The international system established after 1945 was not merely a temporary institutional arrangement that emerged following the destruction caused by the Second World War; rather, it was a comprehensive political, economic, and security architecture aimed at conducting relations between states within the framework of certain rules, institutions, and norms. The establishment of the United Nations, the creation of the Bretton Woods system, the institutionalization of international trade first through GATT and later through the World Trade Organization, the emergence of NATO, and the gradual deepening of European integration constituted the fundamental complementary elements of this post-war architecture. This order was never a conflict-free, egalitarian structure, nor was it a system representing the interests of all states equally. On the contrary, it evolved as a hybrid system in which the military and economic capacities of great powers and the principled claims of international institutions were brought together within the same structure, thereby producing both cooperation and power politics. Nevertheless, the historical significance of this order did not stem from eliminating power struggles, but rather from making them manageable to a significant extent within certain institutional and legal frameworks.
Therefore, when evaluating the post-1945 international order, it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of “stability” and “order.” While order refers to the capacity to make the behavior of states predictable through certain rules and institutions, stability refers to the ability to keep conflicts and power struggles under control. The fact that numerous wars occurred during the Cold War period, from Korea to Vietnam, Afghanistan to the Middle East, and various regions of Africa, clearly demonstrates that the post-1945 system did not eliminate conflict. In contrast, preventing a direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was related not only to nuclear deterrence but also to the strategic predictability produced by the bipolar power structure and alliance systems. Therefore, the fundamental achievement of the post-war order was not the complete elimination of war, but the development of mechanisms preventing competition between great powers from turning into a new world war.
Behind the order created in 1945 lay not only an idealistic search for peace, but also the realities of power politics. After the war, the United States possessed extraordinary economic, military, and technological capacity, and this capacity played a decisive role in shaping the institutional architecture of the new system. However, US power was not used solely in the form of direct military superiority; rather, it was embodied within a more permanent order through the establishment of international institutions, support for economic reconstruction, and the institutionalization of alliance relations. Nevertheless, the institutional structure of the system also reflected the asymmetries of the post-war distribution of power. The veto mechanism of the United Nations Security Council, decision-making processes within international economic institutions, and the Western-centered economic structure carried the tension between the order’s claim of universality and existing power hierarchies within itself from the very beginning. Therefore, the historical balance sheet of the post-1945 order has been neither a complete failure nor a flawless institutional success. A more accurate approach is that this order represented a historical compromise in which power politics and institutionalization operated simultaneously.
The end of the Cold War eliminated the fundamental balance of power upon which this compromise was based. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not merely signify the end of the bipolar system; they also generated a new expectation regarding the future of the international order. The short-lived unipolar dominance of the United States strengthened optimism that liberal democracy, free market economy, globalization, and multilateral institutionalization would expand worldwide. The deepening of European integration, the establishment of the World Trade Organization, the acceleration of international capital movements, the global expansion of production chains, and the centralization of the internet in economic and social life supported the expectation that interdependence would reduce conflict and economic integration would strengthen political cooperation.
However, the post-Cold War unipolar structure did not transform into a permanent global stability order. On the contrary, the crises experienced during this period gradually made the limitations of the liberal international order more visible. The humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia and Rwanda, the September 11 attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2008 global financial crisis, the political disintegration and civil wars that emerged after the Arab Spring, the distributional consequences of globalization, and the increasingly intensifying great power competition revealed the limits of the optimism that had developed in the 1990s. The fundamental problem here is not that all institutions of the liberal order disappeared suddenly. The real issue is that these institutions were unable to preserve their authority, political legitimacy, and implementation capacity to the same extent in the face of changing power distribution.
However, globalization has been at the center of this transformation. In the 1990s, the expansion of global production networks, the liberalization of trade, and the easier movement of capital increased the efficiency of the world economy; the deeper integration of emerging economies, particularly China and India, into the global economic system contributed to lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Nevertheless, the overall increase in prosperity created by globalization and the distribution of this prosperity among countries and societies are not the same thing. Particularly, the relocation of production to other countries in certain industrial regions, the transformation of labor markets, and the deepening of regional inequalities made the political costs of globalization more visible. The IMF’s 2026 report states that while the rapid globalization process of the 1990s focused on productivity gains, the distributional consequences were not sufficiently taken into consideration, and this later contributed to economic populism and political reactions against globalization.
