Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s state visit to Georgia on July 2-3, 2026, was the first official visit by an Uzbek President to Georgia in over two decades. This visit elevated bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership, resulting in the signing of numerous agreements covering trade, investment, transport, customs, digital technologies, healthcare, education, and culture. Mirziyoyev and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze identified regional connectivity and infrastructure development as one of the ‘‘strategic priorities’’ of their bilateral cooperation, emphasizing the importance of strengthening the Middle Corridor as a ‘‘reliable and competitive’’ transit route.[i]
Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili also noted that the strategic partnership would strengthen connectivity between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, describing the Middle Corridor as a fundamental element for the sustainable development and economic cooperation of both regions.[ii] Within this framework, Mirziyoyev’s visit to Georgia indicates a structural transformation in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Accordingly, the South Caucasus is no longer considered merely a neighboring region, but an indispensable extension of Central Asia’s westward connectivity.
Following the outbreak of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War, the Middle Corridor evolved beyond being just an alternative transport route for Eurasian countries aiming to reduce dependence on Russian territory but also have become a strategic necessity. This transformation holds particular importance for Uzbekistan as it continues constructing the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Project. While this railway aims to connect China to Central Asia more efficiently than existing routes, the project’s commercial success depends not only on infrastructure development in Central Asia but also on securing reliable transit connections across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. In this context, Georgia’s Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi stand out as vital links in the emerging Eurasian transport network. Recognizing this strategic reality, the Tashkent administration increasingly prioritizes investments in diplomatic and logistical partnerships to maximize the economic potential of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway.
Reflecting this goal, the two countries have agreed to expand rail discounts, previously limited to container transport, to include other types of rail along the Central Asia-South Caucasus-Anatolia (CASCA+) corridor. Uzbekistan’s Minister of Transport, Ilhom Mahkamov, also announced plans to create Uzbekistan’s own logistics infrastructure in Georgia’s Black Sea ports through a consortium of the country’s leading importing, exporting, and logistics companies, emphasizing the strategic importance of these ports for Uzbekistan.[iii] Taken together, these initiatives demonstrate that Tashkent aims not only to gain privileged access to Georgia’s transportation infrastructure but also to secure the long-term sustainability of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway and, more broadly, the Middle Corridor by establishing a permanent logistics presence in the Black Sea.
Uzbekistan’s interest in this area gained further significance following Georgia’s announcement that its Black Sea ports, particularly Anaklia, will be developed under a state-led ‘‘landlord model’’ after the Chinese consortium selected in 2024 withdrew from the project.[iv] This model ensures that ownership of the essential port infrastructure remains with Georgia while allowing various international investors to participate in terminal development and operations. Georgian Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development Mariam Kvrivishvili specifically invited countries situated along the Middle Corridor route, primarily Central Asian republics, to invest in these projects. This development also lends distinct strategic importance to Mirziyoyev’s proposal to integrate the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway with the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) Railway. Such an integration will contribute to creating a seamless east-west transport chain connecting China and Central Asia to Turkish and European markets via the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus.
The concrete impacts of Uzbekistan’s Caucasus strategy are already becoming visible. The strategic partnership is increasingly being implemented through transport, logistics, and investment projects. One of the most notable examples of this is the multi-purpose Uzbekistan logistics terminal currently under construction in Georgia’s Poti Free Industrial Zone. Spanning an area of approximately 30 hectares with an investment of 18.3 million USD, the project aims to become Uzbekistan’s primary logistics hub on the Black Sea.[v]
Another important factor is the changing character of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Since 2016, Tashkent has adopted a pragmatic and multifaceted foreign policy approach that prioritizes economic connectivity over geopolitical blocs. The strategic partnership established with Georgia is a concrete reflection of this approach. Despite the pause in Georgia’s European Union accession process, Uzbekistan has not allowed political tensions between Brussels and Tbilisi to affect bilateral relations. Instead, Tashkent is increasingly separating its infrastructure diplomacy from normative and ideological debates. For Uzbekistan, the strategic importance of Georgia stems from its geostrategic location between the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and Europe, rather than its internal political orientation. This approach also points to a broader trend becoming increasingly evident in the foreign policies of Central Asian states. Accordingly, pragmatic elements such as connectivity, trade, and investment are superseding ideological and normative considerations in shaping foreign partnerships.
This strategic partnership also yields broader geopolitical consequences. Competition over transport corridors in Eurasia is increasingly encompassing struggles for political influence rather than being limited to infrastructure projects alone. China views the Middle Corridor as a complementary strategic route to the Belt and Road Initiative. The European Union continues to invest in east-west connectivity projects under its ‘‘Global Gateway’’ initiative. Similarly, Turkey and Azerbaijan aim to strengthen their positions in the western segment of the corridor. Within this framework, Uzbekistan’s strategic partnership with Georgia can be seen as a reflection of its effort to consolidate its position amidst shifting geopolitical balances. However, in line with its multifaceted foreign policy approach, Tashkent avoids becoming dependent on any single external actor. The cooperation developed with Georgia is part of a pragmatic strategy aimed at diversifying Uzbekistan’s external connectivity and transit options within the scope of its multi-vector foreign policy.
Mirziyoyev’s state visit to Tbilisi demonstrates Uzbekistan’s awareness that the future of its Eurasian connectivity is now being shaped beyond the borders of Central Asia. The South Caucasus is increasingly becoming an important strategic pillar in Tashkent’s foreign policy. The strategic partnership established with Georgia institutionalizes Uzbekistan’s westward connectivity strategy, thereby expanding its logistical access via the Black Sea. Concurrently, growing Uzbek cargo volumes and potential investments are reinforcing Georgia’s position within the Middle Corridor. In other words, while Georgia functions as a critical maritime gateway opening to Europe via its Black Sea ports, Uzbekistan offers a strategic transit point extending into the rapidly growing markets of China and South Asia.
[i] “Uzbekistan President Visits Tbilisi, Signs Strategic Partnership Agreement with Georgia”, Civil Georgia, https://civil.ge/archives/743370, (Date of Access: 05.08.2026).
[ii] “Uzbekistan President Visits Tbilisi, Signs Strategic Partnership Agreement with Georgia”, Civil Georgia, https://civil.ge/archives/743370, (Date of Access: 05.08.2026).
[iii] “Uzbekistan, Georgia agree to digitize road transport permits”, Kun uz, https://kun.uz/en/news/2026/07/07/uzbekistan-georgia-agree-to-digitize-road-transport-permits-d70ed7, (Date of Access: 05.08.2026).
[iv] “Middle Corridor Development Lacks Security Component”, Jamestown, https://jamestown.org/middle-corridor-development-lacks-security-component/, (Date of Access: 05.08.2026).
[v] “Расширение торгово-экономических связей – президент Узбекистана посетит Грузию в июле” , Sputnik Georgia, https://sputnik-georgia.ru/20260630/rasshirenie-torgovo-ekonomicheskikh-svyazey–prezident-uzbekistana-posetit-gruziyu-v-iyule-299402341.html, (Date of Access: 05.08.2026).
