Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, the support of European countries for Ukraine has mostly been evaluated thru the weapons systems sent, financial aid packages, and military training programs. However, recent developments indicate that a deeper transformation in the quality rather than the quantity of Europe’s Ukraine policy is taking place. In the meeting held in Paris on July 13, 2026, developments such as the formation of new air defense coalitions, the initiation of collaborations for missile production in Ukraine, and the focus of Europe-centered defense companies on joint development projects stand out.[i] In this context, Ukraine is becoming a new partner that contributes to the development of Europe’s defense production capacity, participates in joint technology projects, and can transfer its operational experience gained on the battlefield to the European defense industry. This situation makes the transformation of Europe’s understanding of strategic autonomy visible, along with Ukraine’s changing role.
From the perspective of the European Union (EU), strategic autonomy has been discussed for many years primarily in the context of reducing dependence on the United States (US) in political and military decision-making processes. Especially led by France, this approach aims for Europe to be able to act independently in line with its security interests when necessary. However, following the Russia-Ukraine War, the focus of discussions on strategic autonomy has clearly shifted toward being able to make independent decisions and sustainably developing the production capacity, defense industry, ammunition stocks, and technological infrastructure to support these decisions. The European Defense Industrial Program (EDIP), the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS), the SAFE financing mechanism, and the Readiness 2030 vision also constitute the institutional reflections of this transformation.[ii]
In this context, the prominent initiatives can be considered concrete examples of the transformation in Europe’s understanding of strategic autonomy. The Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense Coalition, established in Paris, aims to develop a lower-cost solution that complements rather than replaces the Patriot system, focusing on the European-supported Freyja air defense project. Within the coalition, the convergence of the SAMP/T system’s manufacturer Eurosam, along with Leonardo, Thales, Saab, and the Ukrainian company Fire Point in the same production ecosystem, indicates that the approach based on national capacities in the European defense industry is increasingly being replaced by a multi-actor and joint production-focused structure.
The announcement by French President Emmanuel Macron that new generation SAMP/T systems will be delivered to Ukraine, along with Ukraine’s approval to produce under license preventive missiles, precision-guided munitions, and SCALP cruise missiles, indicates that this transformation is not limited to military aid; it also encompasses technology transfer and the sharing of production capacity. Additionally, the planning of joint military exercises in countries neighboring Ukraine and the acceleration of preparations for the future establishment of the Multinational Force (MNFU) demonstrate that defense industry collaborations are progressing simultaneously with operational security planning [iii]
At this point, it becomes evident that the model Europe has been trying to develop recently cannot be explained solely by the traditional understanding of strategic autonomy, which is based on political independence. On the contrary, there is a new capacity building process shaped thru joint production, defense industry integration, technology sharing, and operational information transfer. This trend can be conceptualized as “defense industry-based strategic autonomy,” and this conceptualization suggests understanding strategic autonomy not thru the capacity to act independently, but thru the ability to sustainably develop Europe’s defense production ecosystem and to build it together with partner actors.
The most striking outcome of this approach is the reshaping of Ukraine’s position within the European security architecture. Because the new capacity building based on Europe’s defense industry is transforming Ukraine from a partner to be protected into a new actor that directly contributes to the production processes of European security. This transformation necessitates a reevaluation not only of Europe’s understanding of strategic autonomy but also of Ukraine’s role in the international security system. In this context, Ukraine’s role in the early stages of the war can largely be defined as a “security consumer” heavily dependent on external military aid, while in the later stages of the war, this role has begun to transform increasingly.
This transformation is not solely due to the functions undertaken by Ukraine; it is increasingly being recognized and reinforced thru institutional collaborations by European states, defense companies, and joint ventures. In other words, Ukraine’s new position gains legitimacy not only thru its own capacity but also thru other actors recognizing this capacity as an integral part of Europe’s future defense architecture. The definition of Ukraine as a partner contributing to transatlantic security in the NATO Ankara Summit Declaration is one of the most concrete examples of this situation. Indeed, the operational experience gained during the nearly four-year-long war, in areas such as unmanned systems, electronic warfare, air defense, and battlefield innovation, has made Ukraine a carrier of unique expertise that Europe does not possess.[iv]
This transformation is not actually one-sided. As Ukraine’s role changes, Europe’s role is also being redefined. In the early stages of the war, Europe’s primary function was to act as a security provider, offering military aid and supporting Ukraine’s defense. Today, Europe is increasingly transforming into an actor that coordinates joint production networks, manages defense industry integration, and attempts to transfer Ukraine’s wartime experience to its own defense capacity. Therefore, it is possible to speak of a relational role transformation where the parties’ expectations of each other are also being reshaped.
However, it would not be correct to consider these developments as an indication that Europe has fully achieved strategic autonomy. The European defense architecture still significantly depends on the nuclear deterrence, advanced air defense systems, intelligence sharing, and logistical capacity provided by the United States. The central role of Patriot systems in Ukraine’s air defense and the decisive position of the U.S. in critical technologies indicate that this dependency continues. Therefore, the steps Europe has taken recently can be interpreted as a complementary approach aimed at strengthening Europe’s defense industry capacity rather than a strategic autonomy to replace the United States. In other words, Europe’s goal is not to break away from the transatlantic security architecture; rather, it is to have greater production capacity, a stronger defense industry, and a more sustainable technological infrastructure within this architecture. This situation shows that the concept of strategic autonomy is gradually evolving from political independence to production capacity.
As a result, Europe’s understanding of strategic autonomy is increasingly being reshaped thru joint production networks, technology sharing, and defense industry collaborations. In this context, this approach, conceptualized as strategic autonomy based on the defense industry, suggests interpreting strategic autonomy not as Europe’s claim to act independently, but rather thru the ability to develop defense industry capacity in collaboration with partner actors. Ukraine, on the other hand, is not just a supported country in this new security architecture; it stands out as a strategic partner that directly contributes to shaping Europe’s future defense capacity.
[i] John Irish ve Dominique Vidalon, “Ukraine and allies set up coalition to tackle Russia ballistic missile threat”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/allies-muster-more-air-defence-aid-ukraine-battlefield-momentum-shifts-2026-07-13/, (Date Accessed: 14.07.2026).
[ii] “A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU Readiness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry (EDIS)”, European Commission, 2024, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis_en, (Date Accessed: 14.07.2026); “White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030”, European Commission, 2025, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en, (Date Accessed: 14.07.2026); “European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)”, Council of the European Union, 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-industry-programme/, (Date Accessed: 14.07.2026); “SAFE: Council adopts €150 billion boost for joint procurement on European security and defence”, Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/27/safe-council-adopts-150-billion-boost-for-joint-procurement-on-european-security-and-defence/, (Date Accessed: 14.07.2026).
[iii] Reuters, ibid, 13 Temmuz 2026.
[iv] Joachim Klement, “Why NATO should ask Ukraine for help”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/commentary/reuters-open-interest/why-nato-should-ask-ukraine-help-joachim-klement-2026-07-14/, (Date Accessed: 14.07.2026).