The contradictory consequences of globalization have made it necessary to evaluate economic integration not only in terms of prosperity and efficiency but also in terms of dependency and security relations. As economic relations deepened, interdependence between states increased; however, this interdependence demonstrated that economic relations could also transform into areas of strategic vulnerability during periods of crisis. While the fragmentation of production chains across different countries reduced costs, it also created external dependency in critical products, and particularly in sectors such as energy, food, pharmaceuticals, technology, and semiconductors, economic relations increasingly became matters of national security. The IMF also highlights in recent years the renewed rise of trade restrictions and industrial policies, the increasing orientation toward geopolitically closer countries in strategic sectors, and the difficulty of the multilateral trading system in responding to this transformation. Therefore, globalization has not ended, but the logic through which globalization operates has changed significantly. With this transformation, concepts such as “greater integration” have been replaced by concepts including “secure integration”, “resilience”, “strategic autonomy” and “reducing critical dependencies.”
The date of September 11, 2001, constituted a critical turning point that highlighted the security dimension of this transformation. While economic integration and democratization became important elements of the international agenda after the end of the Cold War, the fight against terrorism, security, and military intervention returned to the center of international politics after September 11. In particular, the intervention in Afghanistan and especially the 2003 Iraq War revealed the tension between the universal values of the liberal international order and the strategic preferences of hegemonic power. The US intervention in Iraq generated intense debates regarding the prohibition on the use of force, the United Nations system, and the legitimacy of international law, while practices such as Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib made the relationship between the liberal order and its own principles concerning human rights and the rule of law controversial. Thus, September 11 was not only the beginning of a new security era but also a turning point in which the liberal order was reinterpreted through security policies.
The Arab Spring revealed the same problem from a different dimension. The social movements that began in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and quickly spread to different parts of the Middle East and North Africa strengthened expectations that authoritarian regimes could undergo democratic transformation. The acceleration of social mobilization through social media and digital communication tools also made visible the impact of technology on political transformation. However, unlike the Tunisian case, the developments in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen demonstrated that democratization is neither a linear nor an inevitable process. While regime changes occurred in some countries, others were dragged into civil wars, the dissolution of state capacity, and regional power struggles. The fundamental reality demonstrated by the Arab Spring is that the spread of democratic values depends not only on domestic political conditions but also on the strategic choices of external actors, regional power balances, and security calculations. Thus, it became evident once again that the liberal order could not always establish a consistent relationship between universal norms and geopolitical interests.
The 2008 global financial crisis also constituted the economic dimension of this transformation. The crisis weakened the strong belief that free market mechanisms would independently generate stability, while simultaneously strengthening the role of the state within the economic system. States were forced to develop more active policies in order to rescue banking systems, regulate financial markets, and limit the social costs of economic collapse. Thus, the tendency of the 1990s toward “the withdrawal of the state” gradually gave way to the concept of the “strategic state.” Today, this transformation is visible not only in the financial sector but also in areas such as energy, defense industry, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, critical minerals, and digital infrastructures.
The most evident consequence of this transformation is not the weakening of the state, but rather the transformation of the state’s area of responsibility. Although globalization and digitalization initially appeared to be processes that eroded state sovereignty, states today are attempting to exercise greater control over critical technologies, data infrastructures, supply chains, and strategic sectors. Therefore, the increasing global influence of technology companies does not mean that the state has disappeared. On the contrary, states are seeking to integrate the technological capacities possessed by private companies into national security strategies and establish regulatory and strategic control over critical technologies. For this reason, in contemporary international politics, the relationship between states and non-state actors cannot be explained through a simple opposition of “states are weakening, companies are becoming stronger.” In other words, while states are becoming increasingly dependent on the technical, financial, and data-based capacities of technology companies, they are simultaneously attempting to direct and regulate the activities of these companies in line with their own strategic priorities. This situation reveals a complex power relationship between states and technology companies in which elements of mutual dependence, competition, and control are intertwined.
