Relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) have a history of almost sixty years and have witnessed various political, economic and strategic transformations over this long period. Turkey’s application for association with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 was considered as an important and strategic step towards integration with the West. This application was followed by the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which established an institutionalized partnership relationship between the parties. The agreement aimed to ensure Turkey’s gradual integration into the EEC internal market and to prepare it for eventual full membership.
As a matter of fact, the Additional Protocol, which was signed in 1970 and entered into force three years later, envisioned Turkey’s gradual elimination of customs duties towards the EEC and the gradual establishment of free trade. However, political instability, economic crises and especially the Cyprus issue in the 1970s had negative effects on bilateral relations. As a result of these developments, Turkey-EC relations came to a serious halt with the military coup in 1980. However, Turkey’s application for full membership in 1987 led to a revival in bilateral relations. However, this application was not processed by the European Commission due to both the unfavorable political conditions of the period and Turkey’s structural incapacities.
As the EU accelerated its internal integration process in the 1990s, a new dynamism emerged in Turkey-EU relations. In this context, the Customs Union Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1996, significantly deepened Turkey’s economic integration with the Union. Within the framework of this agreement, Turkey abolished customs duties on industrial products and committed to harmonize with the EU’s common foreign trade policy. Thus, Turkey’s harmonization process with the EU acquis gained momentum and an important basis was created to overcome the technical barriers to full membership.
On the other hand, the fact that Turkey was not granted candidate status at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, whereas Central and Eastern European countries were granted candidacy, caused a serious rupture in Turkey-EU relations and created a deep disappointment in the Turkish public opinion. However, this negative atmosphere dissipated with the official recognition of Turkey’s candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, thus giving an institutional dimension to Turkey’s full membership perspective. With this development, Turkey-EU relations regained momentum and reform processes accelerated, especially in the context of political criteria. In 2001, the Accession Partnership Document set out short and medium-term priorities for Turkey, and the National Program, which was prepared in response, demonstrated Turkey’s commitment and determination to align with the EU acquis.
During this period, Turkey implemented comprehensive constitutional and legal reforms in areas such as human rights, rule of law and freedom of expression. The implementation of these reforms with political determination attracted the attention of the EU institutions. As a matter of fact, the European Council Summit convened in December 2004 decided to open full membership negotiations with Turkey and accordingly, negotiations officially started on October 3, 2005. Thus, Turkey-EU relations entered a new and more complex phase and the accession process started to move forward in a comprehensive framework that includes not only technical acquis harmonization but also compliance with political criteria.
However, the transformation of this perspective into concrete achievements has become increasingly difficult over time due to both Turkey’s domestic political transformations and the breaks in the EU’s enlargement policies. In particular, the full membership negotiations, which started in 2005, provided an institutional framework for Turkey’s harmonization with the EU acquis, but structural and political problems in the following years caused this process to slow down and, in some areas, even come to a complete halt. In this process, the EU has become increasingly harsh in its criticism of Turkey, which Ankara has often interpreted as an interference in its sovereignty. On the other hand, some structural problems, particularly the Cyprus issue, reinforced the perception that the EU applied double standards towards Turkey during the enlargement process. Indeed, in 2004, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) gained full membership status despite the settlement process, which seriously damaged Turkey’s faith in EU membership.
In parallel, Turkey’s adoption of a more autonomous and multidimensional foreign policy course since the second half of the 2010s has further limited the possibility of coordination with the EU. In particular, Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia, its positions in the Middle East crises, its Syria policy and the energy-based tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean have led to debates in the EU about whether Turkey is a reliable partner. In 2016, the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the coup attempt raised concerns of democratic backsliding in Western capitals, particularly in Brussels, and the accession process was largely suspended. Thus, Turkey-EU relations have moved away from normative foundations and evolved into a structure based more on strategic and functional cooperation.
At this point, cooperation between the parties in areas such as migration, energy supply security, counterterrorism and customs functioning started to develop on a level independent of the membership process. In particular, the 2016 Turkey-EU Migration Statement stands out as one of the most concrete examples of this new relationship. In addition, Turkey’s strategic location on energy transit routes has made it an indispensable geopolitical partner for the EU. Moreover, Turkey’s influence in instability-producing regions such as the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean has made it imperative for the EU to reconsider its relations with Ankara in terms of its security architecture.
In the light of all these developments, it is clear that the goal of full membership in the classical sense has been shifted away and relations have gradually shifted towards a “functional partnership”. This new form of relationship is defined in some academic circles as “partnership with special status” or “differentiated integration” and the applicability of a similar model for Turkey is discussed, inspired by the examples of Norway, Switzerland or the post-Brexit United Kingdom. For Turkey, although the goal of full membership has not been officially abandoned, there is growing interest in a more egalitarian and mutually beneficial partnership formula in the current conjuncture.
In this context, the European Political Community meetings, in which Turkey has been actively participating in recent years, offer a new perspective on relations between the parties. This platform, which started with the Prague Summit in 2022, aims to create a multi-layered political dialogue between EU members and candidate and potential candidate countries and encourages cooperation in key areas such as security, energy, infrastructure and economy. Turkey’s participation reflects the parties’ desire to develop a flexible and inclusive cooperation model rather than mutually exclusive. The high-level dialogue meetings held within the framework of the EPC emphasize that Turkey is an actor that cannot be excluded from the European security architecture and its political future, while sending important signals to the EU that strategic dialogue with Turkey should be institutionalized. These meetings have the potential to lay the groundwork for a cooperation that is independent of membership but as deep as membership, and are considered as a functional tool in the redefinition of Turkey-EU relations.
A sustainable and institutionalized foundation for future Turkey-EU relations can only be achieved by rebuilding mutual trust between the parties. In this context, updating the Customs Union and extending it to the digital economy, agriculture and services sectors could bring new dynamism to the economic dimension of relations. Moreover, the completion of the visa liberalization process is not only a technical issue, but will also contribute significantly to social interaction and mutual understanding.
Although Turkey-EU relations were initially built around the goal of full membership, this goal has been replaced by a more flexible and functional relationship based on strategic partnership. This transformation is influenced not only by Turkey’s internal dynamics, but also by the EU’s institutional capacity, political will and changes in the balance of power in the international system. Therefore, a future partnership model that is independent of the membership perspective but as inclusive as membership, based on mutual interest and multi-layered, stands out as a more realistic and viable option for both sides.
