In the referendum held in Switzerland on 27 September 2026, 70.15% of voters rejected the “Neutrality Initiative,” which sought to subject the country’s neutrality policy to stricter rules. With a voter turnout of 47.06%, the initiative aimed to restrict Switzerland’s cooperation with military and defence alliances except in cases where the country was attacked or faced an imminent threat of attack, and to prevent it from participating in sanctions not mandated by the United Nations.[i] In this context, it would be misleading to interpret the referendum result as an indication that Swiss society is moving away from neutrality. Rather, the vote reflected a choice between anchoring neutrality within an immutable and stricter constitutional framework and maintaining it as a policy that can be adapted to changing security conditions.
This distinction is important in terms of the legal and political dimensions of Switzerland’s understanding of neutrality. The country’s permanent neutrality was internationally recognised in 1815, and the rights and obligations of neutral states subsequently developed within the framework of international law. At the same time, Switzerland’s approach distinguishes between the law of neutrality and neutrality policy. While the law of neutrality requires the country to refrain from participating in armed conflicts between states and from providing military support to belligerent parties, neutrality policy encompasses political measures taken to preserve the credibility of this status and protect the country’s interests. Therefore, for Switzerland, neutrality is not an end in itself but rather a means of safeguarding independence and security.[ii] This allows the manner in which neutrality is implemented to change to a certain extent in accordance with the international security environment while preserving its fundamental legal character.
The Russia-Ukraine War has been decisive in bringing this debate back to the forefront. Switzerland’s adoption of a significant portion of the European Union’s sanctions against Russia since 2022 has intensified domestic debates over the limits of neutrality. Supporters of the Neutrality Initiative argue that Bern’s participation in sanctions and its development of security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have eroded the traditional understanding of neutrality. The Federal Council, however, argues that the capacity of Switzerland’s existing neutrality policy to adapt to changing circumstances is important for protecting the country’s security and independence.[iii] Thus, for Switzerland, the Russia-Ukraine War has not merely been a conflict taking place in Eastern Europe; it has also brought back to the agenda the question of which instruments can be used to sustain neutrality in today’s security environment.
At this point, the fundamental issue facing Switzerland is under what conditions neutrality can provide the country with more effective security. Switzerland’s 2026 Security Policy Strategy states that the European security environment has deteriorated significantly following Russia’s attack on Ukraine and that, alongside military threats, hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, sabotage, espionage and disinformation have gained importance. Moreover, the fact that Switzerland is surrounded by NATO and European Union countries makes is difficult to assess the country’s security independently of its surrounding security environment. The strategy explicitly acknowledges that the stability and security commitments of these countries contribute to Switzerland’s security.[iv] Therefore, in Switzerland’s understanding of security, neutrality and international cooperation are increasingly ceasing to be mutually exclusive options.
This change can also be observed in trends within Swiss public opinion. According to the Sicherheit 2026 survey conducted in January 2026 by the Military Academy at ETH Zurich and the Center for Security Studies, 85% of voters support maintaining neutrality. At the same time, while 56% support developing closer relations with NATO, only 32% support NATO membership. In addition, 59% of respondents believe that armed neutrality can no longer be maintained in a militarily credible manner.[v] These figures indicate that, rather than a trend toward abandoning neutrality, there is a growing search within Swiss society for stronger international security cooperation while preserving neutrality.
Relations with NATO are one of the most visible areas of this transformation. Switzerland has participated in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme since 1996 but is not subject to the Alliance’s collective defence obligations. By contrast, under the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme covering the 2025–2028 period, Switzerland aims to enhance cooperation in areas such as political dialogue, the interoperability of the Swiss Armed Forces, air forces, communications, space, resilience and arms control.[vi] The fact that Swiss authorities regard these activities as compatible with neutrality demonstrates that the current approach is based less on NATO membership than on developing the capacity to act alongside partners when necessary. Indeed, Bern argues that this capacity should be developed before a crisis emerges so that defence cooperation with other states can be established in the event of a military attack. Accordingly, the current approach can be regarded as a non-alliance interoperability model that does not create collective defence obligations.
This search for a balance between neutrality and European security cooperation is also reflected in the defence industry and arms supply chains. During the Russia-Ukraine War, restrictions on the re-export of Swiss-made weapons and ammunition to Ukraine by third countries led to disputes between Bern and several European countries. Switzerland’s exports of war materiel decreased by 27% in 2023 to 696.8 million Swiss francs and declined further to approximately 665 million francs in 2024. However, exports increased by approximately 43% in 2025, reaching 948.2 million francs.[vii] Therefore, the available data do not indicate that restrictions stemming from neutrality have caused a linear contraction of Switzerland’s defence industry. The key issue is how restrictions on re-exports may affect Switzerland’s position as a reliable and long-term defence partner at a time when joint defence supply chains are becoming increasingly important in Europe.
Nevertheless, deepening security cooperation is not an unlimited option for Switzerland. Neutrality is not merely a legal status that keeps the country outside military conflicts; it is also an important component of Switzerland’s international identity and mediation capacity. Therefore, it is important not only for Switzerland to remain legally neutral but also to be perceived as a neutral actor by other states. While cooperation with NATO and European security mechanisms can strengthen the country’s defence capabilities, excessively deepening this relationship could generate debates over the political credibility of neutrality. Accordingly, the fundamental dilemma facing Bern is not to make an absolute choice between neutrality and security cooperation, but rather to develop sufficient defence capabilities against changing threats without losing the political room for manoeuvre provided by neutrality.
In conclusion, the 27 September referendum indicates not so much Switzerland’s departure from neutrality as the preservation of the room for manoeuvre necessary to adapt this policy to the changing European security environment. It is also noteworthy that while 85% of Swiss society continues to support neutrality, 70.15% of voters rejected an initiative that sought to define neutrality in stricter terms. Bern is seeking to increase international security cooperation and interoperability without joining a military alliance, while maintaining neutrality not as a form of isolation but as a security instrument that can be adapted to changing circumstances. Therefore, the key issue in the period ahead will not be whether Switzerland remains neutral, but rather how it can deepen security cooperation while maintaining a balance between the legal obligations of neutrality and its political credibility.
[i] “Swiss vote against tightening neutrality rules, ending peacetime cooperation with NATO”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/swiss-vote-tightening-neutrality-rules-ending-peacetime-cooperation-with-nato-2026-09-27/, (Accessed on: 28.09.2026).
[ii] “Neutrality”, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland (FDFA), https://www.eda.admin.ch/en/neutrality, (Accessed on: 28.09.2026).
[iii] “Neutrality initiative: Federal Council rejects rigid interpretation and upholds established practice in line with national interest”, Swiss Federal Council, https://www.bk.admin.ch/en/newnsb/kUHEB2euQu8MyfopZ16zE, (Accessed on: 28.09.2026).
[iv] “Security Policy Strategy 2026”, State Secretariat for Security Policy (SEPOS), https://www.sepos.admin.ch/en/security-policy-strategy, (Accessed on: 28.09.2026).
[v] “Sicherheit 2026”, Center for Security Studies (CSS) & Military Academy at ETH Zurich, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/sicherheit-2026.pdf, (Accessed on: 28.09.2026), ss. 45-55.
[vi] “Cooperation between Switzerland and NATO: The objectives defined for the period from 2025 to 2028”, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, https://www.eda.admin.ch/en/newnsb/StKnoep8yxplsAK6xeHfo, (Accessed on: 28.09.2026).
[vii] “Exportation de matériel de guerre en 2025”, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), https://www.seco.admin.ch/fr/newnsb/TH6DWe30NGhy7ClVBW22P, (Accessed on: 28.09.2026).
