Kazakhstan went to the polls on August 23, 2026, for the first parliamentary election of the new constitutional order.[i] Voters elected the 145-member Kurultay, which replaced the previous bicameral structure, while the Adilet Party, supporting President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, stood at the center of the competition. The election represents not merely a renewal of representation but rather a reconstruction of the state architecture.
A unicameral legislature may accelerate decision-making processes, make institutional responsibility more visible, and reduce lengthy legislative procedures. However, eliminating the second layer of oversight may also narrow the institutional space that restrains majority preferences.
Under the previous system, the Senate served as a channel that brought regional interests to the center and reconsidered regulations passed by the lower chamber. In the Kurultay model, these functions must be compensated through parliamentary commissions, open sessions, and effective opposition. Otherwise, speed may produce a system that simply approves the executive’s agenda without necessarily improving the quality of governance.
The new constitution reintroduces the office of vice president while redefining relations between the executive and legislative branches. The Kurultay’s powers to supervise the government, examine budget implementation, and approve certain high-level appointments are significant. The way these powers are exercised in practice will determine the direction of the reform more strongly than the legal text itself.
The fact that Tokayev’s previous term during the 1995 Constitution period is not considered a first term under the new arrangement constitutes the center of political debate. A judicial interpretation allows the president to run for another seven-year term in the future. Although Tokayev has not yet announced a decision, this possibility postpones the succession debate while increasing concerns regarding political personalization.[ii]
The dismantling of the Nazarbayev legacy represents another dimension of this transformation. After the violent events of 2022, Tokayev reduced the political and economic influence of former ruling circles and promised a new institutional era through the discourse of a “Just Kazakhstan.” However, the absorption of the former ruling party Amanat into Adilet makes the boundary between renewal and continuity unclear.
The expected strong performance of Adilet may reflect not only voter support for reforms but also organizational advantages. The participation of seven parties provides formal pluralism. Nevertheless, the competitive nature of the election will be determined by whether opposition groups can influence decision-making processes, their access to media, campaign opportunities, and their actual weight within parliamentary commissions.
The important point here is the distinction between institutions adapting to a leader’s political objectives and institutions functioning independently from the leader. While the reform may expand the executive’s room for maneuver, it can also establish predictable rules. Permanent institutionalization, however, requires safeguards capable of managing a transfer of power after Tokayev without producing a crisis.
Public perceptions of this process cannot be separated from economic conditions. Annual inflation was measured at 10.2 percent in July, while tax increases and rising living costs have placed pressure on household purchasing power. If political restructuring is not reflected in daily life, the high level of public support for constitutional changes may gradually decline.[iii]
Although Kazakhstan has demonstrated strong economic growth in recent years, the distribution of prosperity continues to involve geographical and social differences. There are significant gaps between oil-producing regions, major cities, and rural areas in terms of income, access to services, and opportunities. The unicameral system will gain social legitimacy to the extent that it can transfer regional demands into budgetary policies.
Energy and mineral revenues therefore represent one of the most important tests for the new Kurultay. Kazakhstan holds a significant share of global oil production and occupies a leading position in uranium production. Copper, zinc, titanium, and other critical minerals are bringing the country closer to the center of energy transition and technology supply chains.
Resource wealth provides extensive opportunities for building strong state capacity. However, dependence of budget revenues on commodity prices directly transfers external shocks into domestic politics. If the parliament transparently supervises transfers from the National Fund, public investments, and mining agreements, the resource-based economy can become a more inclusive instrument of development.
The fact that a large share of oil exports depends on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route extending through Russia to Novorossiysk creates vulnerability. Attacks in the Black Sea disrupted shipments and demonstrated how geography can limit economic independence.[iv] This situation encourages Astana to accelerate Caspian-based alternatives and diversify export routes..
This diversification is consistent with Kazakhstan’s tradition of multi-vector foreign policy. While Astana maintains security and economic ties with Russia, it develops trade and infrastructure partnerships with China and seeks cooperation with the European Union and the United States in the fields of energy and critical minerals. The new parliament’s supervision of foreign agreements could institutionalize this balancing policy.
A unicameral system may allow faster decision-making in investment legislation, transportation regulations, and mining policies. However, for speed to provide predictability for investors, procurement processes, environmental obligations, and local benefits must remain transparent. If the Kurultay’s oversight capacity remains weak, economic diversification may turn into resource distribution controlled by a narrow governing circle.
At this point, political institutionalization must be supported by social trust. Citizens will evaluate constitutional reform not through abstract distributions of authority, but through the protection of wages, improvements in public services, and reductions in corruption. Therefore, the first-term performance of the Kurultay will be measured not by the number of laws it passes, but by its ability to explain the reasoning behind decisions and reflect the demands of different groups in its outcomes. Regular public consultation may contribute to maintaining this connection throughout the country and strengthening institutional trust over time.
At this point, two different directions may emerge in the future. In the first scenario, the unicameral system may become a more effective representative body through expert commissions, open data, and strong budget oversight. In the second scenario, Adilet’s clear dominance may create a structure that rapidly transforms executive preferences into legislation while limiting critical oversight.
The indicators that will determine the direction extend beyond the election results. The opposition’s access to committee chair positions, the ability of members of parliament to question ministers, public participation in legislative preparation, the operating space of independent media, and the position of courts in relation to the executive should be monitored. The powers of the vice president will also test the transparency of the succession mechanism.
In conclusion, Kazakhstan’s unicameral period carries both the promise of institutional simplification and the risk of concentrating power at the center. The success of the reform will be measured not merely by the speed of decision-making, but by accountability, regional representation, and the distribution of economic gains. If the Kurultay gains real influence in these areas, the transformation may produce a lasting state capacity extending beyond the Tokayev era.
[i] “Kazakhs begin voting in election set to tighten president’s power”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kazakhs-begin-voting-election-set-tighten-presidents-power-2026-08-23/, (Date of Access: 23.08.2026).
[ii] “Kazakhstan’s top court says president can seek another term”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kazakhstans-top-court-says-president-can-seek-another-term-2026-07-07/, (Date of Access: 23.08.2026).
[iii] “Inflation in the Republic of Kazakhstan (July 2026)”, Bureau of National Statistics of the Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://stat.gov.kz/en/industries/economy/prices/publications/509837/, (Date of Access: 23.08.2026).
[iv] “Drone attacks reduce July CPC oil loadings by a fifth, sources say”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/drone-attacks-reduce-july-cpc-oil-loadings-by-fifth-sources-say-2026-08-07/, (Date of Access: 23.08.2026).