The geopolitical consequences of this transformation became more evident, particularly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Ukraine War placed military power once again at the center of the European security architecture, increased the importance of NATO, led European countries to reassess their defense expenditures and military capabilities, and transformed their energy policies. At the same time, the war also raised questions regarding the extent to which fundamental principles of international law, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition on the use of force, could be implemented. The issue here is not merely the violation of international law. The fundamental problem is the extent to which international norms can be applied consistently across different crises and the degree to which great powers are influential in the implementation of these norms.
The war in Gaza has further complicated this legitimacy problem. The decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2024 to impose provisional measures within the framework of the case brought by South Africa against Israel under the Genocide Convention, and its subsequent confirmation of these measures while indicating that additional measures should be taken, demonstrates that international legal institutions continue to function, at least partially. In addition, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) decision in 2024 to issue arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant revealed that individual accountability mechanisms under international criminal law could also be activated. Therefore, an assessment stating that “international law has disappeared” would not be entirely accurate from an analytical perspective.
The main issue here is the growing gap between the existence of international law and the political and institutional capacity that enables the implementation of international principles. Indeed, the political resistance that emerged regarding the enforcement of the ICJ’s provisional measures and the ICC’s arrest warrants clearly demonstrates the tension between international law and the political preferences of states. The differing political responses in the contexts of Ukraine and Gaza have intensified debates regarding the consistency of Western states, particularly, on issues of international law and human rights. This situation demonstrates that one of the most fundamental problems of the international order is not merely the absence of rules, but rather the perception of selective application of those rules. Therefore, the central question of today’s crisis is not “Does law exist?” but rather “For whom, under what conditions, and with what capacity can law be implemented?”
At precisely this point, defining today’s international system merely as a “multipolar world” is insufficient. Multipolarity may explain the increase in the number of power centers; however, it is inadequate in explaining how these powers are distributed across different domains. Today, the actor that stands out in military power may not be the same actor that stands out in economic power. Elements of power such as technological capacity, financial strength, energy resources, demographic scale, and diplomatic influence are currently held by different states. Therefore, the emerging structure creates a multilayered and asymmetric distribution of power rather than a simple multipolarity. While the United States maintains its military and financial capacity, China is increasing its weight in the fields of production, trade, and technology; the European Union maintains its economic and normative capacity; India continues its demographic, economic, and technological rise; Russia seeks to preserve its influence through military capacity and energy resources; Gulf countries combine their energy, financial, and investment capacities with foreign policy instruments; and Türkiye is increasing its weight in the international system by utilizing its military capacity, defense industry, geostrategic position, economic potential, and regional diplomatic influence together. Therefore, the system of the future is transforming into a more complex structure not only where the number of states has increased, but also where different forms of power are concentrated in different centers.
The most important dimension of this transformation is the change in the concept of power itself. In the classical geopolitical understanding, territory, population, natural resources, and military capacity constituted the fundamental elements of state power. These elements continue to maintain their importance today. However, data, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, cyber capabilities, space technologies, digital infrastructures, and critical supply chains have been added to these elements. Thus, geopolitics and technopolitics have ceased to be alternatives to one another and have become two complementary fields of power.
The competition between the United States and China is the most concrete manifestation of this transformation. Advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, data centers, computing capacity, chip manufacturing equipment, and digital infrastructures are no longer merely elements of economic growth. They have simultaneously become strategic areas directly connected to defense capacity, intelligence, economic resilience, and national security. Therefore, access to technology, the capacity to produce technology, and the ability to control critical technology supply chains have become complementary elements of classical military capacity. The importance of semiconductors is particularly noteworthy in this context. The fact that a wide range of fields, from modern warfare systems and artificial intelligence applications to telecommunications and the automotive industry, depend on advanced chips has enabled a technological product occupying only a few square centimeters to create extremely broad consequences for global power balances.
This situation represents a process that goes beyond the “politicization of technology.” Politics itself is now being reshaped by technological capacity. A state’s ability to develop artificial intelligence models, access high-performance computing capacity, collect and process data, secure energy supplies, obtain advanced chips, and supply critical minerals is becoming one of the determining factors of its future economic and military power. Therefore, technology is not merely a tool that enhances existing power; it has become a strategic capacity that redefines the nature of power itself.
