition’s departure weakens the justification for bearing arms against foreign forces. Yet these organisations do not owe their existence to a single cause. Some have become intertwined with units affiliated with official security institutions; others have secured political representation in parliament or built networks extending from cross-border trade to local economic activity. The withdrawal of foreign troops may therefore change the terms of the debate, but it will not automatically dismantle the networks of people, money and influence built up over the years.
Although the government has emphasised 30 September as the date for bringing weapons under exclusive state control, a significant number of powerful groups have remained unwilling to disarm. Some organisations reportedly considered this option in 2025 as a way to ease tensions, but the process produced no binding outcome.[iv] Baghdad’s preference for gradual integration over abrupt dismantlement may reduce the risk of conflict. Prolonged uncertainty, however, could allow non-state centres of power to retain their positions.
The difficulty lies in the fact that, within the Popular Mobilization Forces, the boundary between units paid from the state budget and armed factions capable of making independent decisions is not always clear. When legal status and actual obedience diverge, a group’s incorporation into an official structure does not, by itself, guarantee political control over its weapons. Baghdad’s success will be measured less by personnel numbers than by whether appointments, operational orders, budgets and heavy weapons are managed under a single authority. Otherwise, institutional integration may advance on paper while fragmentation persists on the ground.
Counterterrorism will also be a key test of bilateral security cooperation. Iraqi forces are more capable of protecting cities and major transport routes than they were in the past. Nevertheless, activity along the Syrian border, cells concealed in rural areas and the vastness of the desert require continuous intelligence gathering. As the coalition’s shared intelligence pool shrinks, Iraq will need to coordinate aerial surveillance, border monitoring and target verification more rapidly across its own institutions. Bilateral partnerships may meet these needs, but new dependencies could emerge if the terms of data sharing are not clearly defined in advance.
The economic dimension of the security relationship also matters. In the past, protecting the airport centre was crucial to the safety of diplomatic personnel, cargo movements and the continuity of US institutional operations. After taking over the facility, the Iraqi authorities will want to demonstrate that they can provide secure transport for foreign missions and investors. Planned partnerships in energy, finance and infrastructure can advance to the extent that companies’ concerns about the security of their personnel and facilities are reduced. Bringing security provision under Iraqi control and opening up the economy thus become two processes that directly affect one another.
Baghdad’s options are not limited to severing ties with Washington or maintaining the previous arrangements under a different name. Iraq can obtain training, air defence capabilities and technical support from different countries while tailoring the scope of their missions to its own needs. The duration of agreements, the authority granted to foreign personnel, the use of bases and oversight procedures can be disclosed in a form accessible to the public and parliament. Establishing a shared air picture and a flow of intelligence between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government could also prevent the withdrawal from producing separate security arrangements in the north and in Baghdad.
The handover at Baghdad Airport is a powerful symbol of Iraq’s emergence from a prolonged period of external intervention. Yet sovereignty cannot be treated as something secured simply by signing a handover document. What will matter is the state’s ability to protect its airspace, exercise effective command over armed groups, monitor terrorist threats and oversee its agreements with foreign partners. If these conditions are met, bilateral security relationships could give Iraq greater room for manoeuvre. Otherwise, as the coalition’s shared responsibility unravels, the security burden may fall between disconnected institutions and deferred political decisions.
[i] “US signs deal to hand over diplomatic hub at Baghdad airport to Iraqi government”, The National, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/09/25/us-signs-deal-to-hand-over-diplomatic-hub-at-baghdad-airport-to-iraqi-government/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[ii] “Joint Statement Announcing the Timeline for the End of the Military Mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq”, U.S. Department of State, https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[iii] “As the last US troops pack up in Iraq, militias signal their weapons will stay”, Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/e13bf0d6b0389e76d74e8fda9577e734, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
[iv] “Why is US ally Iraq unable to disarm Iran’s militia allies?”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/why-is-us-ally-iraq-unable-disarm-irans-militia-allies-2026-09-09/, (Accessed: 28 September 2026).
