The recent developments in Mali’s security equation reveal a shift in foreign policy instruments from direct confrontations to diplomatic and structural forms of intervention. The conclusion of Wagner’s three-year-long presence in Mali may give the impression of a retreat or failure to many observers. However, this step is in fact the natural outcome of the Kremlin’s intention to transform its presence in Africa. The operational control on the ground has been transferred from a pragmatic and flexible structure like Wagner to a more disciplined and state-controlled entity known as the Africa Corps.[i] This transformation is not merely a matter of personnel or branding; it also reflects Russia’s resolve to redefine the nature of its strategic engagement on the continent.
Wagner’s activities in Mali presented a complex and contradictory picture in terms of conflict intensity. In particular, the recapture of some rebel-held cities and entry into areas inaccessible to the Malian Armed Forces in the north were recorded as short-term successes. However, the same period witnessed a significant increase in human rights violations, including civilian casualties, forced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. Numerous reports and testimonies—such as those published by Human Rights Watch and Forbidden Stories—indicate that Wagner’s presence on the ground was not limited to military effectiveness but also contributed to social fragmentation.[ii] This illustrates how a structure deployed under the premise of providing security gradually turned into an object of fear.
Wagner’s withdrawal was less a result of losses in the battlefield than a consequence of its declining legitimacy on the international stage. The attempted insurrection in 2023 and the subsequent death of Prigozhin created a power vacuum, necessitating restructuring not only within domestic politics but also in the planning of Russia’s presence in Africa. At this point, Russia aimed to establish a new security architecture. The deployment of the Africa Corps was designed as a step toward conducting operations in a more organized, direct, and institutional framework. In this way, the goals were to both evade Western reactions and deepen existing political and military partnerships.
The emergence of the Africa Corps should not be considered merely an organizational renewal. This formation represents an effort to build a long-term infrastructure for solidifying Russia’s strategic position on the continent. Unlike Wagner’s operational flexibility, the Africa Corps has begun to act more effectively in multifaceted domains such as military training, intelligence cooperation, infrastructure protection, and regime-supported institutionalization. In countries like Mali, the modernization of military bases, the installation of radar systems, and attempts to establish regional air superiority should be interpreted within this context. The focus is no longer limited to neutralizing threats on the ground; it also includes active participation in the security architecture of partner countries.
This new approach clearly demonstrates how the vacuum created by France’s diminishing influence in the region is being meticulously filled. The termination of France’s Operation Barkhane and the weakening of MINUSMA have shifted the Sahel states’ preferences regarding security partnerships. The Malian government, dissatisfied with Western demands, has accelerated its cooperation with Moscow. Especially after the coups, the West’s restrictive stance made Russia a more attractive partner. The model offered by the Kremlin is characterized by direct military aid, rapid delivery of equipment, and support policies free of political conditions. In this process, Russia has provided not only collaboration with existing regimes but also a capacity to synchronize with their security apparatuses.
Nevertheless, the flexibility and accessibility offered by this model have also sparked new debates at the societal level. The Malian population views the Russian military presence with suspicion, shaped by the traumas of the Wagner era. How the Africa Corps manages this perception will be determined not only by military achievements but also by the quality of its relationship with local communities. If the new entity focuses solely on regime protection, as in the previous era, it may once again be perceived by the public as a form of foreign domination. When a structure that enters a country as a security provider transforms into a guardian of power, the legitimacy of such a transition becomes questionable.
The potential applicability of the new security model established by Moscow to other countries suggests the durability of this strategy. Similar transitions are likely to be observed in countries like the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Libya. The institutionalization of Wagner-affiliated elements implies that military experts sent to these countries will now operate under more direct Kremlin supervision. This method redefines the scope of responsibility in foreign policy. Instead of a legally and politically controversial structure, a formal mechanism integrated into the foreign policy apparatus emerges—aiming to both evade international sanctions and expand influence on the ground.
The Africa Corps is not solely focused on operational success. It also functions as a deeply rooted instrument of influence by controlling strategic infrastructures, securing critical zones, and engaging with local elites. In areas abandoned by the West, new norms, security paradigms, and alliance models are being constructed beyond merely filling the vacuum. In this context, the model proposed by Russia acts less as a traditional security doctrine and more as a practical instrument of foreign policy vision. The reshaping of perceptions about the continent’s security is closely linked not just to control on the ground but also to which actor offers a more compelling vision for the future.
At the current stage, while the Africa Corps’ impact on the ground is growing, the question of how sustainable this structure is has gained prominence. The Kremlin faces increasing economic and military pressures due to the war in Ukraine. Consequently, Russia’s presence in Africa also serves as a means of accessing new financial resources and circumventing Western sanctions. The role of African minerals, energy resources, and transportation corridors in this strategy aligns the pursuit of security goals with the ambitions of economic sovereignty. This demonstrates a direct relationship between the financing models of field operations and broader geopolitical objectives.
In light of all these developments, it can be argued that the future of the Africa Corps will depend more on the extent to which African states and societies internalize this model than on the Kremlin’s strategic reasoning. Unless these countries move beyond the short-term security relief provided by foreign military assistance, the dependency relationship may solidify into a permanent structure. The delicate balance between preserving sovereignty and the need for external support appears poised to become one of the central battlegrounds of African politics in the years ahead.
[i] “Russia expands military footprint in Sahel with shift from Wagner to state-controlled Africa Corps”, Africa News, 24 Temmuz 2025, https://www.africanews.com/2025/07/24/russia-expands-military-footprint-in-sahel-with-shift-from-wagner-to-state-controlled-afri/, (Date Accessed: 28.07.2025).
[ii] “Torture and Forced Disappearances: Inside Wagner’s Secret Prisons in Mali”, Forbidden Stories, 12 Haziran 2025, https://forbiddenstories.org/torture-wagners-prisons-mali/, (Date Accessed: 28.07.2025); “Mali: Army, Wagner Group Disappear, Execute Fulani Civilians”, Human Rights Watch, 22 Temmuz 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/22/mali-army-wagner-group-disappear-execute-fulani-civilians, (Date Accessed: 28.07.2025).
