United States (US) President Donald Trump, through an executive order issued on 16 October 2026, has exempted a significant portion of the new economic sanctions and additional tariffs against Russia from taking effect. The decision covers measures envisaged under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, adopted on 18 September 2026. The additional tariffs planned for the principal buyers of Russian energy products and for countries that facilitate the circumvention of sanctions have been waived.[i] While the existing sanctions regime remains in force, the non-implementation of the new measures has made visible the tension between Washington’s capacity to increase economic pressure on Russia and the costs this policy may generate.
The institutional dimension of the decision is important for understanding the uncertainty in US sanctions policy. The law adopted by Congress provides for an additional tariff of 500% on goods imported from Russia, and of 100% on the five largest importers of Russian energy products and the five main countries that help circumvent sanctions. However, Section 115 of the law grants the President the authority to issue waivers on national interest grounds. The Trump administration’s use of this authority shows that the legal possibility of economic sanctions does not mean that they will be enforced politically. Accordingly, the credibility of a sanctions threat depends not only on a state’s economic capacity but also on the will of decision-makers to use that capacity.
This development reveals one of the fundamental dilemmas of geoeconomic coercion. Economic sanctions rest on turning trade and financial relations into an instrument of pressure in order to change the behavior of the target state. However, interdependence in the global economy can expose the sanctioning state to direct or indirect costs as well. Russia’s energy exports are one concrete example of this relationship. According to September 2026 data, China and India are among the principal buyers of Russian fossil fuels. Of India’s roughly €4.1 billion in fossil fuel imports from Russia in the same month, €3.6 billion consisted of crude oil.[ii] This trade network shows that efforts to limit Moscow’s energy revenues are directly linked to the economic choices of third countries.
If Washington maintains the waivers, the first scenario is that additional economic pressure on Russia remains limited. In this case, Moscow will continue to bear the costs created by existing sanctions, but the potential of the new tariffs to reduce demand for Russian energy cannot be tested through direct implementation. The extent to which this will contribute to Russia’s war economy will depend on oil prices, export volumes and the preferences of alternative buyers. The 8% month-on-month increase in Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports in September 2026 is an example showing that energy flows can continue despite sanctions.[iii] However, an increase in export volume does not directly translate into an increase in revenue. Price discounts, shipping costs and financial restrictions also determine the effectiveness of sanctions.
The second scenario is that the US reassesses the waivers and puts secondary sanctions into effect. While this option would create additional pressure on Russia’s energy revenues, it could also increase the risk of commercial tension with major economies such as China and India. The Indian case in particular shows how sanctions policy is intertwined with diplomatic bargaining. In February 2026, Washington removed the additional 25% tariff on India, citing New Delhi’s commitments to stop importing Russian oil.[iv] This practice shows that economic pressure can be relaxed to encourage behavioral change. Therefore, the October waiver decision should not be interpreted as the US abandoning secondary sanctions tools altogether. Washington retains these tools as a source of leverage that can be reused in future negotiations.
However, reinstating the sanctions could have broader economic consequences owing to the fragility of energy markets. According to the International Energy Agency’s October 2026 report, owing to the impact of conflicts in the Middle East on supply, the average price of North Sea Dated crude oil reached $116.89 per barrel in September. In the same period, global diesel exports fell by 700,000 barrels per day on an annual basis.[v] Under these conditions, additional restrictions on Russian energy exports could heighten price pressure if alternative sources of supply prove inadequate. Given the effects of energy costs on inflation and economic activity, it becomes difficult for Washington to assess its Russia policy independently of its domestic economic priorities. This shows how a sanctioning state’s own economic vulnerabilities can constrain its foreign policy choices.
The third scenario is a divergence between the economic pressure policies of the US and the European Union (EU) towards Russia. On 12 October 2026, the EU adopted new sanctions covering 826 companies operating in Russia’s military-industrial complex and 743 individuals who manage these companies.[vi] Targeting in particular the supply chains of components used in the production of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and other military systems, this decision reflects Brussels’s approach of increasing pressure on Russia’s war capacity. Washington’s granting of waivers from the new sanctions, by contrast, signals a different trend in terms of transatlantic coordination. In a scenario where Europe expands restrictions while the US prioritizes energy markets and its relations with third countries, the cohesion of joint pressure on Russia could weaken. At the same time, Europe’s continuing commercial ties to Russian energy products show that Brussels, too, cannot act entirely independently of economic dependencies. Therefore, a possible transatlantic divergence can also be explained by differences in the parties’ capacities to bear economic costs.
For Ukraine, the common outcome of these scenarios is uncertainty about the effect of economic sanctions on diplomatic bargaining power. The Kyiv government argues that Washington’s decision may reduce pressure on Moscow.[vii] However, maintaining a sanctions threat and implementing it produce different outcomes. If the US reassesses the waivers depending on future negotiations, economic pressure could turn into a conditional diplomatic instrument. Conversely, if the waivers continue for a long time, Russia may come to see the threat of new sanctions as less of a deterrent. In either case, the effectiveness of sanctions will depend as much on the magnitude of economic costs as on the predictability of Washington’s future decisions.
In conclusion, the US decision to forgo implementing new sanctions on Russia offers an important example for assessing the limits economic coercion faces in the international system. China and India’s energy demand, global supply conditions, the US’s domestic economic priorities and Europe’s security policies are not independent of one another. In this framework, the October 2026 decision shows not that the US lacks instruments of economic pressure, but that its capacity to use these instruments can be constrained by relations of international interdependence. The future effectiveness of sanctions, in turn, will depend on Washington’s willingness to bear economic costs, the reactions of third countries and the sustainability of transatlantic coordination.
[i] “Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026”, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/, (Accessed: 17.10.2026).
[ii] “September 2026 — Monthly Analysis of Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions”, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, https://energyandcleanair.org/september-2026-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/, (Accessed: 17.10.2026).
[iii] “Russia September Crude Exports Rise 8% on Month, Despite Fresh Sanctions”, S&P Global, https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/refined-products/100526-russia-september-crude-exports-rise-8-on-month-despite-fresh-sanctions, (Accessed: 17.10.2026).
[iv] “Modifying Duties to Address Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation”, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/modifying-duties-to-address-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-the-russian-federation-04b2/, (Accessed: 17.10.2026).
[v] “Oil Market Report – October 2026”, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-october-2026, (Accessed: 17.10.2026).
[vi] “EU Adopts Largest-Ever Package of Listings Against Russia”, European Commission, https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-largest-ever-package-listings-against-russia-2026-10-12_en, (Accessed: 17.10.2026).
[vii] “Trump Waives Key Russia-Related Sanctions, Tariffs Before They Take Effect Under New Law”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-waives-many-russia-related-sanctions-tariffs-before-they-were-take-effect-2026-10-17/, (Accessed: 17.10.2026).