However, an important point should not be overlooked here. Technopolitical competition does not mean the end of classical geopolitics. Artificial intelligence systems require energy, data centers, physical infrastructure, and semiconductors in order to operate. Semiconductor production, in addition to advanced technology, depends on certain raw materials, water, energy, advanced manufacturing facilities, and global supply networks. From electric vehicles to defense systems, energy technologies, and high-tech production, the importance of critical minerals is increasing. Therefore, a new strategic link is being established between technology and natural resources. The power struggle of the future will therefore encompass, on the one hand, control over territory, energy, and natural resources, and on the other hand, control over data, algorithms, chips, and digital infrastructures. Technology is not replacing classical geopolitics; it is expanding its sphere of influence.
This transformation is also changing the future of international alliances. The continuation of NATO demonstrates that, contrary to the argument that alliances will disappear, security institutions continue to maintain their importance. However, the functions of alliances are transforming. States are attempting not only to rely on external security guarantees but also to strengthen their defense industry capacities, energy security, critical infrastructures, technology production, and supply chains. Thus, a new balance is being sought between collective security and strategic autonomy. This transformation is particularly evident from the European perspective. While the security partnership with the United States continues, Europe’s efforts to develop its own defense capacity, energy diversification, and strategic technological capabilities are becoming stronger. This situation does not indicate the end of alliances; rather, it points to a new era in which alliances are now being pursued together with policies of national resilience and strategic autonomy.
All these developments raise a fundamental question regarding the future of the international system: “Is a new world order being established?”. Although the concept of a “new world order” provides an explanatory framework for defining the current international transformation, it is necessary to examine to what extent this concept reflects the nature and scope of the ongoing transformation. Because speaking of a change in an international order cannot be reduced merely to the weakening of the existing power structure or the rise of certain actors. The emergence of a new order also requires the clarification of the institutions, rules, power relations, and understanding of legitimacy that will sustain this order. However, today’s international system still preserves its fundamental institutions, such as the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization; international law continues to function, and global trade and financial relations continue to exist, albeit in different forms. Nevertheless, the capacity of these institutions to respond to the changing distribution of power, their level of representation, and their political legitimacy are increasingly being questioned. This picture indicates not a rupture in which existing institutions have completely disappeared, but rather a transformation process in which the institutional and normative foundations of the old order have eroded, while emerging power relations have not yet stabilized within the framework of common rules and permanent institutions. Therefore, current developments reveal a long-term and uncertainty-shaped transition period in which the old order and emerging new power and normative structures coexist simultaneously, rather than a completed “new world order”.
The fundamental characteristic of this transition is contradiction. Protectionism is strengthening while global trade continues. States continue to use international institutions while simultaneously reinforcing national security policies. International law remains in force, while the influence of great powers over this law is being debated. Technology spreads globally, while export controls and strategic restrictions on critical technologies are increasing. States maintain their alliances while strengthening their search for strategic autonomy. Therefore, today’s international system is neither entirely a continuation of the old order nor completely the beginning of a new order. In other words, the old and the new exist simultaneously.
For this reason, explaining the current period solely through one of the concepts of “multipolarity,” “a new Cold War,” or “hegemonic transition” is insufficient. Each of these concepts explains a specific dimension of the transformation. From the perspective of great power competition, a hegemonic transition is taking place. In terms of power distribution, a multi-centered structure is emerging. Regarding US–China relations, a new strategic competition is developing. In the field of technology, a technopolitical transformation is occurring. The broader framework in which all these processes intersect is a complex transformation process where institutional continuity and systemic transformation are intertwined.
At this point, the following fundamental question gains importance: Who will determine the rules of the new world? After 1945, the answer to this question was largely shaped within the Western-centered institutional architecture led by the United States. Today, however, it no longer appears possible to answer this question through a single state. Although the United States remains one of the world’s most powerful military, financial, and technological actors, China’s economic and technological rise, India’s increasing weight, the European Union’s economic and normative capacity, Russia’s military power, Türkiye’s geostrategic position, developing defense industry, and regional diplomatic capacity, together with the increasing autonomy of regional powers, are making the reshaping of the international order more complex.
