The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 not only led to the emergence of new independent states but also shaped the new foreign policy orientation of the Russian Federation. In this context, the “Near Abroad Doctrine” became one of the fundamental reference points of Russian foreign policy. This doctrine still significantly influences Russian diplomacy.[i] The boundaries of the aforementioned Russian foreign policy have increasingly begun to be tested due to the changing international system, the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the growing influence of China.
Russia’s Near Abroad Policy largely reflects the country’s strategic culture and security concerns. Russian strategic culture has been shaped by the impacts left by the Mongol invasions, as well as the attacks of Napoleon and Nazi Germany throughout Russia’s history, influencing Russian historical memory and creating a permanent perception of security threat. For this reason, Russia builds its security strategy on creating buffer zones and maintaining influence over developments in its immediate neighborhood. This approach is known as the “perception of strategic encirclement.” Based on this perception, Russia considers buffer zones to be one of the essential elements of its national security.[ii] Within this framework, Russia views post-Soviet countries not merely as a historical legacy, but also as a domain that can directly affect its own stability and security. Consequently, political and security developments in Russia’s near abroad occupy a central place in Russian foreign policy.
Russia’s perception of strategic encirclement became particularly more pronounced with NATO’s eastward expansion following the Cold War. Moscow evaluated NATO’s expansion toward the post-Soviet space as a threat to its own security sphere. From Russia’s perspective, this situation is seen as a restriction on its room for maneuver in strategic regions such as the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean. Consequently, in response, Russia adopted a more interventionist stance, aiming to protect its strategic interests in the Black Sea and maintain its control over Crimea.[iii] The reason behind this attitude is Moscow’s tendency to directly link the foreign policy decisions and political developments of neighboring countries to its own national security. Such an approach also aligns with Russia’s efforts to preserve its influence in its near abroad.
The fact that some post-Soviet countries began acting more independently and establishing close relations with Western institutions such as NATO was viewed as a development contradicting Russia’s understanding of regional security. These developments stood out as the first major tests of the Near Abroad Policy and laid the groundwork for Russia’s interventionist stance. Indeed, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 clearly revealed Russia’s interventionist attitude. Furthermore, this stance is compatible with Russia’s logic of “offense as defense” and defines developments in the countries concerned as geopolitical risk factors in terms of its own security, stability, and power status.[iv]
In the face of these risks, Russia resorted not only to military methods but also to various economic and institutional tools. Among these tools, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are the primary mechanisms used by Moscow to maintain its influence and role in its neighborhood. However, in recent years, these tools have begun to be questioned by member states, marking the emergence of the first major challenges to Russia’s Near Abroad Policy. Particularly following the Russia-Ukraine War, the sustainability and future of this policy have been widely debated. These debates become more visible through developments across the CSTO. First, Armenia received no support from the CSTO during its 2022 border crisis with Azerbaijan, severely shaking its trust in the organization. Similarly, during the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border conflict in the same year, the CSTO again remained passive, leaving question marks regarding the organization’s utility and reliability throughout Central Asia.[v] In this context, the sustainability of Russia’s Near Abroad Policy through institutional structures has been jeopardized, and Moscow’s status as a regional security leader has suffered serious erosion.
These developments prepared the ground for actors like China to fill the influence vacuum emerging in Russia’s near abroad. Central Asian countries are increasingly turning toward China—which can offer more comprehensive proposals in terms of investment and infrastructure—instead of Russia, whose economic and diplomatic power has weakened, particularly due to the Russia-Ukraine War. Although China is not an actor capable of replacing Russia in the military and security fields, it is steadily increasing its structural and institutional influence in Eurasia. Indeed, following the Xi’an Summit held in 2023 and the Astana Summit held in 2025, China developed new cooperation mechanisms in the region independent of Moscow-centered structures.[vi] This situation also stems from Central Asian countries implementing multi-vector foreign policies rather than remaining attached to a single center.
In this context, Russia has not completely lost its influence in the region; however, its status as the sole decisive actor has been curtailed. Instead, China is assuming a more prominent role as the economic and institutional architect of the region. These developments are not limited to Central Asia; similar trends are observed in the South Caucasus as well. Azerbaijan, in particular, stands out as a strategic partner for China within the scope of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor. In this regard, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev defined Azerbaijan-China relations as “strategic partners,” and agreements worth $821 million were signed within the framework of the Belt and Road Forum in 2019.[vii] Similarly, Georgia serves as China’s gateway to the Black Sea under the Middle Corridor. Furthermore, Georgia offers an alternative trade route that bypasses Russia. The sides elevated their relations to the level of a strategic partnership in 2023, and China secured an active position in the Anaklia Deep Sea Port project.[viii] In this context, China has expanded its influence in regions that Russia considers its sphere of influence, not only in terms of transit corridors and infrastructure but also across various domains including energy and trade.
In conclusion, although Russia’s decades-long Near Abroad Policy has not completely lost its impact, it is being significantly eroded by other actors. As post-Soviet countries become more independent and seek to diversify their foreign policies, Russia’s effectiveness has come under question. Accordingly, China’s economic and institutional power has turned this situation into an opportunity, strengthening its role in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Therefore, the influence of Russia’s Near Abroad Policy may gradually weaken depending on the shifting regional balance of power.
[i] Zhao Huasheng, “Russia and its Near Abroad: Challenges and Prospects”, Valdai Discussion Club, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-and-its-near-abroad-challenges-and-prospect/, (Access Date: 26.06.2026).
[ii] Shah Meer & Ahmed Khan, “Russia’s Strategic Culture and Geopolitics in Europe”, NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability, https://njips.nust.edu.pk/index.php/njips/article/view/212, (Access Date: 26.06.2026).
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Thomas de Waal, “The End of the Near Abroad”, Carnegie Endowment, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/the-end-of-the-near-abroad, (Access Date: 27.06.2026).
[vi] MD.Obaidullah, “China quietly eclipsing a weakened Russia in Central Asia”, Asia Times, https://asiatimes.com/2026/03/china-quietly-eclipsing-a-weakened-russia-in-central-asia/, (Access Date: 27.06.2026).
[vii] Lina Sigurdh, “Navigating Shifting Tides: China’s Advance, Russia’s Retreat, and the Evolving Power Dynamics in the South Caucasus”, SCEEUS, https://sceeus.se/publikationer/navigating-shifting-tides-chinas-advance-russias-retreat-and-the-evolving-power-dynamics-in-the-south-caucasus/, (Access Date: 27.06.2026).
[viii] “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the South Caucasus: A Region Moving from the Margins to the Spotlight”, Caucasus Watch, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/insights/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-in-the-south-caucasus-a-region-moving-from-the-margins-to-the-spotlight.html, (Access Date: 27.06.2026).