Moreover, the rules of the future will not be determined solely by states. Particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital platforms, and biotechnology, technology companies, scientific communities, international organizations, and civil society actors will increasingly play a role in the formation of standards and norms. However, this does not eliminate the importance of states. On the contrary, states will continue to maintain their central position as regulatory and protective actors, particularly in matters related to critical security, sovereignty, infrastructure, and strategic technologies. Therefore, the future international order will not be merely a system in which states compete with one another; rather, it will be a multi-actor structure in which states, international institutions, companies, and technology ecosystems simultaneously influence the formation of rules.
Artificial intelligence is particularly important in understanding how this new order will be shaped. Artificial intelligence is not merely a new technology; it has the potential to transform many dimensions of state capacity, ranging from economic production to defense, intelligence to diplomacy, public administration to information warfare. Questions such as which standards will be applied in the field of artificial intelligence, how algorithmic decisions will be regulated, how data will be protected, within what limits military artificial intelligence will be used, and which actors will have access to advanced models will determine the normative foundation of the international order in the coming period. Therefore, the international politics of the future will not only concern territory and borders; it will also be the politics of standards, algorithms, data flows, and technological infrastructures.
At this point, the fundamental competition of the new world order is shifting from the question of “Who is stronger?” to the question of “Who is able to determine the rules?”. Because economic size alone does not explain the capacity to establish rules. A state’s ability to determine technological standards, influence financial infrastructures, control critical supply chains, create diplomatic coalitions within international institutions, and transform its technological capabilities into global norms will become one of the fundamental elements of power capacity in the future. In this sense, the power to set standards emerges as a new form of strategic power alongside classical military and economic power.
It is not possible to argue that the international order established in 1945 has completely disappeared. Institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union remain important components of the international system. International law also continues to preserve its normative framework. However, the distribution of power within which these institutions emerged is no longer the same. The center of gravity of the global economy is shifting, the capacities of China and other rising powers are increasing, the relative superiority of the United States is facing greater competition, and technology has become one of the new determinants of international power. Therefore, the process being experienced is not the disappearance of institutions, but rather the necessity of redefining the functions of institutions in response to changing power relations.
This transformation also tests the normative foundation of the international system. The Russia–Ukraine War and the war in Gaza have created serious debates regarding the applicability of international law and human rights norms. However, rather than interpreting these crises as the end of international law, it would be more accurate to evaluate them as a growing gap between the implementation of norms and power politics. In terms of the future of the international system, the fundamental issue is not whether new rules will exist, but rather how universal, binding, and applicable these rules will be.
Therefore, the fundamental struggle of the coming period will not consist solely of the power competition between the United States and China. The real struggle will take place over the extent to which different centers of power will influence new technologies, economic networks, security institutions, and international norms. In this competition, military power will continue to maintain its importance; however, alongside military power, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, energy, critical minerals, data, cyber capabilities, space technologies, and strategic supply chains will also become central elements of power politics. Thus, the international system of the future will transform into a structure where classical geopolitics and technopolitical competition are intertwined.
Within this framework, the fundamental issue that will determine the future of the international system is not whether a new hegemon will replace the old hegemon. The more important question is how the changing distribution of power will be institutionalized. If the new order is shaped solely through a hierarchy of power in which military and economic superiority are decisive, a more competitive, hierarchical, and conflict-prone international system is likely to emerge. In contrast, if new institutional mechanisms can be developed that are capable of limiting great power competition, regulating technological developments, preventing the deepening of economic inequalities, and strengthening the applicability of international law, the existing system may be reproduced through transformation rather than disappearing completely.
Therefore, it is not sufficient to define the historical period we are experiencing merely as a “crisis of order”. Today’s international system is simultaneously undergoing interconnected processes such as hegemonic transition, economic restructuring, technological transformation, changes in security perceptions, and a crisis of normative legitimacy. These processes do not progress independently from one another; rather, they mutually shape each other. While economic competition affects technology policies and strategic investments, technological capacity transforms states’ security strategies and instruments of economic competition. Similarly, security concerns reshape trade and investment policies, while transformations in trade and finance directly affect the functioning and legitimacy of international institutions. Therefore, in today’s international system, the traditional boundaries between politics, economy, technology, and security are becoming increasingly intertwined.
This picture points not to an international system that has completely collapsed, but rather to a transitional order in which the existing institutional architecture struggles to accommodate changing power realities. A significant portion of the international institutions shaped after the Second World War still continue to exist. Institutions such as the United Nations, international financial organizations, NATO, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union remain fundamental actors of global and regional politics. However, the distribution of power, economic relations, technological capacities, and geopolitical conditions of the period in which these institutions emerged have changed significantly. Therefore, the issue is not primarily the complete disappearance of existing institutions, but rather the extent to which these institutions can represent changing power relations and respond to emerging areas of challenge.
At this point, the shaping of the future order will not depend solely on the material capacities possessed by great powers. Alongside the United States, China, the European Union, India, Russia, and rising regional powers, international organizations, multinational corporations, and especially major technology companies are becoming increasingly influential in the formation of the new order. However, the determining factor is not only which actor possesses greater economic or military power. The essential factor is the ability to transform existing material and technological capacities into rules, standards, institutions, and sources of legitimacy at the international level. In this sense, lasting influence in international politics derives not only from the capacity to compel the behavior of others, but also from the capacity to create rules, standards, and institutional frameworks capable of guiding the behavior of other actors.
From this perspective, the fundamental question for the future international system cannot be narrowed down to whether the “American order” will be replaced by a “Chinese order.” The more comprehensive question is whether a new institutional compromise capable of reflecting the changing distribution of power and interdependence relations of the 21st century can emerge. If such a compromise is achieved, it may become possible to restructure existing institutions and establish an international order that is more inclusive, possesses greater representational capacity, and better reflects changes in the distribution of power. Conversely, if an institutional compromise among great powers does not emerge, the possibility of the international system entering a prolonged period of fragmentation, bloc formation, strategic competition, and selective application of rules may become stronger.
Therefore, the question “Who will determine the rules of the 21st century?” included in the title of this analysis is not merely a rhetorical question. It represents one of the fundamental theoretical and practical problems of contemporary international politics. Today, there is no single and definitive answer to this question. Nevertheless, current developments demonstrate that the rules of the old order have not completely disappeared, but that an increasingly visible incompatibility has emerged between these rules, the power relations of the period in which they were established, and today’s economic, technological, and geopolitical realities. Therefore, the international order of the future will depend on the interaction between the complete dismantling of old institutional structures and the integration of new power centers into the existing system.
Within this framework, it is still too early to characterize the coming period as an already completed “new world order”. In other words, today represents a “transition period” in which rules, institutions, and power relations are being renegotiated. As a result of this transition, it has not yet been determined whether a more pluralistic, multilateral, and rules-based international system will emerge, or whether a more fragmented, bloc-based, and competitive order in which power centers establish their own spheres of influence will take shape. However, this uncertainty itself constitutes the fundamental characteristic of the period in which we are living. Because while the institutions of the existing system continue to exist, the principles, distributions of power, and rules upon which these institutions will operate in the future are being reconsidered.
Moreover, the shaping of the future international order will not occur solely through traditional diplomatic negotiations or military power balances. Chip production capacity, data centers, artificial intelligence laboratories, energy infrastructures, critical minerals, digital networks, and global financial systems are increasingly becoming fundamental elements of international power generation. These areas are not only determinants of economic competition but also of strategic autonomy, national security, and technological sovereignty. Therefore, the power struggle of the 21st century extends beyond classical military capabilities and economic size; it also encompasses the ability to access and regulate critical technologies, data flows, production chains, financial networks, and global standards.
Finally, it can be stated that the rules of the new world will not necessarily be written only by actors possessing the strongest military force, the largest economy, or the most advanced technology. What will be decisive here is the emergence of actors capable of transforming military, economic, and technological capacity into international rules, standards, institutions, and norms that generate legitimacy. Therefore, the international order of the future will not simply be the result of a transfer of power in which one hegemon replaces another. The essential issue is how the changing distribution of power will be institutionalized and to what extent this new institutional structure will generate legitimacy. The future of the international system will largely depend on the answer to this question. In other words, the rules of the new world will not be written only by the most powerful actors, but by those capable of transforming power into rules, technology into standards, economic capacity into institutional influence, and strategic superiority into legitimacy.
